

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

EXPLORING THE DYNAMICS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

by

Gerald Axel Möller

March 1995

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Donald Abenheim
David Yost

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EXPLORING THE DYNAMICS
OF THE
YUGOSLAV CRISIS

Gerald A. Möller
Commander SG, German Navy
B.S., German Armed Forces University Munich, 1980

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 1995

Author:

Gerald A. Möller

Gerald A. Möller

Approved by:

Donald Abenheim

Donald Abenheim, Thesis Co-Advisor

David Yost

David Yost, Thesis Co-Advisor

Thomas C. Bruneau

Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (ABSTRACT)

Diese Diplomarbeit erkundet die Dynamik der Krise in Jugoslawien. Drei herausragende Ereignisse stehen hervor und sind besonders bedeutend: ethnisch verankerter Nationalismus, ökonomischer Niedergang und die Veränderungen im Feld der internationalen Sicherheitspolitik. Ethnisch verankerter Nationalismus wurde manifest beim Wettstreit um Landbesitz und politische Vorherrschaft unter den Serben, Kroaten, Bosniens Moslems und anderen. Ethnisch verankerter Nationalismus hat jahrhundertalte Wurzeln und kam erneut zum Vorschein in den Jahren nach 1980, zum einen Teil, weil Tito im Jahre 1980 starb, zum anderen Teil auf Grund der ökonomischen Mißwirtschaft der achtziger Jahre. Dies führte zur Suche nach Sündenböcken und verstärkte Mißgunst und Rivalität zwischen den Bevölkerungsgruppen. Die bedeutendsten Veränderungen im Feld der internationalen Sicherheitspolitik war der Zusammenbruch der Sowjet Union, welcher half, den Konflikt in ehemaligen Jugoslawien zu beschleunigen. Die Bedrohung durch die Sowjets stand nicht länger zur Verfügung, um die zusammengesetzten Nationalitäten der Jugoslawischen Föderation zu vereinen, und sie zur Zusammenarbeit zu verpflichten. Der Konflikt in Jugoslawien kann sich ausbreiten, wenn nicht internationale Sicherheits-Organisationen wie NATO und die Vereinten Nationen Lösungen formulieren können. Ihr Versagen beim Bemühen den Konflikt einzugrenzen und zu lösen könnte ein gefährliches Beispiel setzen.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXPLORING THE DYNAMICS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

Gerald A. Möller – Commander SG, German Navy

B.S., German Armed Forces University Munich, 1980

Master of Arts in National Security Affairs – March 1995

Co-Advisors: Donald Abenheim and David Yost,

Department of National Security Affairs

This thesis explores the dynamics of the Yugoslav conflict. Three factors stand out as especially important: ethnic nationalism, economic dislocation, and changes in the international security environment. Ethnic nationalism has been manifest in the competition for territory and political dominance among the Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and others. This ethnic nationalism has centuries-old roots, but came to the fore in the 1980s, owing to the death of Tito in 1980 and the economic setbacks of the 1980s, which led to a search for scapegoats and intensified inter-ethnic mistrust and rivalry. The most important change in the security environment was the collapse of the Soviet Union, which helped to precipitate the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Soviet threat was no longer present to unify the component nationalities of the Yugoslav federation and to oblige them to cooperate. The Yugoslav conflict may spread unless international security institutions such as NATO and the United Nations can devise solutions. Their failure in this effort to contain and resolve the conflict could set a dangerous example.

An important continuity in Balkan history has been Serb nationalism, pursued by violence against other ethno-national groups in the Balkans. Historical analysis shows that the first Yugoslav state (1919-1941) failed, in part because it did not resolve the national question. In 1919 and again in 1945, the state of Yugoslavia was created on the basis of a political idea, with little cultural or historical content. On each occasion, the idea of a united Yugoslavia was imposed from above and conceived bureaucratically rather than democratically. On each occasion, Yugoslavia

disintegrated over the national question. Serb-Croat antagonism remains at the core of today's hostilities.

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in large part from Serbia's struggle to dominate what is left of the former Yugoslavia. The Serbs living in Bosnia and Croatia did not want to live in states that would separate them from Serbia proper. The Serbs declared a 'Serb Republic of the Krajina' (where in March 1995 the Serbs occupy 30 percent of Croatia's territory) and a 'Serb Republic' (which holds 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina). In reaction to this Serb behavior the Croats living in Bosnia announced a 'Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna.' This left only about 20 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- a multi-ethnic state and former showcase of peaceful ethnic coexistence -- for the Muslim population, landlocked and divided in six enclaves. The vital problem for Bosnia's President Alija Izetbegović has been that the Muslims have virtually nothing to offer either the Croats or the Serbs.

The limited interest of the superpowers -- and especially the limited interest of the United States -- in the fate of the former Yugoslavia forced European leaders to confront the Yugoslav problem. For several different reasons both the trans-Atlantic and the European regional security organizations failed to resolve the crisis and bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. The institutional settings were too weak to deal with the problem, and reflected the lack of political will of the member governments. The adaptation to the post-Cold War era had just begun.

In the first six months of the crisis, in 1991, American, British and French diplomacy seemed to be fairly pro-Serb, whereas Germany was more sympathetic to Slovene and Croat claims. When the United Nations appeared on the scene in 1992, mediation and dialogue with all parties became the official rule. Classic impartiality supported the status quo in occupied territory and thus hampered humanitarian aid to reach the victims. The nations acting together in global or regional security organizations -- the U.N., CSCE/OSCE, E.C./EU, WEU and NATO -- could only partially counterbalance with burden-sharing the challenges

raised by the Yugoslav crisis. This crisis has re-established the United Nations as the sole practicable international authority to mobilize military force for hazardous interventions abroad. Experience has also shown that the absence of U.S. leadership has undermined prospects for achieving the aims laid down in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

The United States in spring 1995 is back on the scene, with the Clinton administration returning to its 1992 "lift-and-strike" proposal in a changed environment. The United States seizing the diplomatic initiative may encourage the United Nations to move more decisively towards re-establishing international order and preventing the aggressors from being rewarded. The March 1995 U.S. initiative to restore Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia has presented Milošević with an unexpected *fait accompli* in Croatia. It is for the international community to join the initiative, to work out a solution for the minority status of twelve percent of the population, the "Serbian Croats" presently occupying 30 percent of Croatia's territory.

The United Nations implementation of a revised Yugoslavia policy, with the United States taking the lead, might stop the Serbian attempt to dominate the region militarily. The United Nations could live up to its commitment to prevent and never again permit atrocities like those carried out during the Second World War.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)

DIE DYNAMIK DER KRISE IN JUGOSLAWIEN

**Gerald A. Möller –Fregattenkapitän,
Bundesmarine der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Diplompädagoge, Bundeswehr Universität München, 1980
Master of Arts in National Security Affairs – März 1995
Diplomarbeitsbetreuer:
Professor Dr. Donald Abenheim und Professor Dr. David Yost,
Department of National Security Affairs**

Diese Diplomarbeit erkundet die Dynamik der Krise in Jugoslawien. Drei herausragende Ereignisse stehen hervor und sind besonders bedeutend: ethnisch verankerter Nationalismus, ökonomischer Niedergang und die Veränderungen im Feld der internationalen Sicherheitspolitik. Ethnisch verankerter Nationalismus wurde manifest beim Wettstreit um Landbesitz und politische Vorherrschaft unter den Serben, Kroaten, Bosniern, Moslems und anderen. Ethnisch verankerter Nationalismus hat jahrhundertalte Wurzeln und kam erneut zum Vorschein in den Jahren nach 1980, zum einen Teil, weil Tito im Jahre 1980 starb, zum anderen Teil auf Grund der ökonomischen Mißwirtschaft der achtziger Jahre. Dies führte zur Suche nach Sündenböcken und verstärkte Mißgunst und Rivalität zwischen den Bevölkerungsgruppen. Die bedeutendsten Veränderungen im Feld der internationalen Sicherheitspolitik war der Zusammenbruch der Sowjet Union, welcher half, den Konflikt in ehemaligen Jugoslawien zu beschleunigen. Die Bedrohung durch die Sowjets stand nicht länger zur Verfügung, um die zusammengesetzten Nationalitäten der Jugoslawischen Föderation zu vereinen, und sie zur Zusammenarbeit zu verpflichten. Der Konflikt in Jugoslawien kann sich ausbreiten, wenn nicht internationale Sicherheits-Organisationen wie NATO und die Vereinten Nationen Lösungen formulieren können. Ihr Versagen beim Bemühen den Konflikt einzugrenzen und zu lösen könnte ein gefährliches Beispiel setzen.

Eine bedeutende Kontinuität in der Geschichte des Balkan ist der Nationalismus der Serben, das Streben der Serben nach einem serbischen Nationalstaat, das mit Gewalt verfolgt wird gegen die anderen ethnischen Nationalitätengruppierungen auf dem Balkan. Geschichtliche Analyse zeigt, daß der erste jugoslawische Staat (1919-1941) zerbrach, zum Teil weil er die

Nationalitätenfrage nicht zu lösen vermochte. Im Jahre 1919 und nochmals im Jahre 1945 wurde Jugoslawien als Staat auf der Grundlage einer politischen Idee geschaffen, mit wenig kultureller und geschichtlicher Stimmigkeit. Bei beiden Gelegenheiten, wurde die Idee eines Vereinigten Jugoslawien 'von oben verordnet' und dadurch eher bürokratisch als demokratisch wahrgenommen. Beidesmal zerbrach Jugoslawien an der Nationalitätenfrage. Der serbisch-kroatische Gegensatz verbleibt als der Kern der heutigen Feindseligkeiten.

Der Konflikt in Bosnien-Herzegovina rührt zum großen Teil von den Serben's Kampf her, das zu beherrschen, was vom ehemaligen Jugoslawien übergeblieben ist. Die in Bosnien und Kroatien lebenden Serben wollen nicht in Staaten leben, getrennt von einem Nationalstaat Serbien. Serben verkündeten eine "Serbische Republik Krajina", (wobei Serben im März 1995 dreißig Prozent vom Hoheitsgebiet von Kroatien besetzt halten), und eine "Serbische Republik", (die siebzig Prozent des Hoheitsgebiets von Bosnien-Herzegovina umfasst). Als Reaktion zum Vorgehen der Serben verkündeten die in Bosnien lebenden Kroaten eine "Kroatische Union von Herceg-Bosna". Dies läßt von Bosnien-Herzegovina -- jenem Vielvölkerstaat und Schaufenster friedlichen Zusammenlebens -- nur ganze zwanzig Prozent für die moslemische Bevölkerung übrig, umringt von Nachbarstaaten, ohne Adria-Hafen und auf sechs Enklaven verteilt. Das entscheidende Problem für Bosniens Präsidenten Alija Izetbegović besteht seitdem darin, daß die Moslems weder den Kroaten noch den Serben irgendetwas anzubieten haben.

Das begrenzte Interesse der Supermächte -- und besonders das eingeschränkte Interesse der Vereinigten Staaten -- am Schicksal des ehemaligen Jugoslawien zwang die europäischen Regierungschefs sich mit dem Problem Jugoslawien auseinander zu setzen. Aus mehreren verschiedenen Gründen verfehlten beide, die transatlantischen als auch die regionalen europäischen Sicherheitsorganisationen, die Krise zu lösen und Frieden in das ehemalige Jugoslawien zu bringen. Die verfassungsmäßigen Grundlagen waren zu schwach ausgelegt, um das Problem aushandeln zu können, auch spiegelten sie den Mangel an politischer Bestimmtheit der Regierungen der Mitgliederstaaten wider. Die Anpassung an die Zeit nach dem kalten Krieg hatte gerade erst begonnen.

In den ersten sechs Monaten der Krise, im Jahre 1991, erschienen die amerikanischen, britischen und französischen diplomatischen Bemühungen eher serbenfreundlich; während Deutschlands Sympathie eher mit den Slovenen und den

Kroaten ging. Als die Vereinten Nationen im Jahre 1992 die Bühne betraten, wurden Vermittlung und Dialog mit allen Beteiligten die offizielle Norm. Klassische Unparteilichkeit unterstützte indes den *status quo* in den besetzten Gebieten, ihre Folgen hinderte humanitäre Hilfe daran, die Opfer zu erreichen. Mit der jugoslawischen Krise wurden Herausforderungen an die internationale Staatengemeinschaft gestellt, die Nationen, welche in weltweiten und regionalen Sicherheitsorganisationen zusammenarbeiten -- den V.N., KSZE/OSZE, EG/EU, WEU und NATO --, nur teilweise durch Lastenteilung meistern und ausgleichen konnten. Die Krise in Jugoslawien hat die Vereinten Nationen als die einzige handlungsfähige überstaatliche Autorität wiederhergestellt, die in der Lage ist, Streitkräfte zu mobilisieren für gefährliche Einsätze weltweit. Die Erfahrung hat ebenfalls gelehrt, daß die Abwesenheit der Vereinigten Staaten in der Führungsrolle die Aussichten untergraben konnte, diejenigen Ziele zu erreichen, welche in den Verlautbarungen des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen niedergelegt wurden.

Im Frühjahr 1995 kehrten die Vereingten Staaten auf die Bühne zurück, wobei sich die Clinton-Regierung ihrem Vorschlag von 1992 zugunsten "lift-and-strike" (d.h. Aufheben des Waffenembargos und chirurgische Aktionen durch die Luftwaffe) in veränderter Umgebung erneut zuwandte. Indem die Vereingten Staaten die Führung der diplomatischen Initiative an sich nehmen, vermögen sie die Vereinten Nationen zu ermutigen, bei der Wiederherstellung der internationalen Ordnung bestimmter voranzuschreiten und Angreifer davon abzuhalten, belohnt zu werden. Die amerikanische Initiative im März 1995, welche die Souveränität Kroatiens widerherzustellen soll für alle Gebiete ganz Kroatiens, hat Milosević unerwartet in Kroatien vor vollendete Tatsachen gestellt. Es ist der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft anheim gestellt der Initiative zu folgen und an einer Lösung mitzuarbeiten für den Minderheitenschutz für diejenigen zwölf Prozent der Bevölkerung, die serbischen Kroaten, welche derzeit dreißig Prozent vom Hoheitsgebiet von Kroatien besetzt halten.

Wenn die Vereinten Nationen eine überarbeitete Jugoslawien-Politik durchsetzen, angeführt von den Vereinigten Staaten, mag dies den Versuch Serbiens beenden, die Region militärisch zu beherrschen. Die Vereinten Nationen könnten dann zu ihrer Bestimmung aufleben, nie wieder Grausamkeiten gegen die Menschlichkeit zuzulassen, wie sie im Verlauf des Zweiten Weltkrieges ausgeübt wurden.

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I. INTRODUCTION: WHY AND HOW TO EXPLORE THE DYNAMICS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

Yugoslavia's nightmare has been underway since mid-1991.

The first great mistake of European and American diplomacy in the Yugoslav crisis was a failure to diagnose what had gone wrong. Or worse, and [Misha Glenny suspects] nearer the truth, they realized the country was breaking apart but considered the squabbles of a rather unappealing group of Balkan politicians to be insignificant when measured against the drama of the Gulf War and the rapid erosion of the Soviet Union. (President Bush's desire to prevent the latter was reflected in James Baker's demand in Belgrade that Yugoslavia remain whole.) The steady disintegration of Yugoslavia led to dramatic shifts in identity and consciousness among the peoples who lived there. This was one of the most terrible times in their history. As in a bad dream, they were being dragged into an inferno, aware of the fate awaiting them and unable to do anything about it.¹

This observation underscores the importance and relevance of exploring the dynamics of the Yugoslav crisis. This introduction to the thesis outlines the methodology and theories used to understand the events. The theories employed concern ethnic nationalism, economic decline and dislocation, and changes in the external security environment. The Balkans are analyzed as a region influenced by global and regional organizations for defense and collective security; and a historic overview of Yugoslavia's political development is provided. Finally, the purpose and the plan of this thesis are addressed.

A. IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE

This thesis argues that despite all the efforts already undertaken to bring the war to an end in the former Yugoslav federation, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a solution acceptable to all parties has yet to be defined. It explores the dynamics of the Yugoslav conflict with a view to identifying possible solutions. This study is

¹ Glenny, Misha, "Yugoslavia: The Great Fall" in: *The New York Review of Books* (New York, volume XLII, number 5, March 23, 1995), p. 56.

important because the war of Yugoslav succession has already caused incalculable suffering and loss and could lead to a longer and wider war. The Balkan region is relevant because United States and Western interests are involved in the Bosnia conflict. The war is also relevant to Western Europe, because this conflict may spread and because internationally agreed commitments to human rights are being violated. The credibility of international security institutions such as NATO and the United Nations (UN) is at stake and their failure could set a dangerous precedence.

B. METHODOLOGY AND THEORIES

The methodology used is qualitative historical analysis, based on primary and secondary sources. Sources include books, periodicals, and scholarly journals on current events and Balkan history and about international relations theory. Daily newspapers and press releases are also incorporated.

The theories useful in explaining the dynamics of the ongoing crisis concern ethnic nationalism, economic collapse and changes in the external security environment.

In 1985 it became obvious that the cohesion of the Yugoslav Federation was breaking down. That cohesion had resulted from Tito's unique position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (the external security environment) and successful economic support by the West, which enabled the Yugoslav Communists to create relative prosperity in Yugoslavia compared to the rest of the Communist world. In order to stay in power Serbia's President Milošević successfully recreated cohesion within his Serbian ethnic group through the use of ethnic nationalism. He revived the idea of a Greater Serbia.

1. Ethnic Nationalism

Yugoslavia was never able to create Yugoslav nationalism. A Yugoslav identity as a basis for patriotism was never achieved, despite temporary purposeful close amalgamations of the Yugoslav peoples of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia and Macedonia. The separate peoples never forgot their national agendas.

It is a well-known constant of political life that even slight differences in interregional economic standards may awaken sharp feelings of resentment that catalyze, where they coincide with ethnic divisions, surges of nationalism. Jealousy kindles collective affectivity and ethnocentric behavior, often resulting in violence and even civil war.²

The revived Serb nationalism provoked imitations: Croatia's President Tudjman created Croatism and Macedonia's President Gligorov turned towards the idea of a "Greater Macedonia." Serb, Croat and Macedonian nationalism are all examples of "hyper-nationalism", which Stephen van Evera defines as the

glorification of one's national character, history, symbols, religion, etc, and of the rightness and legitimacy of one's case, while maligning the claims of others.³

The leaders of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia (after 1989) embarked on nationalism because, as Kissinger wrote:

...the ethnic splinters from disintegrating empires, such as the successor states of Yugoslavia ...are obsessed by historic grievances and age-old quests for identity, they strive primarily to prevail in ancient ethnic rivalries. The goal of international order is beyond their fields of interest and frequently behind their imagination.⁴

This situation was only possible because of Yugoslavia's economic decline, which began in the early 1980s and accelerated in 1989. Additionally this situation was the result of the change in the external security setting, with the threat of the

² Ramet, Sabrina P., *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia* (Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1992), 2nd Ed., p. 136.

³ van Evera, Stephen, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War" in: *International Security* (1991), pp. 23-24.

⁴ Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 807.

Soviet Union gone by 1991. Both events led to the breakdown of the allocation of responsibilities and powers in the federal system of Yugoslavia.

2. Economic Decline and Dislocation

The federal units, administrative areas created by Tito, were economically very different developed. With regard to these interregional inequalities, Sabrina Ramet writes that,

...the policy of aid to the underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia was viewed by the Tito regime and the Titoists who ruled Yugoslavia after his death from 1980 to 1987, as the key to eliminate the nationalities question altogether.

...Alternatively, the failure to ease interregional inequalities, it was argued, 'would threaten the integrity of the Yugoslav community and throw into question the common interest of all its regions and nationalities'.⁵

After the failure of numerous five-year and one-year plans a common fund was raised to foster development. In

February 1965, the federal Assembly passed a bill creating the Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo (FADURK)....The fund was to be financed by a 1.85 percent tax on the social product, to be paid by all federal units....Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo were declared eligible for assistance under the new program.⁶

The controversy between the republics about where to invest the money led to polemics instead of encouraging development.

The trick of Yugoslav federalism -- if it is to work -- must be to accomplish the Madisonian feat and so arrange the political order that

⁵ Ramet, Sabrina P., *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, 1992, p. 137.

⁶ Ramet, Sabrina P., *Ibid*, 1992, p. 150.

the outcome of interrepublican debate is the same as it would have been had the republics been seeking the Yugoslav general interest.⁷

However, beginning in the 1980's (shortly after Tito's death in 1980) the federal units pursued their own individual interests -- consistently and as a matter of policy. The units were motivated by exclusive interests, and they pursued these interests whenever they had the opportunity. In the period from 1984 until 1990 rigorous efforts were undertaken by the republics and by the government to stabilize the economy. Ramet writes that

It used to be axiomatic that the more developed republics favored economic liberalization and decentralization and the less developed republics favored economic centralism and the maintenance of centrally controlled state funding. By the mid-1980s, first Slovenia, then Croatia, and finally economic liberals in all the republics came around to the idea that the return to private enterprise was necessary and inevitable if there was to be any substantial economic recovery.⁸

The effects of the decline of the economy reached the underdeveloped poorer southern republics first, but the developed republics had also to face hunger and poverty.

The Yugoslav economy, which had seemed promising and even resilient in the mid-1970s, was in deep trouble by the late 1980s. In Zagreb, capital of the 'developed' republic of Croatia, some five thousand households were functioning without electricity as of 1989 because the families could not afford to pay for power. Moreover, as economic conditions deteriorated, economic crime increased. In the first eight month of 1989, Croatia alone registered a record of 37,000 crimes, most of them involving theft or embezzlement. Wracked by problems of economic insolvency, foreign debt, unemployment and

⁷ Ramet, Sabrina P., *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, 1992, p. 174.

⁸ Ramet, Sabrina P., *Ibid*, p. 174.

inflation, the Yugoslav economy was further strained, in 1987, by an especially widespread rash of strikes, some of them protesting a national wage freeze decreed by federal prime minister Branko Miculic....Conditions became so bad that on August 20, 1989, some 30,000 citizens --mostly local Montenegrins -- demonstrated in Nikšić to protest their hunger and poverty.⁹

After nationalization in 1946 and collectivization in 1952, the still-communist Yugoslavia supported decentralization on a limited scale as early as in 1952. For Yugoslavia as a whole in 1971 decentralization and de-collectivization included the "triplex depolarization" program, consisting of "de-etatization", decentralization and democratization. In 1989 Belgrade was ready to even consider re-privatization.

By June 1989, [the official Yugoslav newspaper] Borba was calling reprivatization 'the last chance for socialism' -- a claim not without irony. And the election of noncommunist governments in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and in Bosnia in 1990, the process of reprivatization quickened....By September 1990, more than 30,000 private companies were operating in Yugoslavia.¹⁰

For Milošević the ruined economy immediately required the naming of scapegoats and in a first step all the non-Serb elements of the federal presidency had to be blamed. Later on he purged what remained of the Communist party of any people not loyal to his form of nationalism.

3. Changes in the External Security Environment

With the break-up of the Soviet Union the external threat to Yugoslavia was gradually reduced, and it almost disappeared in 1991.

For Gorbachev the trio of new commitments -- to political change, against the use of the Soviet army as a safety net for other Communist regimes in trouble in their own countries, and against imposing compulsory emulation of Soviet processes elsewhere -- formed one

⁹ Ramet, Sabrina P., *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, 1992, p. 174.

¹⁰ Ramet, Sabrina P., *Ibid*, p. 175.

aspect of his strenuous effort to end the Cold War and erase the Soviet Union's image in Western eyes as an expansionist, militarist, aggressive, imperialist 'evil empire'. For most East Central European Communist regimes, it tolled doom.¹¹

The glue that kept the Yugoslav federation together was opposing a possible invasion by the Soviet Union. This was completely gone in 1991 and with it the support for cohesion within the federal state. This contributed to the breakdown of the allocation of powers and responsibilities in the federal system.

C. THE BALKAN REGION

Cathal J. Nolan has offered the following definitions of the *Balkans* and the *Balkan states*:

Balkans: The region below the Danube, surrounded by the Adriatic, Aegean, Ionian and Black Seas, and containing the Balkan states. *Balkan states*: The states occupying the Balkan Peninsula of southern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, the European portion of Turkey and Yugoslavia -- since 1991 broken into *successor states* of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia (and counting).¹²

It is not solely the uniqueness of the physical geography of the Balkans that has given them notoriety. It is the overall propensity of the region's population to form antagonisms along numerous fault lines. Today, the Muslim and Christian religions, and the divisions between Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic believers, create complex internal structures. All of these groups believe in distinct ethnicities -- Slovene, Croat, Serb, Bosnian, Macedonian or Albanian. Beyond these major groups, the population is further divided into ethnic splinters like the Sunni

¹¹ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 227.

¹² Nolan, Cathal J., *The Longman Guide to World Affairs* (New York, Longman, 1994), p. 28.

Gegs (the same ethnic Albanians as live in Kosovo) and the Bektashi Tosks¹³. Further segregation is based on language families and dialects. Finally, the Serbo-Croat language can be written by Croats in Latin and by Serbs in Cyrillic letters.

"Balkanisation"¹⁴ in the Balkans seems always to take place when the power of subjugating force has faded. With the Cold War gone, the strategic importance of the Balkans has gone as well. The Balkans, especially Yugoslavia, first politically and then militarily faded in significance as the Soviet Union disintegrated. The Balkans are no longer considered an important European sub-region in the strategic analyses of many external observers. Mathias Jopp, a research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, argues nonetheless that today's war in the Balkans has important implications for Western Europe's future security policy development. He writes that

[t]he Yugoslav crisis, for which the West Europeans have been attempting to find a solution since its outbreak, has become the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War, a drama for the peoples concerned and a threat to the stability and security of all the Balkans. But its implications go far beyond sub-regional effects...it has influenced the restructuring of post-Cold War security relations and has complicated Western Europe's development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and search for a new role in international affairs.¹⁵

It seems likely that the Yugoslav crisis will have enduring effects on the framing of a common European security and defence policy. European integration

¹³ Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, *Pandaemonium, Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 3.

¹⁴ Nolan writes that to "balkanize [means] to divide a country or region into small, ineffective and quarrelsome states, such as those in the Balkans." Nolan, Cathal J., *The Longman Guide to World Affairs* (New York, Longman, 1994), p. 29.

¹⁵ Jopp, Mathias (Ed.), *The implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe's foreign relations* (Paris, Institute for Security Studies WEU, 1994) Chaillot Papers 17, p. 1.

has slowed since Maastricht. The involvement of the European Union and the Western European Union in the Yugoslav war again may hinder the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

D. HISTORIC OVERVIEW ON YUGOSLAVIA

Slavic tribes arrived in the Balkans during the sixth century and settled in the area which later formed the territory of the state of Yugoslavia. These tribes were autonomous units until the Turks began to expand the Ottoman Empire during the twelfth century. None of the medieval Christian kingdoms in the Balkans could resist the Muslim Turks and one after the other was conquered: Macedonia in 1371, Serbia in 1389 first and finally in 1521, Bosnia in 1463, Albania in several steps between 1463 and 1479, Croatia in 1541.

The Southern Slavs -- "*juzni slaveni*" or "*jugoslaveni*" -- had been living in Christian kingdoms, however divided by Catholic or Orthodox faith. Once conquered by the Muslim Turks, the dividing line between the jurisdiction of Christian powers and the Muslim Ottoman empire reinforced the earlier division as a major cultural divide. During the period of the rise and decline of the Ottoman empire and again during World War II the Southern Slavs were ruled by various foreign powers, including Turks, Venetians, Hungarians, Austrians, Italians and Germans.

World War I began shortly after the assassination of the heir apparent to the throne of Austria-Hungary, who was killed in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, by a Bosnian student. As one result of World War I the Southern Slavs were brought into a common state: people who saw themselves in 1918 as Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, or Montenegrins lived together with non-Slavic peoples such as Hungarians, Austrians, Germans, Italians and Albanians in close proximity to Slavic Bulgarians and Greek Macedonians.

The inter-war "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians" tried to solve the so-called national question by down-playing the differences among its Slavic

peoples or even by denying the differences. The government also changed the name of the state to the "Kingdom of Yugoslavia" in 1929, hoping in this way to create loyalty towards "Yugoslavia" and to enforce a "Yugoslav" identity.

Political loyalty to the state had to be insured after the Second World War. Tito, the head of Yugoslavia's postwar communist regime, created within the federation of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the population of the Vojvodina (which today includes 400,000 Hungarians) and especially of Bosnia-Herzegovina made the Communist party hesitate. The Vojvodina became an autonomous province and Bosnia-Herzegovina became a republic where Serbs, Croats and Muslims were declared to have equal rights. The southern part of Yugoslavia, given to Albania during Yugoslavia's occupation during the Second World War, was reconquered by Tito's partisans. Despite its predominantly Albanian population, it became the second autonomous province, called Kosovo-Metohija.

Tito's Yugoslavia began as a centralized state of the Stalinist model, but after 1952 became a federation comparable to Lenin's early communist state. Decentralization should have granted the representatives of the six republics and two autonomous regions an opportunity to become spokesmen for their nationalities.

The collective leadership, created by Tito, was able to limit the influence a single nationality could achieve during Tito's rule through May 1980. The autonomous regions as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina never achieved true representation, free of Serbian influence.

After Tito's death, the collective leadership intended to follow "Tito's path" to avoid a break-up of Yugoslavia. However, the increasing economic deterioration of Yugoslavia could not be avoided; and the federal balance, the distribution of power between the federation and the federal units, was blamed for the collapse.

The Communist party, which was still in control of Yugoslavia, could not achieve a consensus on how to ease the economic problems, either by change or continuity in the power structure or by enforcing or preventing decentralization.

In March 1981, in Yugoslavia's poorest region, Kosovo, students at the University of Prishtina protested for freedom of the press, for equal rights for ethnic groups (particularly for the same rights to job access for Albanians in Kosovo compared to Montenegrins and Serbs), and for the status of a republic. In April the student demonstrations spread all over Kosovo, and violence exploded. The Yugoslav army occupied Kosovo, reestablishing order. This was the first open outbreak of interethnic tension leading to violence in post-Tito Yugoslavia.

During the following years the Slovenian and Croat leaders pushed for economic reforms to transform Yugoslavia into a true federation, whereas Serbia tried to eliminate the autonomous regions. Free elections were held in the spring of 1990 in Slovenia and Croatia, and the parties openly discussed possible secession from Yugoslavia if reforms failed. In Kosovo, Vojvodina, Serbia and Montenegro the Communist party representatives closed ranks and controlled four of eight (50 percent) of the votes of the collective presidency, thus enabling Milošević to block every reform attempt should Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia vote together with Slovenia and Croatia.

In the summer of 1990 the Serb "uprising" in Croatia started the war of Yugoslav secession, which became a full scale war in the summer of 1991. Serbia with its satellites Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro formed rump-Yugoslavia, the "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (SFRY), later renamed the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (FRY). In June 1991 the Yugoslav People's Army attacked Slovenia. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in July 1991, and received their recognition in spring 1992. Macedonia left Yugoslavia in 1992 and received recognition, currently backed up by UN peacekeepers monitoring its Yugoslav frontier. Bosnia-Herzegovina's republic-wide referendum to decide its status within the Yugoslav federation in April 1992 led to Bosnia's declaration of

independence and to a secession war in which the Bosnian Serbs have so far occupied 70 percent of the territory.

Since then, numerous cease-fires have been negotiated, approved and violated. Peace plans and peace conferences have been executed, and international and regional security organizations have contributed efforts to reestablish peace without ending the war. Over 40,000 peacekeepers are deployed in the region, with 23,000 forming the United Nations Protection Forces Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). 15,000 peacekeepers are in Croatia, where they hold the ring between the Serbs and the Croats in Krajina. The Serbs hold one-third of Croatia's territory.

A United Nations Security Council resolution approved in September 1994 calls for an end to any political dialogue with the Serbs until they accept the Contact Group Peace Plan. Despite this, the American Ambassador to Bosnia, Mr. Victor Jankevich, finds the Serbs' ability to set the agenda in Bosnia excruciating and the Clinton Administration's reluctance to use even mild force to back up diplomacy dismaying¹⁶. In December 1994 even former U.S. President Jimmy Carter - clearly acting for the Administration - was engaged in the shuttle diplomacy between Pale and Sarajevo which led to the current cease-fire. Thus the United States, in a sharp reversal of policy, has now taken the lead in talks with the Serbs.

Despite all the failed efforts previously undertaken in order to bring the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to an end, a solution for a durable peace acceptable to all the parties must be developed. Understanding the dynamics of the Yugoslav conflict is a necessary first step to contributing to a viable solution. A settlement for this conflict is crucial because its continuation may well challenge the stability of Europe.

¹⁶ "For months, Mr. [Anthony] Lake, President Clinton's national security adviser, had been talking about the need to combine the threat of force with diplomacy to protect...and quell the fighting." Gordon, Michael R., Jehl, Douglas and Sciolino Elaine, *"U.S. and Bosnia: How a Policy Changed," The New York Times* (New York, Vol CXLIV, No. 49,900 December 4, 1994) p. 1.

At present, this war involves the states of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the rump-Yugoslavia and the religious and ethnic groups of Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats therein. Neighboring countries run the risk that the conflict will spread into their territory. Because the United Nations agreed to enforce an embargo on the former Yugoslavia, some nations have suffered major economic losses caused by trade deficits. Moreover, the number of refugees leaving the former Yugoslavia without intending to return as long as the war continues, surpasses the capacity of neighboring countries to accept them without financial and political complications.

The Balkan region is relevant because U.S. and Allied interests are involved in the solution of the Bosnian conflict. U.S. troops act on behalf of the United Nations in Macedonia, U.S. aircraft support Operation Deny Flight and U.S. ships participated until November 1994 in Operation Sharp Guard. U.S. disengagement certainly could set a dangerous precedent. The international commitments imposed by the United Nations could no longer be honored because U.S. allies - like NATO acting as an executive arm of the UN - seem to need U.S. support to achieve credible deterrence.

Moreover, internationally agreed upon commitments to human rights have been violated by the belligerent parties and this cannot be accepted, because the credibility of international security institutions is at stake.

E. PURPOSE AND PLAN

This thesis explores the dynamics of the Yugoslav conflict. The Serbs have always wanted to fulfill their national ambitions; and since 1991 they have found international conditions more favorable to this end than for well over a thousand years. The present sponsor of this revived Serb nationalism is Slobodan Milosevic. For the Serbs the emphasis on ethnicity and nationalism represents a return to an accepted value system, with significant historical roots. Serb nationalism was also manifest after the defeat of the occupying Third Reich, after the defeat of Austria-Hungary and during the decline of the Ottoman empire.

Chapter II of this thesis deals with the history of the Balkans, with special attention to the history of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Albania and the creation of the myth of the quest for a Greater Serbia.

Chapter III deals with Communist Yugoslavia and how Tito dealt with its multiethnic population. Multiethnicity became Tito's justification for a federal system in which ethnic and republic boundaries coincided. The federal government, the six republics and the two autonomous regions built the nine-actor balance-of-power system between 1960 until 1989.

Chapter IV analyzes how Slobodan Milosevic successfully dismantled Tito's constitutional heritage to win Serb control over Yugoslavia and thereby may have lost the opportunity to build a Greater Serbia which would allow all Serbs to live in one state. It also deals with the other major internal dynamics at work during the break-up of Yugoslavia: Tudjman's Croatism, Kucan's Slovenia and Gligorov's Great Macedonia.

Chapter V explores how the collective security system reacted, and how the regional security systems failed to stop the war. It highlights the stands of the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany and explains the absence of a major military intervention. The reluctance of the Western powers to end the conflict by force may be explained by various factors, notably the judgement that the financial costs or casualties would outweigh any gains and the fear that the Russians would see a provocation and might side with Serbia.

Chapter VI provides analysis and synthesis. Findings are offered regarding the decisive causes for the fighting and the permissive factors, including the reluctance of the outside powers to impose a peace by diplomacy, by force or by coercion so far.

II. HISTORY OF THE BALKANS

A. BALKAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

Today's political geography includes five entities which earlier formed the Yugoslav Federation. These are, from north to south: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina¹⁷, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was founded after the Second World War (29 November 1945), was politically organized into six provinces and two autonomous areas, and lasted until June 1991. The federal units were known as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, plus the two autonomous areas of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Besides Serbia with its two autonomous provinces and Macedonia, every republic of the former Yugoslavia had access to the Adriatic coast. When the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union no longer existed, the international security incentives to remain united within a Socialist Yugoslav Federation also came to an end. The Yugoslavia of 1945 - 1991 was situated on the edge of the Soviet sphere, and fell apart when the Soviet empire crumbled. The struggle for the Yugoslav succession has created the present crisis in the Balkans.

1. Unbroken Continuity: Geography

Physical geography seems to be the only unbroken continuity in the Balkans. The political landscape throughout recorded history has been either eruptive, like an active volcano, or (during periods when an overwhelming dominating power controlled everything) as silent as a churchyard. Once Soviet power had diminished, the centrifugal forces became preponderant, especially in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia. As the geography of power does not allow for any vacuums, the Serbs felt the need to fill that vacuum. The Serbs, in a first step, annexed Kosovo and the

¹⁷ Except for citations, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this paper will be called Bosnia-Herzegovina. In newspapers since 1992 "Bosnia" and "Bosnian" have been used to stand for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Vojvodina areas. Both lost the status of autonomy. Today Kosovo and the Vojvodina are part of Serbia, and together with Montenegro, form what is called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) or "Rump-Yugoslavia."

Inside the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina¹⁸ it seems that the struggle between (a) the centrifugal forces fighting for a sovereign and multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina and (b) the centripetal Serbian forces contending for a greater Serbia provides evidence about the prevailing tensions which need to be relaxed before a new eruption engulfs the Balkans as a whole.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is landlocked a fact which aggravates the situation with respect to direct outside accessibility.¹⁹ The "Rump-Yugoslavia" has some ports on Montenegrin soil on the Adriatic coast, but these ports are subject to the United Nations embargo. All the other neighbors of the former Yugoslavia, besides Austria and Hungary, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have sea access -- either to the Mediterranean Sea or (in the case of Bulgaria and Romania) the Black Sea.

2. Discontinuity in Political Geography

The last occupying power (Germany) and the liberating power (Russia, then the Soviet Union) no longer have common frontiers with today's belligerent parties in the Balkans. The former Yugoslavia's physical access to Germany is restricted by Austria, Switzerland and Italy. Russia is hidden behind the former "cordon sanitaire" of Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. Turkey was neutral during the Second World War and has a common frontier with Bulgaria and Greece. Italy, adjoins Slovenia.

¹⁸ Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence and received recognition of its sovereignty by the United Nations in 1992.

¹⁹ Plans existed for Bosnia-Herzegovina to have an Adriatic port, perhaps through a corridor access solution through Croatia.

However extensive the boundaries of Serbia, no direct frontiers will be established with countries that were formerly eager to establish direct or hegemonial influence in the Balkans, such as Habsburg-Austria-Hungary, Hitler's Germany, Tsarist and Soviet-Russia, Mussolini's Italy and Ottoman Turkey.

History suits as a prerequisite for understanding the turmoil in the Balkans and facilitates exploring the dynamics of the Yugoslav crisis. The Balkan situation has changed throughout history. A historical evaluation contributes to understanding the present crisis in the Balkans. This historical analysis examines continuities and discontinuities in politics and culture. Breaks in continuity resulted from personalities and ideas. These ideas influenced this part of the world and shaped the behavior of its population.

B. HISTORY OF THE BALKANS 400 - 1826

The historical period examined in this analysis begins with the barbaric migrations to the Balkans. The history of the Balkans is pursued through a selection of major events influencing the Balkan peoples until 1995. For this purpose the epochs covered are divided into six periods. The first four periods are discussed in this chapter.

The first period includes the settlement of the migrating tribes in the fifth century, the spread of medieval Christianity, and the expansion of the Muslim crescent by the Turks. It also saw the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the ambitious Habsburgs²⁰ desire for hegemony, Napoleon and the Vienna peace settlement of 1815.

The second period considers the different ideas about Europe which in the 19th century led to a system stabilized by a balance of power.

²⁰ Two spellings of the Habsburg dynasty exist : Hapsburg and Habsburg. The latter version was used by the Habsburgs themselves and will be used throughout this thesis, except for citations.

The third period deals with the post-Vienna era, including the Crimean War, when the equilibrium was lost and badly reestablished, and the Berlin Congress of 1878. With Pan-Slavism materializing the Great Serbian dream became manifest, and finally the rise of nationalism dominated Europe. The First World War broke out when Serb nationalists forced their agenda onto Bosnia-Herzegovina by assassinating the heir to the Habsburg throne.

The fourth period covers the First World War and the inter-war period until 1939.

The Yugoslav Civil War, the Second World War and Tito's Yugoslavia are discussed in the next chapter. The ten years since 1985, which included the ascension to power of Serbia's present ruler, Slobodan Milosević, are dealt with in Chapter IV.

1. History of the Balkans 400 - 1453: From the Barbaric Migration to the Early Middle-Ages

With the demise of the Roman Empire during the period of the Barbarian Migration (375-568), some migrating tribes in the 5th century finally settled in the Balkans. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia derived their names from these tribes: Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians and Serbs.

Other migrating tribes passed through the area, arrived and vanished, as did Attila's central Asian Huns, and contributed to the final defeat of the Western Roman Empire in 375 AD. Again invading out of Asia's steppes, Gengis-Khan's Asian Horde devastated Europe in the 12th century and contributed to the further decline of the Eastern Roman Empire.

Other Hun tribes continued to migrate during the 10th century and ravaged Europe. Some finally settled in the plains north of the mountainous forested areas of the Balkans and became known as the *Hungarians*. For the Balkans the Slavs became important:

The Slavs²¹, a major branch of the Indo-European family of peoples, originally lived in the Pripet Marches. The area settled by Slavs later included parts of Poland, White Russia and the Ukraine. During the early centuries the history of the Slavs was connected with that of the Germans (Goths), Huns, Alani and Turkomans....From the 6th century Byzantine writers spoke of the *Sklavenoi*, placing them along the Lower Danube, but also in the Eastern Alps....Groupings of Slav tribes: The Eastern Slavs (Russians subdivided later into Ukrainians, White and Great Russians), the Western Slavs (Poles, Pomerani, Abodrites, Sorbs, Czechs and Slovaks), and the Southern Slavs (Slovenes, Serbs, Croats and Bulgars). The unity of the Slavic World was disrupted by German colonization in the Danubian area and the Eastern Alps after the destruction of the Avar kingdom and by the migration of the Magyars to the Hungarian plains.²²

The year 650 marks the approximate date of the completion of the Slav occupation of the Balkan area.

Part of the Slav people extended as far west as Carniola and Carinthia, but these [the Slovenes] were conquered by the Franks in the early 9th century and were thenceforth part of the German Empire.²³

The Croats had been conquered in the same campaign as the Slovenes by the Franks, but revolted in 818 and were again subdued.

In 924 Tomislav became King of Croatia, accepting his crown from the pope. He ruled over later-day Croatia and over a territory as far south as Montenegro....In 1102 Croatia was joined with Hungary in a dynastic union, after the defeat of the last ruler, Petar, by King

²¹ (Slovene from *slovo* = the word)

²² Kinder, Hermann and Hilgemann, Werner, *The Anchor Atlas of World History*, (New York, Anchor Books Doubleday, Penguin Books, 1974), p. 111.

²³ Langer, William L., *An Encyclopedia of World History* (Boston, Massachusetts, Houghton Mifflin Co, 1980), p. 264.

Ladislav. This involved the definitive victory of the western orientation in Croatia and the separation from other southern Slavs.²⁴

This early alignment of Slovenes and Croats to the Western European civilization and the Roman Catholic faith had stayed unchanged to this day.

The Serbs inhabited the mountainous areas of the Balkans and were organized in clans and tribes. In 960 occurred the

death of Chaslav, who had made the first effort to unite the Serbs....Technically the territory was under Byzantine suzerainty, which when the Eastern Empire was strong, was effectively exercised. By the end of the 10th century the inhabitants of present-day Serbia and eastern Bosnia had for the most part accepted eastern Christianity, while western Bosnia and Croatia leaned toward Roman Catholicism. But the conflict of the churches drew the southern Slavs this way and that, becoming frequently an important political as well as religious issue.²⁵

The Southern Slavs were already separated by political lines and religious orientations which marked the fault lines along which the fractures would follow, leading to violence and war.

North of the Balkans settled the Hungarians, organized in various tribes of which the Magyar was the leading one. In 906 they destroyed the rising Slavic kingdom of Moravia. Some fifty years later they were defeated by Emperor Otto in the Battle of Augsburg in 955. They settled, established frontiers, and were defeated by the Great Mongol Invasion in 1241. King Bela and his army had to flee to the Adriatic. The Mongols pursued him but turned away when the news of the death of the Great Khan reached them. The Mongols devastated Hungary and left.

²⁴ Langer, William L., *An Encyclopedia of World History*, p. 265.

²⁵ Langer, William L., *Ibid*, p. 265.

Immediately Frederick of Austria took advantage of the situation and appropriated some of Hungary's western provinces. While Bela defeated Frederick of Austria, the last of the Babenbergs, Ottokar II, expanded his Kingdom of Bohemia. This led Ladislav IV, Hungary's King from 1270 until 1290, into an alliance with Austria's King Rudolf of Habsburg; and together they succeeded in breaking Ottokar's power in 1278, and Bohemia and Moravia became Imperial Estates in 1306.

During the early Middle Ages numerous former Slav states had already been absorbed into larger political entities. Slovenia in the 9th century became linked to the German Empire. The western Slav tribe of the Czechs settled in Bohemia and Moravia and built powerful kingdoms. Both in 1306, today forming the Czech Republic, became German Imperial Estates. Hungary, closely linked to Croatia since 1102, was leaning towards the German Empire and willing to form alliances with Austria, ruled by the Habsburgs since 1270. The scene for serious events to come is was already set.

In Anatolia in 1061 the Turks arrived, migrating out of Baktria into an area shared between Greek and Kurd settlers and nomads. The Turks spread throughout the next centuries into the Arab areas of the Arab peninsula. The Turks used their triumph over the subdued states to spread Mohammed's teachings and subsequently conquered the littoral of Asia Minor, the Holy Land, and Egypt, and pressed on in North Africa to conquer almost all of Spain. They invaded Europe through the Balkans.

2. History of the Balkans: Rise of Islam 1389 - 1453

May 29, 1453, is still of as much importance today as it was some 500 years ago. On his day, the Ottoman Sultan Mohammed II converted the largest church of Christianity, the Hagia Sophia, into a Mosque. Mohammed II became "Mehmet", "The Conqueror", as he turned Constantinople (Greek for Constantin [founded]

City) into Istanbul²⁶ and put an end to the Byzantine Empire. Anecdotes state that Mehmet allowed Emperor Constantin XI to die on duty, defending his city. This violent end of the Byzantine epoch, during which European culture based on Roman and Greek heritage and Christian faith had prospered, definitively marked the beginning of the Greek-Turk antagonism²⁷

3. The Rise of the Ottomans: Defeat of Christianity at the Two Kosovos, 1389 and 1448

The Fall of Constantinople in 1453 was not only a shock to Christianity but an achievement reflecting Muslim fighting superiority. It marked the establishment of Turkish power. The Ottoman Islamic Empire now began consolidating its domains. It is regarded as a short stop in Ottoman expansionism before three generations later the Turks arrived in front of Vienna - the Habsburg capital - in 1529. This event mobilized all of Christendom.

Neither Europe nor the Austrians still celebrate the defense of Christianity, which was to be their final victory. However, in another Ottoman campaign in the Balkans, led by Sultan Murat, "the [by God/Allah] Wanted" in 1389 is still yearly celebrated by the Serbs on June 28, as the Saint-Veits-Day. The total defeat of the south Slav-Serbian army commanded by Lazar I. Hrebeljanovic in an area called "Kosovo"²⁸ in Serbo-Croatian is annually remembered.

Kosovo for a second time became of interest when Sultan Murat the Second, during another stop on his Balkan campaign on October 19, 1448, finally defeated

²⁶ (phonetic: eesh-tarnn-bull means in greek: in we go and turkish/arabic: here-we-are)

²⁷ At this very moment 1,235 UN peace-keepers for roughly \$ 47 million (annual cost) keep Greek-speaking Cypriots away from Turkish-speaking Cypriots. Turkey and Greece are both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

²⁸ Kosovo means "blackbird field", or German "Amselfeld."

the Hungarian Johann Hunyadi, who commanded the Christian Hungarian-Polish army of Poland's King Wladislaw.²⁹

The same Murat conquered the Greek port of Saloniki³⁰ on the Balkans from the Venetians, thus controlling the shipping from and to the Bosphorus. Many Mediterranean islands, such as Corfu, Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus, had fortified ports with huge Venetian fortresses protecting the sea lines of communication to the Orient from the Adriatic through the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, where the Turkish hegemony blocked trade and shipping. Numerous crusades were undertaken to loosen this economic constraint. Murat II found his final resting place in the year 1489 in the marvelous mosque in Hadrianopolis.³¹ Adrianopolis was the Ottoman capital before Istanbul, which Murat the First had conquered 90 years earlier.

4. Consolidation and Decline of the Ottomans

The Ottoman Empire lived through the classic four periods of all Great Powers³² -- its rise (1071-1453), its consolidation and achievement of Great Power status (1453-1699), its decline and end (1700-1923), finally its survivor's consolidation (1924-today).

²⁹ The myth of Kosovo is an important element in Serbia's arsenal of politico-historical symbolism. In 1989 the 600th anniversary was extensively used by Milošević.

³⁰ The Saloniki of the Bible or today's Thessalonike is the second largest city of Greece and capital of the Greek region of Macedonia. In the Balkan region it is the most important Mediterranean port accessible immediately outside the Adriatic Sea, which is covered by the U.N. embargo.

³¹ Hadrianopolis (Greek for Hadrian founded city) dates back to the Roman Emperor Hadrian, 130 A.D. He built the limes 'Hadrian's Wall' in England and reconstructed Jerusalem. Adrianople is today's Adorn, the capital of the Turkey's European province.

³² Paul Kennedy outlines these four phases in his book *The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict. From 1500 to 2000* (New York, Random House, 1988).

In 1699, at the largest expansion of the Ottoman empire, the peace agreements of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) finalized the period of the Turkish War (1683-1699). After 1529, again the Muslim Ottomans had arrived in front of Vienna in 1683 and were barely stopped by the Holy League. The peace agreements were divided into three separate treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Venice, the Ottoman Empire and Poland, and the Ottoman Empire and Austria. In the Balkans, Hungary without the Banat, and Siebenbürgen, without huge parts of Croatia and Slovenia, became part of the Habsburg dynasty's territory. Austria-Hungary, with Croatia and Slovenia, reached now to the port of Trieste on the Mediterranean. In 1699, for the last time, the Habsburgs were ascending to their apex in Great Power status. With the Crimean war in 1856, the Habsburgs were in a period of steady decline.

5. Russia Reviving the Muslim-Christen Antagonism

Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus was another Great power during the Thirty Years war and on its decline when Russia was ascending on the scene. The Swedes were defeated by the Russians, who in turn gained a port on the Baltic. Russia then started coalition warfare with Austria. On completion of the Austrian-Turkish war in 1606, Austria's ruler was acknowledged Emperor and recognized by the Sultan. Russia had fought alongside Austria in order to further Russian interests, while at the same time fighting for Christianity. The Tsar wanted to expand Russia to the south in pursuit of the Black Sea. As a first step in 1699, the Sultan lost Podolia, the Polish Ukraine. In several other wars with the help of the Catholic Austrian Emperor, the Orthodox Russian Tsar, during the campaigns of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792, gained all Turkish areas north of the Black Sea, from the Kuban river to the Dnjepr river. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1806-1812, Russia conquered the remaining Turkish areas between the rivers Bug, Dnjestr and Pruth. The Ottoman Sultan and Kalif, the political ruler and religious leader, also had to admit that he -- himself acting as the superior of all his Muslim subjects -- would now respect both the Protectors of Christianity, the Tsar and the Kaiser. Both

were allowed to act with respect to religious affairs for their newly gained Christian subjects inside the Ottoman Empire.

6. Bosnia-Herzegovina: Defending Christian Europe

One line of argumentation indicates continuity ever since the divergence in faith. Since the very beginning of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, deep differences in religious practices have been apparent. Despite more than four decades of almost peaceful coexistence, the antagonisms between Christians and Muslims are still sufficient to stimulate citizens to embark upon atrocities against humanity. Jealousy, rivalry and mistrust are justified as "ancient hatred." The argument of defending Christianity against its enemies is still used in the present crisis in the Balkans. Serbs pretend to justify "ethnic cleansing" within their area of influence by returning to this argument -- the supposed need to stem Islamic influences in a Greater Serbia. Serbs and Croats, as if driven by paranoia, attempt to justify their atrocities by referring to their fear of having any community of Bosnian Muslims (evoking the phantom of an Islamic fundamentalist state) in their neighborhood. The martyrdom of the early Serbs at both the battles of Kosovo provides the ultimate justification.

C. IDEAS ABOUT EUROPE IN COMPETITION

The idea of unifying Europe under the leadership of the Catholic faith was, in principle, buried at the end of the Thirty Years war. The idea of Divine Law was also buried with it. This nostalgia was revived by the Habsburgs, however; and it has affected today's situation. This approach is in opposition to the French idea of "raison d'état".

1. The Habsburg Idea: Europe United by Catholicism

Nobody in Europe besides the Habsburgs could have wished to create a united Holy Roman Empire. As Kissinger puts it:

Had the Holy Roman Emperor succeeded in establishing central control over all the territories technically under his jurisdiction, the relations of the Western European states to it might have been similar to those of China's neighbors to the Middle Kingdom, with France comparable to Korea or Vietnam and Great Britain to Japan.³³

With the Reformation weakening the Papacy, and the Protestant states breaking away from Rome and with it breaking away from religious universality, the nostalgia of a universal monarchy had to be replaced by a new order of principles. It was the French Catholic Cardinal Richelieu who linked the concept of "raison d'état" to the concept of "balance of power" and wanted his "Most Christian French kings" to enhance French security and enable France to expand eastward. Germany as the divided battlefield was no threat to France. Richelieu's vocation as cardinal, however, did not keep him from seeing the Habsburg attempt to reestablish the Catholic religion as a geopolitical instrument. Austria intended to achieve dominance in Central Europe; and Vienna, would thus have reduced France to a second class state.

2. The French Idea: Liberate Europe Along National Self-Determination

With the French Revolution the monarchical state was replaced by the French nation. The monarch was succeeded by an elected ruler of a democratic government and former Capet subjects became French citizens. The first citizens of a nation-state, the French inspired much of Europe to go the same way with them. The French Napoleonic campaign through Europe built a French empire. Even though its decline followed promptly, Napoleon exported the revolutionary idea from Paris to Rome, Madrid, Vienna, Berlin and St.Petersburg. Napoleon's influence also reached the subjects of the Tsar in Russia, the whole of the Austrian Empire and the Balkans down to the Straits of the Bosphorus. In the short run, the patriotic nationalistic idea only partially succeeded in France. In the long run, this idea

³³ Kissinger, Henry A., *Diplomacy* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 57.

remained influential. As a result nationalism has been used and misused in various ways. The history of Yugoslavia has illustrated almost all the variations what Nationalism can be used for.

3. Vienna 1815: Preserving Privileged Positions

The Napoleonic campaigns brought war and disaster to Europe, Moscow and back to France. The preservation of international peace and the creation of a system to guarantee stability became the major task to be achieved at Vienna. Norman Rich wrote that,

[a]fter the Napoleonic Wars the leaders of the European great powers [i.e. Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Russia], conditioned by almost a quarter-century of revolution and warfare, had become convinced that the primary objective of their diplomacy must be the preservation of international peace and stability, for only through peace could the civilization they cherished, and their privileged position within it, be maintained.³⁴

Additionally

[t]he peacemakers at Vienna consolidated Central Europe into the German Confederation, ending the power vacuum which had tempted French expansionism. The Quadruple Alliance was formed to block French aggression. European congresses, the last of which was held in Berlin in 1878, met periodically to sort out solutions to Europe's major conflicts.³⁵

Consequently after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Europe should have stayed stable. This Congress peace did not create a power vacuum as "the Peace of

³⁴ Rich, Norman, *Why the Crimean war ? A Cautionary Tale* (University Press of New England, Brown University, 1985), p. 1.

³⁵ Kissinger, Henry A., *Diplomacy* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 324.

Westphalia (1648) [did on the eastern] border of a military heavyweight" as Kissinger wrote, because the stronger power "Louis XIV France...found the temptation to expand at the expense of weaker neighbors irresistible."³⁶

4. Post-March 1848: Restoring the Eroding Power-System

The merits of the French Revolution were (next to the discovery of Liberté, Fraternité and Egalité), the interpretation of a state and its subjects as a nation and its citizens. The citizens should participate in their governments via democracy. The birth of nationalism made the established European powers very uneasy.

Russia was the only great power in continental Europe whose government had not been overthrown or severely shaken by the revolutions of 1848. In the course of those revolutions Russia had come to the aid of Austria to suppress revolution in the Habsburg dominions, and it had provided support and encouragement for the suppression of revolution everywhere else.³⁷

On completion of the eruptions of March 1848 the "Concert of Europe", that informal system of mutual cooperation among the great powers, had already "seriously eroded."³⁸ Order was, however, re-established but ignored the nationality issues. Everywhere in Europe nationalities were seeking freedom from foreign rule.

D. HISTORY OF THE BALKANS 1826 - 1914

In the period after the Congress of Vienna, the established balance-of-power system initially worked well. The decline of Ottoman rule in the Balkans allowed

³⁶ Kissinger, Henry A., *Diplomacy* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 320.

³⁷ Rich, Norman, *Why the Crimean War ? A Cautionary Tale*, 1985, p.2.

³⁸ see: Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L., *Force and Statecraft. Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1983), 2.Ed 1990, p. 35.

Serbia to pursue a more aggressive agenda to the benefit of the Serbian nation. During the Crimean War the equilibrium was lost and badly reestablished. The Berlin Congress of 1878 prevented a break-up of the balance-of-power system but left most of the powers frustrated. Nationalism manifested itself in different forms. Pan-Slavism materialized in Russia's western regions and the Great Serbian Dream became unmistakable. Finally the rise of nationalism dominated Europe. The First World War broke out when Serb nationalists forced their agenda onto Bosnia-Herzegovina by assassinating the heir to the Habsburg throne.

1. Prelude: Post-Vienna Serbia Enters the Scene

The core of today's crisis in the Balkans is Serbia, even though the center of actual fighting has shifted and is now limited to Bosnia-Herzegovina's Muslim areas of Bihac and Sarajevo. Serbia's history is embedded in the Balkans and takes its unique appearance from the arrival of nationalism.

During the Napoleonic wars the ideas of the French Revolution were spreading. With Napoleon's campaigns and in the aftermath of his defeat, the idea of national Serb sovereignty was revived.

From 1804 until 1806 the Serb leader, Kara Georg Petrović, called Karadordes (Black George), revolted and led an uprising in Belgrade against the Ottoman janissaries. This led to a short period of Serbian autonomy. The autonomy attested to the Serbs in the peace of Bucharest in 1812, however, only lasted until 1815 with the signing of the Vienna Congress. A new uprising in 1815 led by Milos Obrenović achieved autonomy again, and the Serbs was granted the title of a "Principauté of succession" under Ottoman sovereignty. Sovereign Serbia installed a parliament called the Skupschtina and proclaimed a constitution. Milos Obrenovic in 1819 was established as the ruler, with a right of dynastic succession. When he, despite the Serb constitution, began to rule in a very autocratic fashion, he was forced to resign in 1835.

In 1844 I. Garasanin developed the "Greater Serbian Program." This program promoted the idea of a single unified nation for all Southern Slavs, which in 1844 included part of Habsburg Austria.

2. The Decline of Habsburg-Austria: Crimean War 1856

The President of the second French republic, Louis Napoleon, elected in December 1848, believed in his mission to restore France to a position of dominance in Europe. He tried to achieve this by supporting the ideological principle of nationalism, with a view to reorganizing Europe along national lines under French political and moral leadership.

At the very end of the Crimean War - deliberately evoked by Napoleon in provoking a crisis with Russia in the Near East in Spring 1850 - the mutual confidence among the European statesmen essential for the belief in the "Concert" was destroyed.³⁹

Within the autocratic "Holy Alliance", Russia, the former Friend of Prussia and Protector of Austria, was defeated and humiliated in the Crimean War. However, Russia was not eliminated as a threat. Austria's neutrality antagonized all the powers; and it lost its role as a military power and its leading position in diplomacy. Prussia was almost dismissed as a major power.

France could not reestablish predominance in Europe by championing the nationalities movement. Britain after this inglorious war withdrew largely from continental affairs, but stayed apprehensive about the revival of French power.⁴⁰

³⁹ Rich, Norman, *Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale*, p. 6.

⁴⁰ Rich, Norman, *Ibid*, p. 200.

The Crimean War showed the Great powers which guaranteed the Vienna peace agreement weak; it therefore invited Serbia to push its agenda.

3. Pursuing the Great-Serbian Dream: the Ottoman Retreat

As a result of the Crimean War, the relative importance of the great powers became self-evident. In the eyes of Serbia, the Austrian Empire at the end of the Crimean War was considered weak. The Ottoman Empire, to which Serbia was nominal subject, could hardly be considered a power.

In 1835 Milos Obrenović, who had ascended to power in 1819 and had established inheritable succession, was forced to resign. Karadordes' son Alexander was elected by the Serb parliament and ruled after 1842.

After the Ottoman setback in the Crimean War, the Skupschtina in 1858 forced Alexander, the Karadordević, to abdicate power. The very autocratic Milos Obrenović was recalled to power to succeed Alexander.

In 1867 it was Milos' son, Michael Obrenovic, now ruler of the Serbian Principauté, who successfully achieved the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Serbia. Michael had to make this arrangement with the powers surrounding Serbia. By compromising, he became a target for those who still glorified the 1804 revolutionary Karadordes. Michael was assassinated by fanatics in favor of the Karadordes dynasty. Assassination became one of the characteristics of Serbian diplomacy. Despite the aspirations of the "Karadordevićs," Michael was succeeded in 1868 by his nephew Milan I. Obrenović.

The Congress of Berlin in 1878 established a completely sovereign Serbia, enlarged to the south by 11,000 square kms. In 1882 the Principauté of Serbia was renamed the Kingdom of Serbia. Encouraged by the status of kingdom and motivated by the growing Great Serbian dream, Serbia decided in 1885 to attack Bulgaria. Bulgaria under the leadership of von Battenberg had given in to Bulgarian nationalist desires and took the lead in reunifying Bulgaria with East Rumelia. Rumelia was a province full of Christian Bulgarians under the Turkish yoke that wished to be united with their brother Bulgars. This unification occurred at the

expense of the Ottoman Empire. With tactical fortune, von Battenberg, was able to save his Bulgaria as the young ruler immediately countered Serbia's attack. Only the strong intervention of Austria-Hungary saved Serbia. And again during the 1886 Bucharest peace talks, Austria-Hungary had to intervene and saved Serbia. Fortunately for Serbia, no territorial compensation had to be handed over to Bulgaria. Aggression -- open, by force, or in more subtle ways -- to support the dream of Great Serbia has been a continuous phenomenon in the repertoire of Serbian diplomacy.

4. The Russian Fear of Pan-Slavism and the Austro-Hungarian Design

Nicholas I, the Russian Tsar and Head of the Orthodox Church, felt entitled to act alone as the defender of his Orthodox Christian subjects against the Turkish yoke. During his Crimean campaign he was completely rebuffed in his expansionist dreams to reach the Straits and also repelled in his quest for pan-Slavism. During the Berlin Congress, Alexander III's Russia was reestablished. Bismarck worked as the honest broker, who was very much in favor of Russia, but could not prevent the Tsar from retaining his expansionistic dreams.⁴¹

Nicholas I felt offended when von Battenberg, the newly established ruler in Bulgaria, took the lead in uniting his Slavic state in a clearly defined Russian sphere of interest in East-Rumelia. Alexander III wanted to be the Tsar of the pan-Slavic

⁴¹ *The Berlin Congress June 13 - July 13, 1878*: The main decisions had been made in the proceeding secret agreements, but there was much trouble and friction about details, especially after the Anglo-Russian agreements leaked out....Bulgaria was divided into three parts...Macedonia, which was to have certain reforms. Austria was given a mandate (June 28) to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and to garrison the Sandjak and Novi Bazar, a strip laying between Serbia and Montenegro. The territory given to Serbia and Montenegro was reduced. The Greeks were put off with promises for the future. Serbia, Romania and Montenegro became independent states....The upshot of the treaty was that it left Russian nationalists and Pan-Slavs profoundly unsatisfied and left the aspirations of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece unfulfilled. Cited in: Langer, William L., *An Encyclopedia of World History*, p. 781.

world and felt that only he should be allowed to act in protecting his subjects from the Turkish yoke.

Alexander's irritation became even greater when with respect to saving Serbia, a Slav territory, it was unfortunately not the Russian authority that stopped Bulgaria's counterattack. It was the weak Austrian-Hungarian ruler who intervened in an area that Russia's monarch considered his backyard. Russia still maneuvered how to lead pan-Slavism when Vienna developed Austro-Hungarian designs to influence the Balkans with Great Power politics. After its 1866 war against Prussia, Austria was unable to dominate the German Federation. Bismarck's North-German Confederation was a Prussian tool. Locked with no prospect of expansion to the North (Prussia), to the West (German Confederation and Italy) nor to the East (Russia), Austria and Hungary (the double monarchy since February 8, 1867) concentrated on influencing the Balkans. There the Ottoman Empire still existed, and Russia had not reached the straits.

5. Correcting Serbia's Dynastic Successions for The Great Serbia

In Serbia in 1889 King Milan I Obrenović abdicates power in favor of his son, Alexander I Obrenović. This Serbian ruler did not steer a course of aggressive foreign policy and as a result Alexander I became the last Obrenović ruler. He and his wife again were victims of the blood-feud between the Karadories and Obrenović families which began in 1817, when Kara Georg Petrović returned from his exile in Austria and was assassinated. Some of King Alexander's high-ranking officers killed him and his wife in 1903.

Again, Serbia looked back to the times when the strong arm of Karadordes fought the janissaries. The Serbian national assembly elected Peter Karadordević and crowned him King Peter I. of Serbia. He ruled Serbia until the end of World War I. In 1903 his foreign minister, Nikola Pasić, who enjoyed the Tsar's trust, revived the Greater Serbian dream.

The pre-1918 kingdom of Serbia, whose politicians, generals and civil servants ruled the new state, had been an ally of czarist Russia. The prime minister of Serbia, Nikola Pasić, had enjoyed the czar's trust, and he and his cabinet had based their foreign policy, both before and during the First World War, on close relations with Russia, which they had seen as their protector against Austro-Hungarian and German Military expansionism.⁴²

6. The Bosnian Annexion Crisis 1908 to 1909

Russia's obsession to reach the straits and access to Europe and the Mediterranean and to gain warm water ports motivated Russia to approach Austria-Hungary. In Buchlau on September 16, 1908, both states arranged an agreement, signed between the Secretary for Austria-Hungary's Foreign Affairs, Count Ährenthal, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Iswolskij, over the Straits, Bosnia and the Herzegovina. It was a profitable deal for Austria-Hungary, since it could now annex the states of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For Russia the subject of the Straits was still an open issue due to British influence and resistance. But the same year, a consolidation of British-Russian entente occurred during a meeting in Reval between of King Edward VII and Tsar Nicholas II. A larger treaty, the Baltic Treaty between Russia, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark signed in St. Petersburg, settled other pressing disputes; in this case it conserved the status quo in the Baltic.

On the Balkans the Sultan had to respond to the Turkish national "Young Turk" movement. The Young Turks represented extreme Turkish nationalism, in which the Islamic way of life was to preside over all Ottoman subjects. The Young Turk movement would have also included all Muslims in the Balkans as well. The movement weakened Turkish foreign policy and gave Ferdinand I of Bulgaria the opportunity to declare Bulgaria's independence on October 5, 1908. He established

⁴² M. Ekmecic, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije* (Belgrade, 1973) cited in: Djilas, Aleksa, *The Contested Country, Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution 1919-1953*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 57.

himself as ruler with the title of Tsar of Bulgaria, a title which was later recognized by Russia and Turkey.

Germany, under the rule of Wilhelm II since 1888, was still on its way to establishing itself as a Great Power. Willing to play a partner role with Britain, Germany refused to begin the role as a junior partner. Without the presence of Bismarck as Chancellor, William II tried to act in the tradition of the Congress of Berlin in order to impress London as an honest broker, but found no friends.

To give Turkey compensation for the annexion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany forced Austria-Hungary to accept financial agreements with Turkey. Meanwhile in Turkey, incited by the Young Turk movement, Sultan Abdul Hamid II was replaced by Mohammed V.

While acting in favor of Turkey against Austria, Germany forced Russia to drop its support to the Serbian government. Russia had to demobilize after an Austria-Hungarian ultimatum and again felt humiliated. Taking the blame, the Russian Foreign Minister, Iswolskij, was forced to resign.

Together with Britain, Russia successfully attacked Persia in the Middle East and forced Persia to adopt a constitution. At the same time, Britain started to build eight Dreadnought battleships⁴³.

On October 24, 1913, Russia signed the secret treaty of Racconigi with Italy. Both powers agreed on the prolongation of *status quo* in the Balkans, and both partners would compensate the other in case of a change. The former German Chancellor von Bülow, acting as special ambassador in Rome, failed in 1914 to hold

⁴³ Note: The Dreadnought became the British "battleship of the line" with 22,500 tons displacement and ten guns caliber 30.5 cm, a term later used for battleships of 20,000 tons with standardized strong artillery. With this type of ship Britain outran the German attempts to build up a German high seas fleet as important as the Royal Navy. Also hampering timely realization of the High Seas Fleet was politics. Tirpitz's close friend and strong supporter Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow lost his Emperor's confidence over the "Daily Telegraph Disagreement" and resigned. Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg became Chancellor.

Italy back from joining the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, the "Nibelungen."

7. The Balkan Confederation and the End of the First Balkan War 1913

On March 13, 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria signed the Serbian-Bulgarian defense agreement which was widened into the "Balkan Confederation" in October 1912 and integrated Montenegro as well as Greece. This defensive treaty was actually a secret offensive alliance against Turkey. The expected occasion arrived when Italy attacked the Ottoman Empire in Tripoli, a Mediterranean port in North Africa, today the capital of Libya. The Balkan Alliance presented Turkey an ultimatum for reforms in Macedonia which was refused by the Sultan. War was declared against Turkey on October 18, 1912, with the goal of partitioning Turkish interests in Macedonia⁴⁴. Bulgaria invaded Thrace and laid siege to Adrianople. Serbia and Montenegro conquered the Sandzak and Novi Bazar.⁴⁵ After the start of the offensive Greece, together with Bulgaria, followed its own priorities and conquered Saloniki and the territories up to Epirus.

Turkey was beaten on all fronts and had to agree to the loss of most of its European territory. Turkey defended its remaining interests in Constantinople. It also lost almost all the Aegean Islands in signing this treaty in London on May 10, 1913.

Bulgaria, dissatisfied about the results of its gains in Macedonia, decided on June 19, 1913, to attack Greece.⁴⁶ Greece was defended by the Turks. However,

⁴⁴ The idea of partitioning Macedonia was discussed again in 1992 between Misotakis (GR) and Milosević (YU).

⁴⁵ During the Berlin Congress in 1878 Austria was allowed to garrison the Sandzak and Novi Bazar, a strip lying between Serbia and Montenegro.

⁴⁶ Located in the center of the Balkan peninsula, the geographic region of Macedonia is divided among Bulgaria, Greece, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). According to Duncan M. Perry it has been a "source of conflict in the Balkans since the 19th century." Duncan M. Perry, *Macedonia: From*

Bulgaria in coalition with Romania, defeated Greece, which in turn sued for peace. Greece lost most the gains that it had obtained in the 1912 Balkan War.

Serbia in 1913, with Russian support, had established itself as the biggest power in the Balkans and had mobilized its forces for the pursuit for a Greater Serbia.

8. Albania and Austria-Hungary Limit the Great Serbian Dream

Serbia has gained territory and successfully proved its aggressive foreign policy of nationalism towards a Great Serbia at the expense of the hated Muslim world. The blame for its earlier defeat by the Bulgarians under von Battenberg's command was erased, but access to the Mediterranean sea via the Macedonian port of Saloniki was still denied, and Serbia remained landlocked.

The Serbian territorial claims to gain access to the Mediterranean sea in the Adriatic were also denied during peace negotiations in London in 1913. Instead of sea access Serbia got a new neighbor called Albania.

During the Turkish Young Turk movement -- a term that stood for a enforced campaign of Turkish nationalism, in which the Islamic way of life was to be brought to all Ottoman subjects, including those in the Balkans -- the resistance against Turkish rule in the Albanian part of the Balkans led to revolt in 1910. During the Balkan War, on November 11, 1912, Ismail Kemal Bei proclaimed the independence of Albania. The long-standing idea of Albanian sovereignty was finally realized and ratified in London at the end of the Balkan Wars on July 29, 1913.

Albania was part of the Serbian Empire of Stephan Dusan in 1343. It was impossible for Albania to resist the expanding Ottoman Empire. After the final defeat of the North Albanian leader, Prince Gjergj Kastrioti, who died in 1468, most of the Christian population escaped to Southern Italy and Sicily. Those who stayed converted mostly to Islam. Since this time, the Orthodox church has

Independence to Recognition (RFE/RFL Research Report, Vol 3, No 1, 7 January 1994), p. 119 cited in: Human Rights Watch Helsinki, *The Macedonians of Greece*, (New York, May 1994), p. 4.

supported uprisings in the southern part of Albania and the Roman Catholic church has subsidized uprisings in the northern part of Albania.

In 1913 Serbia had to accept the existence of a sovereign Albania as a Serbian neighbor.⁴⁷

To the West, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia was still confronted with Austria-Hungary, whose plans for expansionism conflicted with those of Serbia and still baned the realization of the Great Serbian dream. When Russia was defeated by Japan on its far eastern border, Russia turned its interest back to pan-Slavism and again became a strong supporter of the Great Serbian idea. The idea of uniting all southern Slav nationalities of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire under Serbia had already led to growing tensions throughout the years. Austria's General Staff under von Hötendorf had developed several plans for preventive war against Serbia as well as against Italy.

Serbia also had a long tradition of achieving goals by means other than diplomacy: war, terrorism and assassination are found in the tool box. When the heir-apparent of Austria-Hungary, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife visited Sarajevo, both were killed by a Bosnian student on June 28, 1914.

It soon became evident that the attack was not from a misled lunatic. The assault was sponsored by the Serbian government and welcomed by the pan-Slavic nationalist public. In its ultimatum of July 23, 1914, Austria-Hungary demanded the punishment of the terrorist and Austrian participation in the commission of inquiry. Serbia reluctantly agreed, but pointed out that foreign participation in the inquiry was a challenge to Serbian sovereignty.

9. Conclusions on Serbia, the Balkans and the Great Powers

Analyzing the Balkan history, beginning with the arrival of the Slavs in the early Middle Ages until a young extremist of the most fanatical armed Serb faction

⁴⁷ Ever since 1913, Albania had to steer a course avoiding a collision with its much more powerful neighbors, Yugoslavia and Italy.

of the Yugoslav movement murdered the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, makes various layers of motivation perceptible. These incentives accumulated throughout the centuries and led in 1914 to a war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. Belgrade fought for a unified state of all Southern Slavs. The Serbs throughout history have felt themselves given a unique mission distinct from the other Balkan inhabitants. This mission in the beginning of the 20th century crystallized, they felt, into their task of achieving a nation-state for all southern Slavs.

Various momentums encouraged this conviction about Serbia's historical mission.

The religious momentum: The defeat during both the battles of Kosovo created a sense of special Serbian responsibility for the duty that is only achievable through religious martyrdom. Serbia sacrificed itself in defending Christianity against Islam and the conquering Turks.

The nationalist momentum: The Serbs still remember with pride their early Serbian Empire of the 14th century, even though the crowned Tsar of Serbs and Greeks, Stephan Dusan, failed to conquer Constantinople and with it the imperial crown. Since 1343 the Serbs have felt that they have lived through centuries under a foreign yoke. But in reviving and pursuing their idea of a Greater Serbia they made enormous progress in reshaping their Balkan territory. At the beginning of the 20th century their vision of achieving a nation-state for all southern Slavs was in reach again.

The momentum of force: Serbian convictions about the legitimacy of the use of force, including violence, to achieve national goals are founded in the legacy of the Great Serbian dream. Aggression, invasion and war against neighboring territories to ensure the expansion of Serbia were considered legitimate methods. The assassination of the ruler (and his wife) to extinguish a dynasty or as simple political course-correction was considered proper policy.

The momentum of power politics: political arrangements in the Balkans resulted from power politics. The Great Powers used the nationalism of the different ethnic groups to weaken the other Great Powers. The ethnic groups and smaller nations of the Balkans thus realized that their fate shifted under the influence of the Great Powers. Great Powers rose, expanded and declined. Smaller nations were only allowed to act in coalition with Great Powers. Smaller nations formed part of the greater power's zones of interests, either used as buffers or traded as compensation among the Great Powers. The Great Powers competed with each other, and their goals in the Balkans were directly influenced by success or defeat elsewhere. This worldwide correlation on the eve of the First World War may be explained for Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary as follows:

For *Britain* the existence of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish control of the Straits was a cheap but weak guarantee to keep the Russians away from the Mediterranean, where London planned to establish a link via Egypt to India and the African colonies, with access to Persia.

Russia had reached the Pacific but its fleet was defeated by Japan, which established itself as a Great Power trying to dominate East and South East Asia and even China. The former Spanish overseas empire had declined and the Spanish Pacific possessions (i.e. the Philippines and other islands, sighted during the period of discovery by them) became interesting to the Americans and the Japanese. Unable to influence the events on the Pacific rim in Russia's pursuit of glory, Russia could concentrate in European politics and sponsor members of the pan-Slavic movement.

France was left to isolation because of Bismarck's diplomacy, but profited from every mishap in German foreign policy. France dedicated its efforts to colonial extension in Africa. France's foreign policy centered on getting back Alsace-Lorraine and arranging a treaty network at the expense of Germany.

Germany under Prussia's lead felt itself misunderstood by all the Great Powers and was unable to establish herself as a partner of Great Britain. Germany's

isolation brought her closer to its remaining partner, the unpredictable and weak Austria-Hungary.

In the *Double Monarchy* Austria, however, was far from realizing its weakened position and unable to conduct a course of *Realpolitik*. Exclusively obsessed with the goal of expanding southward, Austria was unable to counter the domestic threat presented by the multiple ethnic groups in the Austrian part of the Double Monarchy. Unrest had reached the Polish population in Galicia and Silesia, and the Czechs and Slovaks in Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. In the Balkans the Croats, Slovenians and Bosnians were all ready to fight for their own sovereign nation at the first opportunity.

E. HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE, EUROPE AND THE BALKANS, 1914 - 1945

1. The First World War

Once the decision was made in Austria to go to war, despite all the diplomatic efforts of Germany and Great Britain to avoid the confrontation, Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914. The other powers checked via their diplomats that the earlier agreed treaties would work (the French President Poincaré, for example, visited Russia on July 20 to 23), and then mobilized their armed forces and declared war in accordance with their treaties.

Serbia declared war on Germany. Russia already at war with Germany, declared war on Austria-Hungary on August 6, and two Austrian offensives against Serbia in 1914 failed. On October 6, 1915, a coalition of German and Austria-Hungarian troops crossed the Danube river and conquered Belgrade on October 10, 1915, and completely defeated Serbia for the rest of the war until the Oriental Army of the Allies reconquered Belgrade on November 1, 1918. This and the defeat of Bulgaria were primarily accomplished by the Serbian troops of the Allied Oriental Army.

Serbia became part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which was proclaimed on December 1, 1918.

The protector of Serbia, the Russia of Tsar Nicholas II, was replaced by a revolutionary Russia before the war ended. Nicholas II abdicated power after the February Revolution in 1917, but he and his family were assassinated on July 17, 1918.

The Double Monarchy ceased to exist on October 10, 1918, when Emperor Charles promised to establish Austria-Hungary as a Confederation. On October 20, 1918, a revolution in Vienna led to a sovereign Hungarian Government, which was established on November 1, 1918.

2. The Decline of the Versailles Treaty 1919 - 1939

On January 18, 1919, the Paris peace conference began without Germany and worked on the conditions for a peace agreement, which was handed over to the German delegation on May 7, 1919, and accepted by the protesting German National Assembly on June 28, 1919. The newly elected democratic German National Assembly congregated for the first time in Weimar. The assembly responded to the London Ultimatum and agreed on 132 Billions of Gold Marks on May 5, 1921, as the total amount of reparations to be paid.

Austria had to sign its peace treaty in St. Germain en Laye on September 10.⁴⁸ Thus marking the very end of all Habsburg's imperial designs, Austria had to agree to a sovereign Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary. Tirol went to Italy as did Trieste. Istria and areas in Dalmatia went to Yugoslavia.

Hungary signed the Trianon treaty in which the Banat area was divided between Romania and Yugoslavia. The treaty took away Croatia and Slovenia from

⁴⁸ Austria had to sign its peace treaty in St. Germain en Laye on September 10, where 500 years earlier on September 10, 1414 at St. Germain en Laye the electorate Assembly of the Holy Roman empire decided not to elect the French King Francois I but instead agreed on a Habsburg King to become their Emperor.

Hungary what later became Yugoslavia. Slovakia became part of Czechoslovakia and Siebenbürgen went to Romania.

Bulgaria in the Neuilly Treaty (signed November 27, 1914) lost all territories in Thrace to Greece and no longer had any access to the Mediterranean in the Aegean sea.

The Versailles Treaty did not work out as the "Peace without Victory" that had been earlier proclaimed by United States President Wilson. It did not bring the Nations peacefully together as intended in the League of Nations. Instead of neighbors living peacefully together old ideas were revived in the competition for power and resources.

In Russia the Revolution favored the Bolshevik party; and with Lenin's proclamation of Communism, Russia's pan-Slavic dream was revived to help in dominating Russia's area of interest. The countries liberated from the Ottoman yoke to achieve national sovereignty should now, Moscow argued, form an International Communist Union, and Russia would help all communist parties in the world to export revolution, so that in the long run the capitalist countries could be defeated.

In Germany public opinion became more and more reluctant over the years to accept the treaties. The democratic parties and political coalitions of the Weimar republic were not able to produce confidence in democratic procedures, especially when the world economic crisis reached Germany and a huge amount of the population became unemployed. Extremist parties portrayed their political opponents as scapegoats, and promised an end to the Versailles humiliation, rearmament and work for everybody; these parties thus became more and more popular.

Whereas communism was used in Russia to justify worldwide expansionism and replaced under Bolshevik rule Russian nationalism as a label (but not as an idea), in Germany nationalism was used to get away from the humiliation of the draconian Versailles treaty and to reestablish Germany as a sovereign power.

In 1933 Hitler assumed power, employed almost everybody in huge governmental projects, and rearmed Germany. When the Polish leader Pilsudski sounded out Paris about assistance against Nazi Germany in early 1933, he achieved nothing and therefore in May 1933 undertook a rapprochement with Hitler. The conclusion of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement on July 18, 1935, allowed Hitler more freedom in foreign affairs. The sanctions imposed against Italy by the League of Nations pushed Mussolini into Hitler's arms, and France chose to accept Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. Chamberlain's "appeasement" policy was intended to integrate Germany and Italy in a four-power European order which could replace the Versailles settlement. On January 27, 1939, Hitler decided to build a powerful German High Seas Fleet, breaking the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Hitler's open expansion started with the incorporation of Austria into the *Third Reich* on March 13, 1938, followed by the Sudetenland after the Munich pact of September 29, 1938. The remainder of Czechoslovakia was dismantled on March 15, 1939. When on March 31, 1939, Britain guaranteed Polish independence (following Germany's establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the inclusion of Slovakia as a German satellite), Hitler arrived at the limits of "peaceful" extension.

3. The Second World War

Hitler was willing to wage war in order to subjugate Europe. The Second World War devastated much of Europe and killed fifty-five million people. It led directly to the Holocaust, D-Day, the unconditional surrender, the Nuremberg trials, and a divided Germany (in accordance with the London Protocol of September 12, 1944).

In the Balkans in April 1939 Mussolini invaded and annexed Albania and used Albania as basis to attack Greece on October 28, 1940, -- without success, however. The Soviet Union on June 28, 1940, annexed Romania's part of Bessarabia and the northern part of the Bukovina. Bulgaria and Hungary got back their

territories which were annexed by Romania in 1919: Siebenbürgen and the Bukovina.

Yugoslavia at the outbreak of World War II stayed neutral. However, warned by Mussolini's actions, Belgrade decided in December 1940 to sign a friendship agreement with Hungary and to join the Three Power Pact (Rome-Berlin-Tokyo) on March 25, 1941. This bowing to foreign pressure led immediately to a putsch by Serbian officers who overwhelmed Prince Regent Paul and his president Dragisa Ćvetković. They proclaimed Peter II as King and ruler on 27 March, 1941.

When Yugoslavia on April 4, 1941, signed a Yugoslavian-Soviet agreement on friendship, Hitler decided to react as well. The German Army conquered Yugoslavia: air strikes on Belgrade on April 6 were followed by the occupation of Zagreb on April 10, the occupation of Belgrade on April 12 and 13 and the capitulation of the Yugoslavian army on April 17, 1941.

Simultaneously Bulgarian troops invaded Thrace and Macedonia. When German troops conquered Saloniki on April 9, 1941, they broke the Greek Metaxa defense line and the British Thermopylae defense line, and proceeded to occupy Athens on April 27, and the Peloponnesus, the Greek islands and Crete during the rest of May.

The invasion of Yugoslavia in Spring 1941 created an independent Croatia, the Croatia of Ante Pavelic. A German military administration was installed in Serbia, with a German dependent Serb government established under the Serb General Milan Nedić on August 30, 1941.

Areas north of Croatia were annexed by the *Third Reich*. Laibach, Montenegro and Dalmatia became part of Italy. Parts of Macedonia went to Bulgaria, with other parts of the territory transferred to Hungary. King Peter II and his government fled to London, as well as King George II of Greece.

In Yugoslavia basically two groups initiated in partisan warfare to fight the occupation forces: the monarchist movement of General Draza Michailović and the communist movement of Josip Broz. Tito formed a provisional government and

unified the partisan movement. He gained the support of the Allies in 1943. However, during the period Yugoslavia was controlled by the occupation force of the *Wehrmacht* a total of 1.7 million Yugoslavs, including partisans and civilians killed in retaliation, became victims of the war.

Churchill's 1943 plan to attack Italy with an Allied invasion force and to disembark in the Po river delta to contain a huge amount of German troops prior to an invasion in Normandy was not accepted. This opened the Balkans as an area of influence for the Soviet Union.

4. Conclusions on Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Germany

I. Garasanin's 19th century program for a Great Serbia was realized after the First World war by uniting the Kingdom of Serbia-Montenegro under the dynastic rule of the Karadordević Alexander I with some former parts of Austria-Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the southern part of Steiermark, the Vojvodina and areas of western Bulgaria, the Kosovo and Macedonia. The Serbs were determined to dominate this multi-ethnic and multi-religious state.

The first constitution in 1921 officially stated the predominance of the Serbs and therefore was not accepted by the Croats. The federative-oriented Croat party of Stjepan Radić refused parliamentary cooperation until 1924, and then joined a coalition from July 1925 to April 1926. In June 1928 Stjepan Radić and two other Croat members of parliament were assassinated. King Alexander I proclaimed the Dictatorship of the King and tried to reorganize Yugoslavia by creating a supranational Yugoslavian patriotism. He did not achieve his goal and was assassinated by Macedonian and Croat extremists on March 9, 1931. A new authoritarian constitution and very restricted elections assured a majority for a government in favor of the military and the police. Relatively free elections in 1935 strengthened the opposition, and on August 26, 1939, the government agreed in to create a province of Croatia with strong autonomy.

A first conclusion on Yugoslavia might be that only an external threat of immense magnitude is able to bring the different ethnic groups together. Whenever

the Serbs have felt their rule endangered, they have used force and assassination to act in favor of keeping power. The Croats seem to have always been ready to accept a loose organization, working together (if necessary) in a federation, but preferring to be autonomous.

The Soviet Union continued the tradition of Russian expansionism and exchanged through revolution the idea of Russian pan-Slav nationalism for a new ideology of international communism. Once the Bolshevik rule was established and Stalin took over, nationalists and other competitors in achieving power were eliminated. Stalin allowed himself all sorts of alliances, even a Hitler-Stalin pact, to achieve his Soviet expansionism.

In Germany Hitler gained power by using the public's dissatisfaction with the "unfair" Versailles treaties and the readiness of the population for an ambitious form of German nationalism, which might lead to a better future. To achieve his goals he allowed himself all sorts of coalitions. To fight the Social Democrats, he even united his Brown Shirts with the Communists. Once in power he used all sorts of propaganda and demagogism. And when he could no longer achieve his goals "peacefully", he did not hesitate to use force, which led to war.

III. FROM YUGOSLAV CIVIL WAR TO TITO'S HERITAGE

A. PRELUDE

A Croat, Josip Broz, called Tito, made his way to become the most powerful man in Yugoslavia. He managed to rule the Yugoslavia he created until he died in

1980. However, Tito's political system contained weaknesses which explain why Tito's heritage in the 1980s could not survive and why Titoism eventually had to collapse with or without his leadership.

This chapter argues that the Yugoslav people's nationalism was used by Tito to establish and maintain power. The manipulation of Yugoslav nationalism was administered by the Yugoslav League of Communists (YLC) using a "federal arrangement." This Socialist federalism was too fragile to stand on its own. The rationality to run the Yugoslav economy by so-called "self-management" is examined and reasons given why this economic model was unable to endure. Both the "federal arrangement" and "self-management" systems were incapable of providing a sufficient economic basis. They are held responsible for the non-viability of Tito's heritage.

The first section deals with inter-war Yugoslavia and the unfinished business left over from Versailles and the second section shows how Tito used the uncertainties during the war to achieve power and succeeded in obtaining external Allied support for the partisan movement.

The third section explains how Tito used the Yugoslav people's nationalism, which he embodied in the myth of the heroic partisans. During this process he was able to get all other aspirants to power exterminated. Tito's vision of international communism reveals the impossibility of cooperating with General Dragoljub Michailović. General 'Draza' Michailović fought against the occupying German forces for a royal postwar Yugoslavia. Because of his perception of Serbia's national interest, he was reluctant to fight the Serbs of Nazi Germany's Serbian puppet

General Milan Nedić. Tito succeeded in aligning all the peoples of Yugoslavia towards the Communist camp, against all expectations based on Yugoslavia's earlier anti-communist history.

Yugoslavia's King Alexander, a former page at the Russian imperial court at St Petersburg, provided refuge and generous material support in Yugoslavia for thousands of post-1917 anti-communist Russian exiles. This help even included setting up and maintaining an officers' school for cadets who had escaped to Yugoslavia after 1917. Even after the king's assassination in 1934, Yugoslavia continued its anti-communist policy and was one of the last European states to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1940.⁴⁹

Section four considers Tito's method of pushing the international Communist post-war agenda too quickly for the Kremlin's leadership. This forced Yugoslavia out of the Soviet camp by 1948 when Stalin decided to impose the break. Tito, however, arranged that his type of communism in the following years was considered to be a bulwark against the Soviet Union by the West as well as by independent Communists and the later "Non-Aligned-Countries". In doing so, Tito assured American and western support for Yugoslavia. Henceforth any attempt by Moscow to dominate Yugoslavia would harm East-West relations.

A federal political structure was created to deal with the nationalism within Yugoslavia. This structure was supposed to provide for socialist federalism and was labeled "brotherhood and unity". Its purpose was to counterbalance the several ethnic entities by a federal bureaucracy before they might break away in nationalist divisions.

Section five shows that Titoism did not create a viable Yugoslav socialism, a "Third way" or a path to "Open Socialism". All Socialist scientific planning, Five-Year and One-Year plans, funds and programs to help Yugoslavia's underdeveloped regions failed. Yugoslav socialism worked only with money pumped into the

⁴⁹ Cviic, Christopher, *Remaking the Balkans*, (New York, Council On Foreign Relations Press, 1991), p. 12.

economy from outside. Credits supplied by Western anti-Soviet fear alone kept the economic system going. Private ownership of means of production was banned. Worker "self-management" was simply a public relations exercise.

Section six illustrates the weakness of Tito's heritage as the fertile ground for the events of the 1990s.

B. INTER-WAR YUGOSLAVIA: THE AFTERMATH OF VERSAILLES

Inter-war Yugoslavia can be regarded as a result of the unfinished business left over from Versailles, where the peacemakers intended to provide:

...the permanent diminution of German power, the permanent containment of Russian power, and the permanent restoration of international order in Europe.⁵⁰

Furthermore, Joseph Rothschild writes,

At the close of World War I, the four defeated empires that had dominated and ruled East Central Europe -- the German, Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian empires -- were replaced by a dozen new or restored or enlarged would-be nation-states, all of which based their asserted legitimation on the reigning politico-moral principle of national self-determination....The territorial arrangements ... for all their admitted flaws...still freed three times as many people from nationally alien rule as they subjected to such rule.⁵¹

These 25 per cent, those who ended up under "alien" rule, contributed to the internal weaknesses and external vulnerabilities of the peace settlement which caused cross-border ethnic tension. Explaining the inter-war background, Joseph Rothschild suggests that

⁵⁰ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), 2nd ed., p. 3.

⁵¹ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity*, p. 3.

... as a general rule in interwar East Central Europe, common borders entailed hostile relations.... Simply to list the area's internal irredentist disputes may convey an impression of their cumulative complexity, though not of their bitter and well-nigh paralyzing intensity.⁵²

In Italy's case, despite Rome being with the winners after the war, the peace settlement frustrated Italian hopes to dominate both sides of the Adriatic Sea. In Italian, the Adriatic Sea is still called "our sea" (*mare nostro*). In 1919, Italy's design for Yugoslavia was reaching even further out:

Italy craved Yugoslavia's Dalmatian littoral on the Adriatic Sea and schemed to fragment the entire Yugoslav State into its ethnoregional components. It also aspired to control Albania directly and to intimidate Greece into subservience. Indeed, Italy's ambitions also included the establishment of diplomatic protectorates over Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, in order to redouble the pressure on Yugoslavia. But in contrast to Germany and the Soviet Union, Italy lacked the economic and military muscle to realize its political designs.⁵³

To allow every ethnic group or self-defined "nation" to become a nation-state under its own rule was President Wilson's vision, which created large difficulties in the Versailles settlement:

The determination of a newly independent state to 'nation-ize' not only its cultural and political patrimonies but also its economic wealth was often a key motive behind such seemingly social and 'class' programs as land reform and etatist industrialization. They were politically easiest where property of 'alien' landlords and entrepreneurs could be expropriated for the benefit of 'native' peasants and bureaucrats. Such an amalgamation of ethnic and social

⁵² Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity*, p. 8.

⁵³ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity*, p. 9.; note that Italy continued to challenge Yugoslavia on territorial issues, mainly around Trieste and in Dalmatia until Italy agreed in the CSCE Helsinki conference protocol in 1975.

policy was facilitated by the fact that ethnic, religious and class differences and identities often coincided or at least overlapped....In the Balkans, the entrepreneurial class was Greek, Italian, and Jewish and only incipiently native, while in several areas the landlords were still Muslim or Magyar.⁵⁴

In inter-war Yugoslavia the problems almost immediately started with the formal ideology of a "Yugoslav" nationality, which appeared to be a manipulative device screening the Serb domination. The Serbs intended to politically control Yugoslavia, even though as the Croatian economy and culture was by far more developed. Yugoslavia's first constitution in 1921 stated the predominance of the centralistic Serbs and therefore was not accepted by the Croats. The Croat party of Stjephan Radic refused for years any parliamentary participation.

Forms and styles of governmental activity - some of which persist to this day - passed through several similar sequences in interwar East Central European countries. Yet throughout these changes and phases the bureaucratic political class formed the effective...virtually autonomous ruling class.⁵⁵

The Great Depression eroded the parliamentary regimes of the 1920s, which had protected the bureaucracy's ongoing power. This led to a replacement of the "old regimes" by royal, military or political dictatorships.

In June 1928 Stjephan Radic and two Croat parliament members were assassinated. In 1929 King Aleksandar abolished the constitution and declared royal dictatorship over Yugoslavia. He tried to save Yugoslavia by creating a supranational Yugoslav patriotism. He was ready to abolish even the royal name of the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" in favor of Yugoslavia, meaning "South

⁵⁴ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity*, p. 11.

⁵⁵ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity*, p. 18.

Slavs". Slovenian, Serbian, Croatian and Macedonian extremists had, however, their own agendas for the future of Yugoslavia.

The imposing domestic and diplomatic successes of the Nazis, which contrasted so vividly with the apparent stagnation and decadence of France, gave the impression that authoritarian dictatorship was the wave for the future. States of lesser power, especially new or restored states, generally take as their model the political institutions and values of the seemingly strongest and most successful Great Power of the day. On the morrow of World War I, it appeared to be France; after the Depression, it became Germany....Furthermore, and with specific reference to East Central Europe, Nazi Germany's policies rendered territorial revisionism realistically 'thinkable', and ethnic xenophobia...psychologically 'respectable'.⁵⁶

In March 1931 Yugoslavia's King Aleksander was assassinated by Macedonian and Croat extremists and a new authoritarian constitution in favor of police and military control was established. Germany meanwhile

supplied capital goods for industry, encouraged the diversification of vulnerable one-crop agricultures, and offered a steady market at reasonable prizes. Nazi Germany's economic policy and behavior thus effectively supplemented its ideological, political, military, and diplomatic prowess in attracting Danubian and Balkan Europe to itself in the second half of 1930s. Though the Serbs recoiled at the last moment, the Yugoslav governments had also climbed on this bandwagon.⁵⁷

Despite the Versailles Treaty's aim of permanent diminution of German power, the post-Depression circumstances allowed Nazi-Germany to embark on a war in which Germany would be replaced by the Soviet Union as the region's hegemonic power:

Nazi Germany acquired control over the region's economy by first dominating its exports, then (through exports) controlling its imports,

⁵⁶ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity*, p. 19.

⁵⁷ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity*, p. 20.

and finally rendering it utterly dependent on continued German purchases, supplies, spare parts, and infrastructure. In this way, Germany achieved a position approaching both monopsony and monopoly. By 1939 on the eve of World War II, Germany's economic hegemony over East Central Europe was more categorical than it had been in 1913, demonstrating that the political advantages that occurred to it from the replacement of the Habsburg Empire by several smaller states were paralleled by economic opportunities. Thus the combination of Nazi Germany's ideological, diplomatic, political, and economical drives paved the way for its military conquests. In one form or another, all the states of the region eventually succumbed to German offensives, as resisting victims (Poland, Yugoslavia), as passive victims (Czechoslovakia), as calculating satellites (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria), as ephemerally 'independent' dependencies (Slovakia, Croatia), or as trophies from the mid-war collapse of Italy (Albania).⁵⁸

That Yugoslavia is listed as "resisting victim" -- contrary to Croatia -- became Tito's merit. The Communist movement in Yugoslavia had not influenced the course of events before Tito actually appeared on the scene.

1. Tito's Biography Before 1927

Josip Broz, later known as Tito, was born in 1892 in Kumrovec in Croatia. The Croat town of Kumrovec is situated at the Sutla river, forming the border to Slovenia, in the province known as Zagorje. Few noteworthy events of his childhood are known. Nora Beloff⁵⁹ wrote that "the details of his early life are hard to come by". The only evidence of Tito's achievements was his own testimony.

⁵⁸ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity*, pp. 22-23.

⁵⁹ Nora Beloff belongs to a *revisionist* school of historians (discussed at a later point in this chapter). Already in the 1980s she and others, including authorities like Harold Lydall, challenged the established interpretations of the Yugoslav events.

According to Tito's former friend and later critic, Milovan Djilas, who was very close to Tito throughout the war, "everyone, except his most slavish toadies, took Tito's self-mythologizing as harmless fun."⁶⁰

In Tito's case a distinct streak of "mythomania" added to the difficulty that influenced biographies. With regard to Tito's birthplace, Nora Beloff reports that

both Croatia and Slovenia were, of course, still parts of the Habsburg Empire and both were Roman Catholic. But Croatia had belonged to Hungary for some 800 years and at that time formed part of the Hungarian side of the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that serfdom was abolished in the region (Tito's grandfather was one of the beneficiaries). Slovenian lands, on the other hand, were part of the hereditary Austrian territories and in the eighteenth century the peasants were already benefiting from Joseph II's enlightened despotism.⁶¹

Due to the Habsburg tradition of preserving administrative records, Tito biographers know that as a child he survived a nearly-fatal diphtheria attack. Once he finished school and had grown up, Tito

went first to Zagreb, where he worked as a general mechanic in a workshop and then to Kamnik in Slovenia, where he joined the Sokol, a pan-Slav and pro-Yugoslav society....He was soon off to Bohemia, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire...He then went on to Munich and worked for a while at Mannheim at the Benz automobile factory before going on to Vienna, where he was employed by Daimler....He obediently went home, when he was aged twenty-one, and was summoned for military service. He was assigned to a Croat infantry regiment and soon became the youngest NCO [non commissioned officer] in this unit.⁶²

⁶⁰ Djilas, Milovan, *Tito: the story from the inside*, (New York, 1980) cited in: Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1985), p. 31.

⁶¹ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p. 32.

⁶² Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p. 37.

Nora Beloff reports that in 1908 Tito joined the Imperial Army. During this time many educated young people in Croatia and Slovenia were taken up with the idea of the unification of the Southern Slavs: Serbs, Croats and Slovenes merged into a single independent state. But in 1908 the Habsburgs formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Slav provinces formerly within the Ottoman Empire. The Dual Monarchy responded to growing Slav restlessness by a mixture of carrot and stick: on the one hand, material concessions, on the other, the exploitation of latent differences between its Orthodox and Catholic subjects. When Tito came to power, he employed similar methods, earning him the sobriquet "the last of the Habsburgs".

In June 1914 Gavriilo Princip, an eighteen-year-old, was recruited, armed and trained by the most fanatical wing of the Yugoslav movement. This armed faction was the Serb minority.

Their leaders sent Princip to murder Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne. When war was declared Tito experienced warfare in the Imperial Army.

There is no record that he had any misgivings about marching against Serbia but, in any case, a few month later his regiment was moved to the Russian front....For Tito's wartime experience, we have to rely almost entirely on his personal testimony. As he recalled, his regiment, having reached a tributary of the Dniestre River, was suddenly attacked and overwhelmed by fierce Circassian warriors. Fighting off one Circassian bayonet, he was pierced in the back by another and left bleeding and unconscious....Tito claims he was taken by stage to the little town on the Volga near Kazan, where he spent a year in an Orthodox monastery which had been transformed into a military hospital. He was subsequently employed as a mechanic on the trans-Siberian railway.⁶³

Nora Beloff continues to report that

⁶³ Maclean, F., *Tito: a pictorial biography*, (New York, 1980) cited in: Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1985), p. 38.

According to his story, he made his way to Leningrad (then Petrograd), participating in Bolshevik demonstrations against the Kerensky Provisional Government...was locked up in the fortress of St Peter and St Paul and then sent to Omsk in Siberia. After the Bolsheviks took over he and other prisoners joined the Red Guard and helped protect the railways. When Omsk was recaptured by the Whites, Tito found refuge in the home of a beautiful fifteen-year-old Russian girl, already member of the Communist party, Pelagea Byelusnova, generally known as Polka. In flight from the Whites, he said, he found a job as mill operator, in the services of...a Kirgiz tribal chieftain... [and]...when the Reds got back he returned to Polka, followed her into the Communist party and early in the 1920s married her in the little Orthodox church of Bogoljubskoye near Omsk.though he and Polka stayed long enough in Siberia to witness the Bolsheviks final victory,the young couple packed their few possessions, turned their back on the revolution and made their way, slowly via Leningrad and Vienna, to his childhood home Kumrovec,...now in a different country under another dynasty.⁶⁴

From 1921 to 1925 Tito worked in Zagreb as a flour mill operator and Polka produced four children, of which only one survived. Polka returned to Russia in 1929 while Tito was serving a prison sentence.

2. Tito's Ascent to Power

In Yugoslavia the Bolshevik triumph in Russia, a contrast with the general chaos at home, helped the Communist party.

In the first parliamentary elections for the Yugoslav assembly, they polled 12.4 per cent of the votes, notably by exploiting the discontent of ethnic minorities not yet adjusted to the new Yugoslavia. But they knew they could never win power by due electoral processes and they tried instead to break up the state by inciting separatism and revolution....In their frustration, the Communists resorted to terror. They tried and failed to assassinate the Prince Regent, later King Alexander I.But they did manage to shoot and kill the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior, Milorad Draskovic... After Draskovic's murder the 59 elected Communist deputies were deprived of their mandate....Most of the Communist leadership fled the country,

⁶⁴ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p. 40.

established a Communist Central Committee abroad and involved themselves in esoteric doctrinal disputes.⁶⁵

It took Tito 13 years to achieve power in the Communist Yugoslav Party. At the mill in Zagreb in 1921 Tito had ample time to tell

... nostalgic stories about his role in the Russian revolution. Having allowed his sympathies to be known, he was spotted in 1924 by Stevo Sabic, an educated middle-class Croat and former army officer, first in the Austro-Hungarian than in the Red Army. Unlike Tito he had stayed on in Russia to become part of the revolutionary apparatus.⁶⁶

It was the Comintern, as secret arm of Soviet foreign policy, which gave paid employment first to Sabic and, later, to the man who was to present himself as the incarnation of Yugoslav patriotism....It was as a trade-union organizer that Tito, guided and financed by his new friend Sabić, began his thirteen years' ascent from a rank-and-file member of a front organization to being endorsed by Stalin as Secretary General of a reconstituted Yugoslav Communist Party. Tito's zeal and flair impressed his colleagues. After successfully inciting strikes, first at the Kraljevica shipyard on the Adriatic, then at the railway repair workshop at Smederevo near Belgrade, he was appointed in 1927, legally, local secretary of [the] Zagreb Metal Workers' Union and, illegally, member of the party local Committee. By now he was a professional revolutionary, living off the Russians until 1939, when...the Yugoslav Communist Party was able to finance its operations from its own funds.⁶⁷

Tito was twice arrested and sent to prison both times. In the royalist era Tito even managed to get the son of his judge, Vladimir Bakaric, to become one of his closest followers. Tito was out of prison in 1928, during the perennial Serbo-Croat quarrel over the centralist Yugoslav state.

⁶⁵ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, pp. 41-42.

⁶⁶ Maclean, F., *Tito: a pictorial biography*, (New York, 1980) cited in: Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1985), p. 42.

⁶⁷ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p. 43.

An extremist Montenegrin deputy shot Stjepan Radić, the popular Croat peasant leader. In the subsequent round-up, the police found a cache of weapons in Tito's lodging and he was subsequently arrested. The new regime handled its political prisoners differently. After Tito had declared himself Communist, an illegal act, he was sent to jail for an additional five years. Freed in 1933, Tito was ordered to go back to Kumrovec and report daily to the local police station, where the local police chief was an old schoolfellow.

Within a few months of his release, Tito was invited to the Party's headquarters in Vienna and co-opted into the Central Committee. Tito returned with authority bestowed by membership in the Central Committee, and in September 1934 he convened a Communist conference in the castle of Gornji Grad outside Ljubljana. The Comintern had already selected two of the younger of 30 conspirators (Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrić) for Moscow training, men who later became Tito's closest collaborators.

In 1934, King Alexander I. attempted to save Yugoslavia in another effort to strengthen the bonds of the Little Entente, a group sponsored by France and formed by Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Tito, by now a well-educated and trained believer in the communist international movement, did his best to break up Yugoslavia into the "worker-and-peasant states in Croatia, Dalmatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Vojvodina." Tito intended to use the nationalism of these entities within the proper Marxist-Leninist context to push forward towards a future socialist world, in which there was no need and no place for a "Yugoslavia."

Alexander set out for an official visit to France where he arrived on October 9, 1934, and was murdered by an Ustasha terrorist in Marseilles. In Yugoslavia, Communists and their Ustasha associates became immediately targets of police investigations and action. Fearing police repression, Tito departed for Vienna and Moscow. In Moscow he was given a job in the Balkan section of the Comintern and in 1935 appointed Secretary of the Yugoslav delegation.

...in Moscow in 1938,...he and a colleague, Vladimir Čopić (later liquidated in the Stalinist purges) jointly translated Stalin's *History of the Soviet Communist Party*....Before he became party leader he virtually had no personal property, but in 1939, when the Yugoslav communist party, by then under his direction, ceased to depend on Russian subsidies...he drew on party funds to buy himself a vineyard.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union Stalin realized that Hitler no longer needed the German Communists to demolish the Weimar Republic. Instead, Hitler diverted national energies towards rearmament and preparations for war. Therefore all parties in Yugoslavia had to join in a "Popular Front" and support the new "anti-Fascist" line of parties opposed to Nazism throughout Europe.

C. THE SECOND WORLD WAR: CIVIL-WAR YUGOSLAVIA

Tito successfully used the uncertainties of the war to achieve power over his rivals. His exploitation of ethnic nationalism to suit his agenda is well-documented. As a trained Communist, Tito followed Stalin's revolution from above, a revolutionary principle he admired. "Stalinism" became fixed, too, in the international movement. The *Komunisticka partija Jugoslavihe* (KPJ, Communist Party of Yugoslavia) was no exception to this rule.

Stalin's task for Tito with respect to his responsibilities in Yugoslavia became very difficult. First, the Party had to cooperate with any other anti-Fascist political group. Second, Tito had to abandon his popular support for ethnic separatism and promote the defence and unity of Yugoslavia. Tito planned to prepare Yugoslavia's Communists for war and Yugoslavia as a potential ally for the Soviet Union.

After the Axis aggression in April 1941, the royal government of Yugoslavia, headed by King Peter II, fled the country and ultimately established itself in London as an Allied government in exile. After the

⁶⁸ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, pp. 34-36.

Yugoslav armed forces capitulated to the Germans on April 17, the territory of Yugoslavia was either portioned outright among the Axis partners and their satellites (Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria) or incorporated into special occupational zones (Serbia, Banat). The unannexed portions of Croatia with Bosnia-Herzegovina formally became a new Axis ally, the Independent State of Croatia.⁶⁹

The Soviet government agreed to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia in an effort to prevent the expansion of the war into the Balkans. Stalin signed a "Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact" with Belgrade in Moscow only hours before the Axis forces attacked Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941. Diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia were terminated by the Soviet Union on May 8, 1941.

In October 1940 the Yugoslav Communist party had 6,600 members. It began armed resistance with 12,000 members in 1941, with an end strength of 140,000 in 1945.⁷⁰

In order to cooperate with other anti-Fascist groups Tito could count upon 17,800 additional members in the *Savez komunističke omladine Jugoslavije* (SKOJ, League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia). By June 1941 he was able to inform Stalin that he had reached an agreement with Dragiljub Javonović, the leader of Serbia's Left Agrarians. The aims of the agreement were full of communist revolutionary enthusiasm:

- (1) Joint struggle against the occupiers.
- (2) Joint struggle for Soviet power and alliance with the USSR.
- (3) Joint struggle against English agents and attempts to restore the old order.
- (4) Joint struggle against the stirring up of national hatred.

⁶⁹ Banac, Ivo, *With Stalin Against Tito*, (New York, Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 4.

⁷⁰ Figures from: Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity*, p.129, and Ivo Banac, *With Stalin Against Tito*, 1988, p. 4.

(5) Joint committees of the worker peasant alliance.⁷¹

Tito formed the elite First Proletarian National Liberation Shock Brigade on December 21, 1941, Stalin's birthday. He also openly embraced the iconography of international communism, a five-pointed red star and hammer and sickle. By doing so, he promoted the aims of International Communism too fast for the Soviets, because the survival of the Soviet Union depended on a strong coalition with the United States and Great Britain.

As nothing could be done to offend the British or their Yugoslav clients in London, Stalin even proposed that Tito cooperate with the Commander of the Royalist Yugoslav Army. The Royalist Serb soldiers were called Chetniks and commanded by General Draza Michailović. General Michailović acted as the Minister of War for the Yugoslav Government, which was exiled in London. He and Tito met first on September 17, 1941, and a second time on October 19, 1941.

What was to be remembered however is that Tito and his men never wavered in their intention of using the collapse of the Yugoslav state as an opportunity for replacing it by a Communist dictatorship and that this inevitably brought them into collision with Michailović's people who were fighting to preserve precisely what the Partisans were trying to destroy.⁷²

For the second meeting Tito set up a "National Committee of Liberation" and submitted twelve conditions to Michailović as a concession for going into partnership:

As an officer, still pledged to the King, he refused to recognize the authority of Tito's committees and rejected the proposal for joint court martials to carry through purges inside the armed forces.⁷³

⁷¹ Banac, Ivo, *With Stalin Against Tito*, p. 6.

⁷² Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p. 68.

⁷³ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p. 68.

Michailović still regarded the Partisans as dangerous, but assumed they were on the Yugoslav side against Nazi Germany. Tito's view was completely different. He and the other Communists disagreed over when Michailović should be eliminated.

By the end of 1941, fighting both between the Yugoslavs and against the occupiers had spread into Bosnia, Montenegro, Dalmatia, Lika and other Serb-inhabited areas all over the country. But it was at Ravna Gora that the Partisans and Michailović's forces initiated a conflict which was to last until 1947, by which time Michailović had been shot as a traitor, and the last bands of Chetniks had been rounded up and executed by the Partisans and the Communist secret police.⁷⁴

British support for Michailović faded away because Britain's priority was the struggle on the ground against the Axis powers.

To this end they [the British] were to support whoever was prepared to kill the most Germans.... There were in fact three reasons why the British dropped Michailović in favor of Tito. In the first place, Tito had convinced them that, unlike Michailović, he was a serious ally against the Germans. But he had also given a strong impression that, also unlike Michailović and his largely Serb Chetniks, he and his partisan movement enjoyed broad support among all Yugoslav nations. Finally his forces controlled a much larger territory.⁷⁵

Tito benefited greatly from the spy activity in Cairo's Special Operations Executive Office (SOE). Well-placed disinformation supported the Communist case in London.

⁷⁴ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, pp. 70-71.

⁷⁵ Cviic, Christopher, *Remaking the Balkans*, p. 20.

1. Disinformation by Communist Spies

A revisionist school of thought argues that the decision to drop Michailović and to support Tito was a tragic mistake. London's decision was due partly to overly optimistic reports by some British liaison officers on Tito's military capabilities. It was also due to deliberate pro-Tito and anti-Michailović disinformation by communists and fellow-travellers in key British organizations such as the SOE:

In the European continent, in those days, the words 'British Intelligence Service' still evoked a highly coordinated network of professional agents, masterminded undeviatingly in the higher interest of the British Empire. The reality, as Graham Greene, Malcolm Muggeridge and many others personally involved have told us, was very different. The miscellaneous bunch who staffed the *ad hoc* special services tended to spend as much time fighting each other as fighting the enemy. And as Andrew Boyle has shown, the intrigue, secrecy and unaccountability of these proliferating bodies provided ideal conditions for subversive activities.⁷⁶

Furthermore to Tito's advantage, the internal organisation of the British foreign service was adjusted in a way that would inadvertently help the Partisan cause.

The opportunity of the Westerners dedicated to the Partisan cause came in 1943 primarily because of the changed military situation. Responsibility for contacts with the resistance movements in Yugoslavia consequently shifted from London to Cairo and whereas the personnel in the London office was stolidly anti-Communist and consistently underestimated both the fighting strength and the internal discipline of the Partisans, the key people in Cairo were ideologically and, at least in one case operationally, committed to the Communist cause. As these were in control of British and, until 1944, also of American intelligence-gathering, they were in an unchallengeable

⁷⁶ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p. 87.

position to select, direct and repress material coming from the (Yugoslavian) field.⁷⁷

These circumstances (fortuitous for the Yugoslav Partisans) demolished Michailović and helped Tito gain power. But the strategic power play to organize the post-war geography -- and with it to determine the destiny of Yugoslavia -- was coordinated between the Allied Powers in defeating the Third Reich. The Percentages Agreement of October 9, 1944 negotiated between Winston S. Churchill and Stalin in the Kremlin, designed only as wartime arrangement, became very important.

Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Romania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have 90 percent predominance in Romania, for us to have 90 percent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p. 87. Nora Beloff writes further: "One Communist, well-placed to serve Party interests in Cairo, was James Klugmann, a senior member of the British Communist Party, and correctly identified as such by General Vlatko Velebit, Tito's first delegate to the West. Klugmann served as a staff officer, first in Cairo and later in Bari, handling the traffic of men and material in and out Yugoslavia....As Lieutenant-Commander A.R. Glen, DSC, RNVR (now Sir Alexander Glen; former Assistant Naval Attaché in Belgrade in 1940/41) later commented: "One can only be astounded that Klugmann was left installed in a key position in Bari. But I would guess there were many more little creatures with sharp noses and strong claws digging away for the new red dawn that obsessed them in the East." James Klugmann was at school and college with Donald Maclean and certainly formed a part of the old-boy network comprehensively exposed by Andrew Boyle, of which the most famous members, besides Donald Maclean at the Foreign Office, were Anthony Blunt at MI5, Kim Philby at MI6 and Burgess in political warfare. This group operated in comfort at a time when reformist intellectuals tended to regard the Communists as leftwing members of their common progressive family." *Ibid*, pp. 88-89.

⁷⁸ see: "The Percentages Agreement" in: Stokes, Gale, *From Stalinism To Pluralism, A Documentation History of Eastern Europe Since 1945*, (New York,

The Percentages Agreement became the base-line for the iron curtain. In order to receive British respect and support Tito had glorified his Partisan movement. The main argument the British Premier Winston S. Churchill used to impress President Franklin D. Roosevelt in order to gain American support for Tito was that the Yugoslav Partisans had the ability to pin down 33 Nazi Divisions. This again became an important well-placed disinformation.

D. CONSOLIDATING TITO'S POWER

Tito's aims were in harmony with the "national" aims of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Above all, Tito's vision of Yugoslavia would provide protection against the enemies they feared: the Slovenes feared Germany and Italy, the Croats feared Italy and Serbia and the Macedonians feared Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria.

In November-December 1942 the Central Yugoslav leadership met at the first Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation and accepted in its declaration that each group's future would be determined in accordance with each group's wishes:

The National Liberation Movement fully recognizes the national rights of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia and all other regions. It is a movement which is as much Croatian, as it is Slovene and Serbian. It guarantees that the national rights of all peoples of Yugoslavia will be preserved.⁷⁹

In November 1943, however, now with the full recognition of Tito's leadership by the United Kingdom and the support by the United States, and most important with the end of the war at hand, Tito dropped visions of national rights for the various Yugoslav peoples:

Oxford University Press, 1991), Chapter 4, pp. 31-32.

⁷⁹ Connor, Walter, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, (Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 160.

On the basis of the right of all nations to self-determination, including the union with or secession from other nations, and in accordance with the true will of all nations of Yugoslavia, tested during the three years of common national struggle for liberation which has cemented the indissoluble fraternity of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia passes the following decisions: 1. The peoples of Yugoslavia do not recognize and never have recognized the partition of Yugoslavia by Fascist Imperialists, but have proved in the common armed struggle their firm will to remain united in Yugoslavia.⁸⁰

This statement completely ignored the civil war realities and should therefore read, as Walker Connor states,

that the nations of Yugoslavia have proved by their propensity to engage in interethnic, genocidal conflict with their neighbors, their firm will to achieve independent statehood.⁸¹

1. Solving the National Question by Creating the Myth of the Heroic Partisans

Conventional history portrays the Second World War as Yugoslavia's anti-fascist struggle. A closer examination reveals numerous nationalist agendas. Tito owed his Partisan victory to his understanding of these national concerns. He successfully manipulated and skillfully exploited them for his own international communist power-seeking ends.

Michailović's Chetniks shared a fear with most Serbs of the Croats of Ante Pavelić's so-called Ustasha 'insurgent' regime. The Ustasha tried to expel the ethnic Serbs living in Croatia to German-occupied Serbia. Once this became impossible, they were sent to concentration camps. But the Serbs fought not only Bosnian Muslims and Albanians; Serbs also opposed Serbs in civil war: Serb Royalists

⁸⁰ Connor, Walter, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, p. 160.

⁸¹ Connor, Walter, *Ibid*, p.160.

against Serb Partisans, Royalists against the German puppet Nedić's army, and Nedić's army against the Partisans. During the war, when all sides annihilated opponents challenging their leadership, the Serb factor within the Partisans grew steadily. Many Serbs living in Croatia joined the Partisan ranks in Croatia in 1941 to avoid the persecution of the Pavelić regime and many Chetniks joined after Tito proclaimed an amnesty in 1943. Tito's mobilization in Serbia in 1944 to repulse the Germans and the final victory without Soviet Russian help increased the total number of Serbs in the later Yugoslav army.

2. Purpose and Reality of 33 Fabricated Axis Divisions

Christopher Cviic states that the present vigorous debate about who was or was not really fighting the Germans and why, and about the actual role of the Communists in the British change of policy is still in full spate:

For the pro-Partisans at Cairo the demolition of Michailović was not enough. In order to justify maximizing military and political support to their friends it was also necessary to convince Western governments of the indispensability of the Partisans in the war effort....By the summer of 1943 Churchill, briefed by SOE Cairo, felt able to inform Roosevelt that the Partisans were 'pinning down' 33 Axis divisions. In reality Axis troops in Yugoslavia never exceeded 30 divisions of which at that time only seven were German and most of these were battered and diminished units back from the Russian Front or youngsters in training. One of them was an SS division composed of locally recruited volunteers under German cadres, most of them Yugoslavs of German ethnic origin. The Italians never had more than sixteen divisions in Yugoslavia, all qualitatively below average strength, and the rest of the occupation force was recruited, either voluntarily or forcibly, from the native communities. Some Moslems preferred to serve in an SS division rather than join the Pavelić Croat army....On 24 September 1943 the Commander-in-Chief of the German forces visited Hitler to protest that he was expected to hold down a front of 5.000 km with ten poor-quality divisions; In October 1943, that is after the Italian collapse, the occupation troops in Yugoslavia consisted of fifteen German and eight Bulgarian and Croat divisions, nothing like enough to make up for the units lost by the Italian

withdrawal. By June 1944 the Germans had no more than eighteen divisions of their own in the whole Balkan theatre.⁸²

Once the Allied leadership was convinced of the value of the Partisan movement, Tito exploited it to destroy his rivals and build patriotism around it. The theme of the patriotic struggle could be used as unifying propaganda, whereas the historical record suggests that the real Partisan war contribution was doubtful:

According to the official German war records, the German losses between 22 June 1941 and 1 April 1945 for the entire Balkan theatre, both killed and missing, were 20,256 men including 394 officers. These included casualties incurred in Albania, Bulgaria and Greece as well as Yugoslavia (against both Michailović's and Tito's forces). Most of the losses were sustained not against the Partisans but during the Soviet and Bulgarian attacks on the retreating army in 1944/45.⁸³

The Partisans claimed losses of 305,000 killed and 425,000 wounded; but -- they said -- they participated in the victory 'without' Soviet-Russian help. In the end, however, the Red Army forced the Germans into retreat, thus liberating Belgrade. In the Spring of 1945 the Communists attained power over the whole of Yugoslavia, which became a Socialist Peoples Republic on November 29, 1945.

E. CREATING TITOISM

Tito was elected as the Committee Secretary General in 1945 and immediately embarked on nationalization and industrialization programs. Tito's foreign policy challenged the Western Allies in Austria and Italy, with territorial claims -- unsuccessfully, however. These territorial claims upset the Western Allies and

⁸² Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, pp. 93-95.

⁸³ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p.102. Note that "Antietam's 26,134 casualties constituted the bloodiest single day in American military history" by Kernan, Michael, *The Pictures That Stunned The North*, in: Smith, Stephen G., *Civilization, The Magazine of the Library of Congress*, (Washington, March/April 1995) p. 71.

caused major problems for Stalin, who wanted to keep his sphere of influence as agreed by Churchill in October 1944 unchallenged. Stalin expected to achieve ideological and overall supremacy in world Communism for the Soviet Union's Communist party by creating the Cominform:

Delegates from nine Communist parties - the Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Yugoslav, Romanian, Bulgarian, French, and Italian - attended the founding session of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in the Silesian Spa of Szklarska Poreba on September 22 to 27, 1947. The hitherto acceptable notion of distinctive national paths to socialism (which had left the pace and forms of political and socioeconomic transformation to local discretion) was rejected.

Of course, the more the Soviet Union insisted on uniformity, radicalization, imitation of itself, and unquestioning acknowledgement of its imperial priorities in East Central Europe, the more it was obliged to intervene explicitly in the domestic affairs of the area's states and to seek direct administrative control of their Communist parties. This proclivity, however, brought it into conflict with Tito's Yugoslav Communists, who, their own radicalism and admiration of the Soviet model notwithstanding, treasured even more their autonomy and cohesion, hard-won as they had been during the bitter wartime Partisan struggles.⁸⁴

Tito was convinced to press for International Communism and in following Stalin's communist economic model Yugoslavia in 1946 - 1947 started comprehensive nationalization that took in everything down to the smallest village shop.

1. Pushing Communism Too Fast: Dropped by the U.S.S.R.

So deep were the divisions in Yugoslav society in 1945 that the Communist party had little with which to hold the country together except the partisan myth, promises of a future cornucopia, and coercive force. The break with the Cominform certainly helped in this

⁸⁴ Rothschild, Joseph, *Return to Diversity*, pp. 126-127.

respect, for even anticommunists rallied to Tito rather than risk Sovietization.⁸⁵

To reach out to the "promising" future, despite the very poor shape of their economy, Yugoslavia's leaders enhanced their revolutionary self-respect by pushing forward with collectivization, showing that despite Soviet criticism, Yugoslavia's communist orthodoxy was still intact.

Tito's foreign policy was guided by the vision of establishing Communist rule throughout the Balkans to prepare for the final Communist stage of international revolution. He therefore supported the Greek Communists in the ongoing civil war in Greece in 1945. Stalin pursued his method for imposing political and structural order on the East Central European Communists. The Soviet interests made it essential for Moscow to break with Tito, whose actions in the Balkans threatened to destabilize the entire Percentages Agreement.⁸⁶

Despite Stalin's moves to restrain Tito, the Balkan region recaptured the attention of the United States'. The U.S. and the Western Europeans incorporated both Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. When the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform on June 28, 1948 finally became manifest, Tito decided in 1949 to close his frontiers to Greek guerrillas. Relations with Stalin deteriorated to such a degree that the Western powers had to provide economic and military aid and to protect Yugoslavia from Soviet threats of aggression. In 1953, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Ankara. In 1954 these same countries signed a treaty

⁸⁵ Ramet, Sabrina P., *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, p. 29.

⁸⁶ see: *The Tito-Stalin Correspondence, March to June 1948* in: Stokes, Gale, *From Stalinism To Pluralism, A Documentation History of Eastern Europe Since 1945*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991). pp. 57-58.

containing a formal pledge of mutual military assistance in case of attack.⁸⁷ Later the U.S. made it obvious that Yugoslavia despite its Communist government would be supported by American financial aid and a fifty-fifty solution was again achieved.

2. Western Policy: Keeping Tito Afloat

Western aid helped to deny Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union and thus was a relatively inexpensive means of strengthening NATO's Southern Flank. The Truman administration provided \$20 million in aid in 1949.

By 1955, at the end of the first period of large-scale Western aid, Yugoslavia had received \$600m worth of American economic assistance, of which only \$55m was in the form of repayable loans. Military aid provided by the United States during the same period amounted to just under \$600 m. By 1960, Western aid and 'soft' credits had reached \$2 billion. Later Western aid continued to be channeled mainly through international organizations, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the European Community.⁸⁸

Without such enormous substantial support, it would have been impossible for Yugoslavia to sustain its independence after 1948, especially since Stalin imposed an economic blockade by the Soviet Union and its satellites. More important for the further development of Yugoslavia was the fact that foreign Western aid allowed Tito to create the federal framework for Yugoslav development. This framework allowed each Yugoslav republic to pursue its own economic policy, within the bounds of centrally determined parameters. Yugoslavia's economy subsequently depended on Western loans.

3. Tito's Creation: Yugoslavia's Federal Units

In 1945, Tito owed his Partisan victory to his understanding of Yugoslav national concerns. He successfully manipulated and skillfully exploited them for his

⁸⁷ Brown, J.F. "*Turkey: Back to the Balkans?*" in: Fuller, Graham E. and Lesser, Ian O., *Turkey's New Geopolitics* (Boulder CA, Westview Press, 1993), pp. 140-162.

⁸⁸ Cviic, Christopher, *Remaking the Balkans*, p.56.

own international communist power-seeking ends. After the Soviet-Yugoslav break, Moscow's support for Yugoslav communism faded while Tito continued to define a unique communist path for Yugoslavia. To promote positive interethnic relations in an interrepublican context, he tried to satisfy the nationalities by granting limited sovereignty in the form of autonomous federal units.

Contrary to popular belief, Yugoslav decentralization did not originate in 1965. The Communist party of Yugoslavia (CPY) became the League of Communists (LCY) in 1952, and that transformation expanded the jurisdiction enjoyed by republican and local party organizations over economic enterprises and projects. As early as 1950, the textile and leather industries had been transferred from federal to republican control: coal, electrical, chemical and certain consumer-goods industries followed, and by the end of 1952, it was possible to speak of effective economic decentralization....By 1965, the federal government no longer had any direct means of control over enterprises.⁸⁹

Federal units were created for different purposes: the most important one was the nationality issue: creating eight federal units to prevent the Serbs from dominating Yugoslavia. During the final Partisan victory huge numbers of Serbs were involved. The Serbs therefore received a republic consisting of Serbia proper with the nominally autonomous provinces of Vojvodina in the north and (most important from a cultural and historical viewpoint in Serbian eyes,) Kosovo, the center of Serbia's medieval state, in the south. In addition, during the first two decades of the postwar period, the Serbs enjoyed a dominant position in Croatia and Bosnia, despite being a minority in both republics. This political domination lasted until 1966, when Tito dismissed Alexander Ranković, a Serb and powerful security chief and party cadre secretary. Ranković's brutal policies against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina could no longer be tolerated.

⁸⁹ Ramet, Sabrina P., *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, p.71.

Gale Stokes calls Ranković's rule a "rebirth of Serbian hegemonism"⁹⁰ By replacing Ranković, who "viewed the Serbo-Croatian-speaking Muslims as a religious, not an ethnic group," Tito lifted "Ranković's iron-handed sway." Tito allowed the Bosnian Muslims in 1968 to be classified as "nation."⁹¹ The other setback for the Serb agenda was the abandonment of Macedonia, called "old Serbia" in pre-war Yugoslavia, and since then beyond the reach of Serbia's influence. The last two republics formed were Croatia and Slovenia.

With the proclamation of the authority of each republic's party and the confirmation by the Ninth Party Congress of March 1969, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia comprised eight constituent bodies, one each for the republics and one each for the two autonomous provinces. The conflicts among the eight constituent bodies became dominated by the national cleavages beginning in the 1970s.

F. SUSTAINING TITOISM

The declaration of eight federal units, with their size forced upon Serbia by Tito, could not alone solve the nationality problem nor could decentralization and re-collectivisation create a functioning and balanced economy.

1. Funding Yugoslavia's Underdeveloped Regions: FADURK

Once the Communist administration set to work, Yugoslavia's agriculture and its war-torn industry had to be developed :

There are two basic strategies of directed economic development: (1) *sector* development, emphasizing the optimal development of each sector of the economy, with a view to the well being of the entire country and (2) *regional* development, treating each of a plurality of

⁹⁰ Stokes, Gale, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down, The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 225.

⁹¹ Brown, J.F., "Turkey: Back to the Balkans?" in: Fuller, Graham E. and Lesser, Ian O., *Turkey's New Geopolitics* (Boulder CO, Westview Press, 1993), p. 146.

regional units as a discrete subject of policy and giving rise to tendencies towards autarky. Although the former strategy has the advantage by utilitarian calculations, it confronts the difficulty in multiethnic environments, of alienating entire nationality groups.⁹²

The first Five-Year plan and the following One-Year plans (1947-51, 1952, 1953) displayed appreciation for the need to develop the southern regions. These plans were ruined by the Cominform blockade and the Soviet embargo.

Decentralization in 1952 enabled the federal units to control their enterprises without central influence and to invest in prestigious projects.⁹³ Parallel development in the northern regions⁹⁴ encouraged competition which was largely unsuccessful in the poorer southern regions. The result was a widening north-south economic gap. It became clear by the early 1960s that the policy of attempting to accelerate the development of the underdeveloped regions through unregulated federal grants had failed. In February 1965, the Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo (FADURK) was created. The Tenth Congress of the LYC in May 1974 evaluated the results and concluded that within its first decade the program had failed to narrow the developmental gap between the north and the south. Yugoslavia was still living on foreign loans without catching up with West European standards of economic performance.

2. Running Yugoslavia's Economy: Self-Management

Yugoslavia's leaders argued for a so-called "third way", a small path situated between capitalism and communism. A market economy combined with central

⁹² Ramet, Sabrina P., *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, p. 136.

⁹³ As only Croatia owned a reasonable trading port on the Adriatic, Slovenia and Montenegro also began to build one. The Bar-Belgrade railway project was revived, as it would link the Serbs to Montenegro and the Adriatic without running through Bosnian or Croat territory.

⁹⁴ Slovenia and Croatia for example were irritated, when Montenegro challenged them in fishing production.

planning was supposed to lead Yugoslavia to prosperity. After a horrendous drop in agricultural production in 1953 the decision to de-collectivize was made. 'Land ownership' more extensive than a so-called 'agrarian maximum' of 10 hectares, however, was not allowed; and no real profits could be made.

As for industrial production 'self-management' of the worker was supposed to enable them to share communist achievements. In broad lines this system of self-management developed

in three main phases, covering three decades. The first, in the 1950s, allowed the workers' councils to share in the management of their factories, though the state held on to the main levers of economic power.

The second, in the 1960s, represented a tentative move towards a market economy.

The third, in the 1970s, marked a regress back to state-control, though,...the controls were now dispersed between the Federation's eight units.⁹⁵

To attain the benefits of this economic system Yugoslavia embarked upon socialist planning: One-Year and Five-Year Plans.

Borba, Yugoslavia's official newspaper, unveiled on July 16, 1984, that "the common characteristic of development of many if not all One-Year and Five Year Plans is, that during the past decades they are never realized." If the Yugoslavs

could be shown to have created a free and relatively prosperous society, there would still be a little hope left for those who believe that collectivism is not necessarily incompatible with democracy. At first, indications to this effect were encouraging: the Communist takeover in Yugoslavia coincided with the early phases of the country's industrial take-off period: this meant, for a time, dazzlingly rapid rates of economic growth. These were paid for...primarily by exploiting the peasants and by inflation rather than savings and they were prolonged by a continued influx of foreign credits. Yet for Westerners disgusted by the blemishes of their own free enterprise society there was a desperate search for any possible alternative. And for believers in workers' cooperatives and co-ownership, Yugoslavia seemed to be providing a fascinating pilot-plant. Few who went to see,

⁹⁵ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p. 224.

had the intellectual honesty of Professor Harold Lydall⁹⁶, who, having been deeply impressed by the success of the Mondragon Co-operative in Spain decided to make a detailed analysis of Yugoslavia, which he had supposed "was the world's only predominantly labour-cooperative economy". A closer look induced a reluctant confession: "In view of all the high hopes and instinctive beliefs associated with the idea of self-management, it is disagreeable to have to concede that it has turned out to be not much more than a vast public relations exercise."⁹⁷

Despite the various plans and decades of plan-fulfilling, the average Yugoslav never could enjoy economic growth or benefit from his labour. Many workers earned their money in Western Europe (a huge percentage laboured as guest-workers in Germany) to support their families left behind in Yugoslavia. The information from abroad brought into Yugoslavia by such workers may have taken away the last illusion that self-management would ever be successful.

G. TITO'S WEAKNESS: HIS HERITAGE

Tito created Yugoslavia with a vision: to create a revolutionary Marxist state. In it the nationalities would be treated equally in a voluntary union of separate peoples. The state's leadership was bonded together by the Partisan experience and Tito's unquestioned authority. This Yugoslavia

created by the Partisans [was] finally buried in June 1991, when the so-called People's Army outside legitimate political control attacked one of the nation states making up the Partisan-created federation: Slovenia.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ For more details of economic mismanagement, see Harold Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 83-84.

⁹⁷ Beloff, Nora, *Tito's Flawed Legacy*, p.24.

⁹⁸ Magas, Branka, "The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina," in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, eds., *Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan War* (Stoney Creek, Connecticut: Pamphleteers Press, 1993), p. 247.

The masterpiece he left behind fell apart within one decade.

Under Tito, Yugoslavia created a unique system which was considered to be a viable alternative to the Soviet bloc of Socialistic states. And for a long time in fact it was. Tito was a masterful politician. His quest for power was stronger than his loyalty or fear of the USSR and he was clever enough to let the West pay the price for Yugoslav independence from the Soviet Union. As a result, the Yugoslavs lived well and had a reputation and a political clout in world matters way beyond their real economic or demographic significance.⁹⁹

Once the international security environment changed, the coercive power of the Soviet Union had faded away and with it the strategic importance of Yugoslavia for the West. The various peoples of Yugoslavia then left their voluntary union and within some months 'Brotherhood and Unity' disappeared. The chance to reform the Yugoslav Utopia and to prepare for real independence and sovereignty most probably was given away already in the mid-sixties, as Magas Branka wrote. The political order established by Tito had some

"significant negative elements", as it was "far from democratic, however more open and liberal than the Soviet alternative."...In the mid-sixties Tito personally intervened to stop economic reforms, as he felt his communist power bases could be threatened, and for the same reason removed the Serb and Sloven liberals from the Communist Party and the government. In looking back that was the first real opportunity to change the future course of events.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Crnobrnja, Mihailo, "The Roots of Yugoslavia's Dissolution," in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, eds., *Why Bosnia? Writings On The Balkan War* (Stoney Creek, Connecticut: Pamphleteers Press, 1993), p. 269.

¹⁰⁰ Magas, Branka, "*The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina*" in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, *Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan War* (Stoney Creek, Connecticut: Pamphleteers Press, 1993), pp. 270-271.

None of the heirs of Tito's legacy, neither the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, nor the federal units themselves were able to keep the Yugoslav Federation together.

IV MILOSEVIC'S YUGOSLAVIA: GREATER SERBIA 1985-1995

A. INTRODUCTION: TITO'S HERITAGE

The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the tragic consequence of an extremely unfavorable confluence of international and internal developments. The end of the division of the world on the basis of the confrontational blocs had coincided with the first steps toward the establishment of democratic institutions in Bosnia. However, the process of establishing the basic integrative elements of a democratic society had only begun when war overwhelmed the new state.¹⁰¹12

The internal developments in former Yugoslavia with respect to the ongoing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina are examined in this chapter. Yugoslavia's internal dynamics required Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia to take the road to international recognition and sovereignty. To proceed in this way was impossible for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The chapter identifies the tensions which spurred Yugoslavia's internal development and the origins of the war. Because Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union contributed to the fall of Communism, the Yugoslav Communist leaders deliberately avoided any reform in their systems for as long as possible for fear that their power base would be threatened.

Nationalism in its most radical form of politicized ethnicity was one of the vehicles former communist leaders used to promote their "hidden" and nationalist agendas. Four previous communist leaders are acting as presidents in the former Yugoslavia's constituent parts in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The way these leaders were able to achieve recognition by the United Nations for their countries is also analyzed. Explaining internal tensions and what

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Trnka, Kasim, *"The Degradation of the Bosnian Peace Negotiations"* in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, Eds., *Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan War* (Stoney Creek Connecticut, Pamphleteers Press, 1993), p. 202.

in the future has to be done to overcome them - if this is at all possible - is also addressed.

The introduction examines Tito's clever arrangement, which froze the internal multiethnic, multireligious and economic situation he inherited and partly created in Yugoslavia. The following section highlights the Belgrade Serbs' motives and their common and distinct support for all Serbs inside Yugoslavia: the Croatian Serbs as well as the Bosnian ones. Section three displays how nationalism united the Croats in response to Serbia's revival of nationalism.

The Slovenes were able to "row their boat ashore" (Section four) before being capsized in the rough seas from the Greater Serbian blast - one that is still vehemently roaring through the Balkans - when the Serb agenda collided with the Croat one. The Macedonians were able to arrange international recognition for their sovereignty (Section five) well before the war between Croatia and Serbia highlighted the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina region (Section six). The chapter concludes on the internal aspects of Milošević's Yugoslavia (Section seven).

1. A Yugoslavia Beyond Real Economic and Demographic Significance

Josip Broz, called Tito, was the Croat partisan leader who organized a local later national resistance movement during World War II. This movement was first directed against occupying Nazi Germany. Tito later turned to the Soviet Communist party in order to achieve supremacy over the former Serbian Royalists of the 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovans', called the Chetniks, fighting the fascist Croatian Ustasha and all other political formations striving for power. Of the 1.7 million Yugoslavs killed during World War II, one million were victims of the civil war that raged within the larger conflict. Tito constructed his Yugoslavia as a delicately balanced mechanism designed to prevent a resumption of the ethnic slaughter among the south Slavs.¹⁰²

¹⁰² Binder, David, "Pariah as Patriot: Ratko Mladić" in: *The New York Times Magazine* (New York, September 04, 1994), p. 28.

The structures Tito developed for his communist country resembled Lenin's Soviet Union during the twenties, where a federal organization attempted to reduce the genuine, ethnic Russian influence inside the Soviet Union. However, soon after Lenin's death Stalin, the Georgian, tilted Lenin's balancing structures in favor of the Russians.

Tito's containment of the Serb majority within Yugoslavia was carefully designed to restrict a Serbian state and the Serb ethnic group within the ethnic spectrum of Yugoslavia. His plan consisted of three major facts: a strong Communist party apparatus provided the power basis, a reliable police apparatus among other agencies of repression (including the Yugoslav army) controlled the states, and finally a Socialist Yugoslavia as a federation.

Tito gave two Serb provinces autonomy as federal entities, creating a Serb-dominated Montenegro (a geographical rather than a political entity meaning "Black Mountains") as another independent federal part. He also cemented the imperial Austro-Hungarian-created Croatian border of Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus dividing Croatian Serbs from Bosnian Serbs. This arrangement prevented the ethnic Serb group from uniting and becoming demographically dominant with respect to Yugoslavia as whole. Instead, the Serbs became "dominant minorities" inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Tito's Yugoslavia

created by the Partisans [was] finally buried in June 1991, when the so-called People's Army outside legitimate political control attacked one of the nation states making up the Partisan-created federation: Slovenia.¹⁰³

Under Tito, Yugoslavia created a unique system which was considered to be a viable alternative to the Soviet bloc of Socialistic states. And

¹⁰³ Magas, Branka, "The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina" in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, Eds., *Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan War* (Stoney Creek Connecticut, Pamphleteers Press, 1993), p. 247.

for a long time in fact it was. Tito was masterful politician. His quest for power was stronger than his loyalty or fear of the USSR and he was clever enough to let the West pay the price for Yugoslav independence from the Soviet Union. As a result, the Yugoslavs lived well and had a reputation and a political clout in world matters way beyond their real economic or demographic significance.¹⁰⁴

The political order established by Tito had some

significant negative elements [and was] far from democratic, however more open and liberal than the Soviet alternative....In the mid-sixties Tito personally intervened to stop economic reforms, as he felt his communist power bases could be threatened, and for the same reason removed the Serb and Sloven liberals from the Communist Party and the government. In looking back that was the first real opportunity to change the future course of events. It also was a strong blow to the Serbs.¹⁰⁵

In 1974

Tito gave his blessing to the constitution which made Yugoslavia a con-federal federation and conferred the status of statehood on both Yugoslavia and its republics....[a]t the same time. ...Serbia was reduced in political status to a second-rate republic in Yugoslavia, since two of its provinces were elevated into federal units.... This was the second blow to the Serbs....After Tito the loss of positive political dynamics produced internal pressures and tensions. The first to surface openly were the economic tensions, caused by Yugoslavia's increasing foreign debt, superimposed on an increasingly growing inefficient economic system dubbed the 'contractual economy' since it was neither a command nor a market driven one.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Crnobrnja, Mihailo, "The Roots of Yugoslavia's Dissolution" in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, Eds., *Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan War* (Stoney Creek Connecticut, Pamphleteers Press, 1993), p. 269.

¹⁰⁵ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina*, 1993, pp. 270-271.

¹⁰⁶ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina*, 1993, pp. 270-271.

At Tito's death in 1980 an authentic outpouring of Yugoslav patriotism could be observed, however the country had already entered a period of dramatic and disintegrative change. The two paths at the crossroad led towards democratization [necessary to arrive at a liberal market economy] or towards repression [and keeping the communist bureaucracy in power]....Already 1981 in Kosovo force was used against student-led demonstrations and in 1984 in Belgrade intellectuals were put on trail for taking part in unofficial debating societies....In the sixties Tito's Yugoslavia had embarked in the decentralization which was embodied in the country's 1974 constitution. This should preclude the federal Party and state organs from acting as effective instruments for conservative reaction especially as those were spearheaded by active or retired army and police chiefs...

Tito's decentralization intended to strengthen the power of the republics and provinces but without significant loosening of the still communist ruling party's monopoly of political initiative.¹⁰⁷

In the political and economic debate following Tito's death, the big question was, which economic reforms and which political changes have to be implemented in order to revive the economy? "Milosevic was then a young upcoming liberal reformer."¹⁰⁸

The federal Party and state were already in a deep crisis over a multitude of questions which the Thirteenth Congress in 1986 had done nothing to resolve. The disarray of the ruling party became evident at its 1988 all-Yugoslav conference, which brought to public attention the existence of two main ideological fronts within it: one represented by Milosević, the other by the Slovene leader Milan Kučan. Kučan sought a democratic reform within the framework of the party, one which would guarantee minority rights. This demand was denounced as an attack on party unity, causing the first step towards the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Kučan's idea

¹⁰⁷ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 248.

¹⁰⁸ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 270.

would have meant recognizing the right of each republic to follow its own path to socialism.

In the absence of a positive and progressive alignment of the political forces and in the presence of a deteriorating economic situation, the politicians in the various republics perceived the situation as a zero-sum game -- the gain of one being the loss of the other -- thus the logic of the situation became increasingly confrontational.¹⁰⁹

Before the outbreak of the crisis no political force in Yugoslavia - not even the Slovenes - considered the maintenance of Yugoslavia an impossibility: the objective was to change Yugoslavia's economic and political structures. Two possible paths might have led Yugoslavia out of Tito's heritage - already referenced as reform or repression. The Slovene leader Kučan became President of Slovenia, whereas his opponent, the former 'young upcoming liberal reformer' Milošević, became Serbia's President. The personalities of these two are important to analyze as their development is directly related to the fate of their particular republics. An effort will be undertaken to paint a portrait of Milošević first, then note Kučan, as he led his country successfully through a ten-days war with Serbia and on to a better future. Thirdly, a discussion of Tudjman, who is still at war with the Serb leader, is important because of his attempt to cut a deal with him in slicing up President Izetbegović's Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kiro Gligorov assembled the Macedonians into a sovereign state, one which is still distrusted and not recognized by Greece.

It is almost impossible to deal in unbroken chronology with the goals of the different republics once they shifted their emphasis away from maintaining the integrity of the Yugoslav Republic. All of them, not only the Serbs in Belgrade, in the Krajina, in Bosnia, in the Vojvodina and in Kosovo, but also the Slovenes, the Croats in Dalmatia, in Herceg-Bosna and on the River Sava, the Macedonians as well as the Albanians in Kosovo and the Montenegrins, pursued their own agendas

¹⁰⁹ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 270.

and self-interest, and most of these agendas at the expense of what was once Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B. REVIVAL OF SERB NATIONALISM AND GREATER SERBIA

Serb Nationalism bears the greatest responsibility (albeit not exclusively) for the tragic outcome of the attempt to change Yugoslavia's political and economic structures. One cannot study Yugoslavia nor understand Serbia and the war of Yugoslav succession without examining the role of Slobodan Milošević, who as the leader of Serbia is widely regarded as the initiator and instigator of the war in the region. He is the leader of Serbian imperialism and implicitly responsible for many of the war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The irony is that Serbia needed Yugoslavia the most: it was the arrangement by which all Serbs lived in one country. Now as Yugoslavia is destroyed, the Serbs are the biggest losers from the destruction. Once the economic and political structures of Yugoslavia could be changed, the three objectives for Serbia were as follows:

- 1) to improve Serbia's position within the former Yugoslavia by becoming a stronger Serbia
- 2) the establishment of a Greater Serbia from the ruins of Yugoslavia
- 3) the inheritance of a "Rump-Yugoslavia"

As Mihailo Crnobrnja puts it

the simplistic logic that these goals - a stronger Serbia in Yugoslavia, a Greater Serbia and a Rump-Yugoslavia were, like the Russian dolls, contained one in each other, proved to be not only wrong but very costly. These goals were mutually exclusive and everyone of them required a different tactic. Through this confusion Serbia found itself in a war, pulling others in as well and without losing on the battlefield, Serbia lost practically everything it wanted to achieve, gaining, in the process, an extremely negative image.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ Crnobrnja, Mihailo, *The Roots of Yugoslavia's Dissolution*, 1993, p. 272.

What brought about the resurgence of nationalism in Serbia? During Tito's reign, despite some expressions of nationalism in all republics, it was never an important issue. The Serb political leadership before Milošević tried to solve the Serbian grievances without recourse to nationalism, but failed. Calculating that he could attain a strong position of power and stay there, Slobodan Milošević brought Serb nationalism back on the political stage. His rise to power illustrates the revival of the great Serbian dream.

1. Slobodan Milošević: The March Through The Federal Institutions

As a member of the Communist party in Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević somehow managed to stay in power through the fall of Communism and take over the presidency of Serbia. This political skill, accompanied by a ruthless drive for power, heightened problems and contributed to the bloodshed. Some call him the "new Hitler."¹¹¹

In January 1986 Milošević succeeded Stambolić as Chief of the Serbian party when Stambolić became President of Serbia.

He seemed to everyone a staunch party conservative, a kind of younger and more energetic version of Russia's Yegor Ligachev, ready to fight those communists in Yugoslavia who aspired to be Gorbachevs.¹¹²

Contrary to the trends prominent in Serbia by then, the Slovenian and Croatian communists were beginning to introduce intra-party elections with more than one candidate, a major step toward multiparty elections.

¹¹¹ FBIS, *Milošević asks Serbs to return to Kosovo* (July 22, 1988), pp. 64-74.

¹¹² Djilas, Aleksa, "Serbia's Milošević: A Profile" in: *Foreign Affairs*, (New York, Summer 1993), p. 86.

A brief resume of events since 1987, the year in which Milošević won untrammelled power in Serbia, demonstrates a clear pattern of anti-federal campaign. First, anti-Albanian sentiment was fanned by the Belgrade mass media, while Serbia's intellectual elite grouped in the academy of Arts and Sciences and the Writers' Association -- fresh from drafting a new national program for a "greater Serbia" (the notorious 1986 memorandum) -- set about organizing a rebellion of the Serb minority in Kosovo against Albanian majority rule. The Kosovo issue was then used at the climatic Eighth Session of the Serbian Party's Central Committee in the autumn of 1987 to eliminate the more constitutionally-minded wing of the Party loyal to the republican president Ivan Stambolić.¹¹³

While president of the Serbian League of the Communist Central Committee Presidium (LCCC) in 1988, Milošević still touted the communist line, stating: "Nationalism is a cuckoo's egg planted into the Yugoslav workers class...by the class enemy. Our fate, our future will depend on our harmony."¹¹⁴ At this time, with the Communist party still firmly in power, he rejected any change in favor of reforms.

A so-called

'anti-bureaucratic revolution' was set in motion designed to extend Milošević's power across all Yugoslavia. After he felt strong enough to directly attack the Vojvodina Party and state leaders, accusing them of being 'autonomists' [which meant being against Serbian state unity], they were brought down in October 1988 by carefully organized 'spontaneous' mass mobilization, after which the Vojvodina Party too was purged.¹¹⁵

By then Milošević's aim became clear, he did not want just to return to Tito's pre-constitution situation of 1974, but he wanted to have a complete revision of the

¹¹³ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 249.

¹¹⁴ FBIS, *Interview with Slobodan Milošević*, (January 3, 1989), p. 70.

¹¹⁵ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 249.

post-war-settlement based on the principle of national equality. In the name of a "strong [Serbian-led] federation" the Belgrade Serbs wanted nothing less than the destruction of the federal arrangements.

The method used by Milošević to mobilize a Serb nationalist force capable of destroying the federal order was relatively simple. Systematic recourse was made to Stalin's old trick of creating enemies against whom mass anger could be turned: Albanians, 'bureaucrats', Vojvodina 'autonomists', Slovenes, Croats, and 'Muslim fundamentalists' were denounced in succession as enemies of Serbia and Yugoslavia.¹¹⁶

Kosovo, Serbia's other province, proved a tougher nut to crack, since the Albanian population rose as one in November 1988 and February 1989, defending not so much their leaders as their hard-won national rights enshrined in the provinces autonomy. Azem Vllasi was expelled from the Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) for defending Kosovo's autonomy. Although the mass demonstrations were peaceful, the province was immediately placed under a state of emergency, voted for by the federal state for fear of Serbia's forces marching into the province on their own....Mass pressure was also brought to bear on the Montenegrin Party and state leadership, which was forced to resign from office in January 1989. As a result of this 'march through the institutions', by 1989 Serbia had acquired control of four out of eight votes on the federal state presidency, five out of nine votes on the federal Party presidency. These federal bodies were thus completely paralysed.¹¹⁷

From now on Milošević successfully worked in exporting Serbia's "anti-bureaucratic revolution." Two major events help to explain his procedure: the 17th plenum YPCC and the 14th Congress of the LCY in April 1990:

October 1988 the seventeenth plenum of the Yugoslav Party's Central Committee took place and the split between Serbia and the other republics now simultaneously deepened and broadened. The representatives of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo (for

¹¹⁶ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 248.

¹¹⁷ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 249.

the last time) and partly Macedonia tried to persuade the Serbian side, that Yugoslav and Party unity could not be built by force. Belgrade rejected all charges of 'hegemonic aspirations' or wishing to create a 'Greater Serbia'. This marked the last desperate attempt to preserve party unity....However the fall of the Montenegrin leadership in February 1989 proved beyond all doubt that Milošević indeed would export the 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' and that the republics would accordingly have to protect themselves.¹¹⁸

Once Kosovo had been crushed and Vojvodina and Montenegro swallowed up, the resistance to Milošević was inevitably led by Slovenia and Croatia whence came a first strategic counter-offensive in the decision taken in winter of 1989 to hold up multi-party elections in April 1990. The final parting of the ways between the pro-Milošević and anti-Milošević forces took place in February-March, at the Fourteenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), a congress which was also its last. The disintegration of the LCY was followed by multiparty elections throughout Yugoslavia, in which the Communists albeit under a new name won only in Serbia and Montenegro.¹¹⁹

Yugoslavia thus did not die a natural death: it was destroyed for the sake of a Greater Serbia. Once he got the army on his side Milošević felt confident of victory. What Serbia had failed to gain in two Balkan wars and two World Wars suddenly seemed within reach. Milošević's attempt at winning over the Army in order to achieve 'All Serbs in one land'¹²⁰ developed also successfully:

Finding the cadres in the communist party ready to fight his political battles was easier for Milošević than winning over the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA). But circumstances helped -- the officer corps was about 65 percent Serbian, and the Serbian majority grew as

¹¹⁸ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 249.

¹¹⁹ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 249.

¹²⁰ *The Economist*, "Is Milošević serious ?" (New York, August 13th, 1993), pp. 46-47.

Slovenia and Croatia moved towards secession and their officers left the army. Slovenian and Croatian anti-army pronouncements also drove the army to look for a protector, and Serbia was the obvious choice...it was a formidable task to transform the YPA into the fighting arm of Serbian nationalism. The army which saw itself as the protector of Yugoslavia and not of any national group believed in the principle of 'brotherhood and unity' proclaimed during the Second World War by communist led partisans and was permeated with Titoist communism....The army was the most antidemocratic and reactionary of all communist institutions. It unofficially approved the attempted coup d'etat against Soviet President Michkail Gorbachev in August 1991.¹²¹

Having consolidated his power over the Yugoslav army, the search for a compromise was no longer necessary for Milošević, even when "at the time of the 1991 secessions, the Yugoslav federal government was dominated by non-Serbs."¹²²

After the elections, Slovenia and Croatia, flanked by Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina offered Serbia a confederal compromise, that is the transformation of Yugoslavia into an association of sovereign states. Elections in Serbia were held in December 1990, eight months after Slovenia and seven months after Croatia. The Great Serb bloc rejected the federal offer out of hand, believing that the army could deliver whatever it wished....Slovenia was allowed to go after a brief military incursion in June 1991, by mutual consent....But neither Croatia nor Bosnia-Herzegovina were allowed to leave and would be squeezed to relinquish as much of their territories as the army could hold. As the war progressed, that began in earnest in August 1991, the contour of the projected racially homogeneous "Greater Serbia" became increasingly visible.¹²³

As illustrated the Serb Nationalist Goals in the longer run are

(1) "All Serbs in one Land" meant keeping Yugoslavia together,

¹²¹ Djilas, Aleksa, *"Serbia's Milošević: A Profile"*, 1993, p. 90.

¹²² Dragnić, Alex N., "Containing Serbia" in: Hoge, James F., Ed., *Foreign Affairs* (New York, Council of Foreign Relations, Nov/Dec 1994), p. 198.

¹²³ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 251.

- (2) overcome Tito's 1974 Constitution for the "Serb National" benefit,
- (3) use nationalism supported by politicised ethnicity as mass movement for power support and
- (4) once Greater Serbia is shaped, reform the economy.

C. CROATISM AND THE CROATIA'S AGENDA OF COMPLICITY

In order to understand the outbreak of the ongoing war it is necessary to investigate how the leaders in the other constituent parts of Yugoslavia acted during the period when Serbian Nationalism was growing. In the provinces favored by the constitution in Milošević's view, Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Milan Kučan in Slovenia had already made arrangements to protect their power bases. In doing so they added to the tensions already originated by the Belgrade Serbs.

When Croatia sought independence - Croatia's government proclaimed independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991 - Tudjman organized the defense of his claims by embarking on almost the same type of nationalism that Serbia had earlier used. Tudjman's Croatism was a call for a Greater Croatia. Croatia proper would include the Serb-populated Krajina, where historically the rural Serbs had settled for centuries, and later would encompass areas not claimed by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There Mate Boban would establish a "Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna".

Serbian nationalism, in the authoritarianism and exclusivism epitomized by Milošević, is very similar to the Croatian nationalism of Njofra 'Franjo' Tudjman and the nationalism combined with Muslim radicalism of Bosnia-Herzegovina's President Alija Izetbegović.¹²⁴

Franjo Tudjman came to power in April 1990 on the wings of Croat revolt against Milošević's nationalist provocations, having successfully tapped the powerful vein

¹²⁴ Djilas, Aleksa, *Serbia's Milošević: A Profile*, 1993, p. 93.

of Croat disenchantment with communism and Yugoslavia that had been silently mounting since at least 1971.¹²⁵

The reactions to Croat nationalistic propaganda were based on prewar experience:

The discussion...none the less revealed how these simple Serb peasants have been traumatized by unscrupulous politicians wishing to realize their politics of nationalist fantasy. A confused tale of real and perceived discrimination emerged. It was largely but not exclusively based on hearsay from friends and relatives elsewhere in Krajina, as Knin was safe country for Serbs from the beginning. The rural Serbs in Krajina, but also the Serbs in other parts of Croatia, were absolutely convinced that following the victory of Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica* HDZ) in April 1990, Croats began to install the infrastructure of a fascist state in Croatia. The Krajina Serbs understood fascism above all to be a state system promoting virulent Croatian nationalism. The revival of Croat national sentiment in any form was *ipso facto* interpreted by them as the return of fascism. The port of Split, just forty miles from Knin, was a new centre of militant Croat nationalism and it was in such regions, far from Zagreb's cosy Central European consciousness, that the more radical Croats started political experiments which simply confirmed the Serbs' erroneous conviction that fascism was awakening from its slumber and therefore they must answer the call to arms.¹²⁶

1. Franjo Tudjman: the Way to Opportunistic Nationalism

From the beginning his administration was autocratic as the constitution of 1990 gave him virtual control over the government and the parliament, and his strategy was compromising. Tudjman was convinced that a 'grand Croato-Serb agreement' was possible. Milošević would let Croatia go its own merry way if only

¹²⁵ Banać, Ivo, "Croatism, Franjo Tudjman's brutal opportunism" in: *The New Republic* (New York, 1993), pp. 20-21.

¹²⁶ Glenny, Misha, *The Fall of Yugoslavia, The Third Balkan War* (New York, Penguin Books, revised edition, 1993), p. 11.

Tudjman did not obstruct him elsewhere, notably in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro and if a deal could be struck to divide Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia. It was not difficult to see how Milošević, who outmatched Tudjman both in cunning and in cannon and beat him hands down in autocracy and inconsistency, easily took Croatia for a ride. Milošević never would have done so much damage had the Croatian leadership pursued a different strategy. But instead of seeking Allies to protect his country Tudjman committed three glaring mistakes:

1) Frustrating the Anti-Milošević coalition

The hopes of Kosovar Albanians, Montenegrins and various minorities - such as the Bosnian Muslim minority in the Sandžak region of Serbia - were quickly disappointed. Their unsolved problems still add to the tensions which lead to war.

2) Lack of preparations for war

Despite resolute rhetoric Tudjman did little to prepare Croatia for the onslaught of the Yugoslav People's Army; ... imagination is a creative faculty that Tudjman sorely lacks.

3) The plot to divide Bosnia

Tudjman's several attempts to plot covertly with Serbia to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina finally was his biggest mistake, as there is no way to appease Milošević as long as one acts against the Greater Serbian agenda.¹²⁷

2. Croat Serb Complicity

These mistakes resulted in disaster when the Great Serbian Agenda met the Great Croatian Agenda. Croatia's role in Yugoslavia's collapse is far from being an "innocent victim" of pure Serb aggression. When confronted by Milošević, Tudjman attempted to succeed by embarking on various dangerous adventures which probably cost him his chance from the very beginning. It still seems impossible to appease Milošević.

¹²⁷ Banać, Ivo, *"Croatism, Franjo Tudjman's brutal opportunism"*, 1993, p. 20.

To be sure, the Serbian leader had backed down at various times. His original goal in 1987 was to assume the leadership of all Yugoslavia and recentralize the country by overthrowing Tito's federal constitution....Later in 1991, he abandoned the idea of holding on to Slovenia... Still later, in 1992, he reconciled himself to the possibility of a feeble Croatian (without the Serb-occupied territories) and a softened Macedonia... Most recently, he has given up the idea of keeping all of Bosnia.¹²⁸

Tudjman was wrong in interpreting any move of Milošević as a conciliatory gesture. In fact, Milošević's retreats only reinforced his claim to an expanded Serbian state. Each of Milošević's retreats was forced upon him by the stiff resistance of the Slovians, Croats, Macedonians and Bosnian Muslims. Thus it was completely unrealistic to assume, as Tudjman evidently does, that Milošević would agree to a withdrawal from Croatia in exchange for Croatia acceptance of Milošević's land grabs in Bosnia. Milošević's aims are promoted every time his goal of creating an ethnically pure Serbian state is mistaken as neutral horse trading.¹²⁹

Tudjman's declared agenda on the divisibility of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or through the Croat looking-glasses of "Herceg-Bosna", would become reality and was so proclaimed on August 24, 1990:

Tudjman played into Milošević's hand in another wayThe various schemes of the international community, a la Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg, created an appearance of fairness to the different parties in slicing Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in actuality strengthened Milošević's attempts to hold onto its conquest. None of these schemes would have worked had Croatia stood by the Bosnian government. Instead Tudjman promoted the division of Bosnia since at least 1990, and in 1992 set up his own para-state of Herceg-Bosna, which made Milošević's job all easier. The irony of the situation is that more than

¹²⁸ Banać, Ivo, *"Croatism, Franjo Tudjman's brutal opportunism"*, 1993, p. 20.

¹²⁹ Banać, Ivo, *"Croatism, Franjo Tudjman's brutal opportunism"*, 1993, p. 20.

two thirds of Bosnia's Croats live outside the so-called Hercegovina.¹³⁰

Tudjman was willing to sacrifice all Croats outside Croatia and Hercegovina. He expected them to withdraw from their ancient homesteads in central Bosnia for the sole purpose of solidifying his deal with Milošević and to receive international legitimacy through the Owen-Stoltenberg scheme.

Again nothing like this could have been established without Tudjman if he hadn't manufactured accusations against the Muslims, or promoted brutalities against them. This damaged longstanding Croat-Muslim cooperation. And when the Muslims picked up arms against the Croats, committing their own brutalities, the circle of war was completed. The hierarchy of the Catholic church soon started tilting against Tudjman's Bosnian policies. The archbishop of Sarajevo is on record as opposing the ethnic cleansing of Croats from central Bosnia and as favoring the coexistence with all nationalities of Bosnia. The victims of Milošević's aggression ended up adopting his patterns of behavior. The international community thus found another excuse for inactivity.¹³¹

So far, the ideas and agendas of the Serb and Croat leader have been outlined. It has been shown that they were both determined to stay in power. They influenced the course of events that navigated their political entities through the troubled waters flowing from the end of Communism in Post-Tito Yugoslavia. The Slovene leader became the first to "row his boat ashore", once the war finally broke out.

¹³⁰ Banać, Ivo, *"Croatism, Franjo Tudjman's brutal opportunism"*, 1993, p. 20.

¹³¹ Banać, Ivo, *"Croatism, Franjo Tudjman's brutal opportunism"*, 1993, p. 21.

D. SLOVENIA SAVED BY THE BRIONI ACCORD

The fate of Slovenia may be remembered as the sole example, whereby Serb aggression, tanks and the YPA involved, was successfully stopped by diplomacy and negotiations:

What the Great Serbian bloc in Belgrade completely underestimated, was the readiness of Yugoslavia's constituent nations to defend themselves. In dismissing this factor of the people's war, the Serbian dominated army made its biggest mistakes. Neither in Slovenia nor in Croatia nor in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the aggression to be the anticipated walkover, despite the defenders lack of arms.¹³²

The Slovene leader Kužan challenged Milošević at the 1988 all-Yugoslav conference on his ideas on how best to deal with the economic problems. Kužan linked reforms with more intra-party democratization. Instead of reform the party adopted repression.

Milošević's first planned provocation of the still Yugoslav Federal Republic of Slovenia -- a threat to hold a big rally of Serb nationalists in Ljubljana, Slovenia's capital city, in March 1989 -- was met by a stiffening of Slovene resistance. In February 1989, a large meeting took place in Ljubljana in solidarity with the strike of Albanian miners at the Stari Trg mine in Kosovo. At the meeting, Kučan declared that the miners were defending Yugoslavia as created in the revolutionary war of 1941-1945. When Serb militants tried to enter Slovenia, the Slovene authorities banned the rally and sent a message that they would be stopped by force at the Slovene border. Serbia responded by imposing a boycott of Slovene goods. It was at this juncture, it seems, that Milošević opted for war with Slovenia.¹³³

Slovenia was allowed to go away from the Former Yugoslavia, by mutual consent, after a brief military incursion - a ten day war - started in June 1991.

¹³² Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 251.

¹³³ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 250.

Serbia was already at war in Croatia, when the Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija*, JNA) started military action in Slovenia.

When the war broke out in Slovenia many Europeans became acquainted with this small pocket of the Alpine lowlands for the first time. But a different war in Croatia was well under way (in Osijek, the eastern Slavonian capital which lies thirteen miles west of the Danube, Croatia's border with Serbia) before the Yugoslav People's Army and the Yugoslav state effectively capitulated to Slovenia by signing the Brioni Accord (July 1991). This agreement, which acknowledged Slovenia's liberation from the control of Belgrade, was preceded by a burst of chaotic diplomatic activity organized by the European Community Troika of the foreign ministers of Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy. The delegation leader Gianni de Michelis on his return two days after their initial negotiations with Slobodan Milošević and his General Veljko Kadijević in Belgrade and Tudjman and Kucan in Zagreb now realized that all his theoretical understanding was of little value in a country where deceit is the most common political currency. For Balkan politicians, it is axiomatic that the only truth is the lie. Throughout the Yugoslav crisis, both President Tudjman and Milošević, not to mention scores of lesser figures, committed themselves solemnly to accords and agreements whose provisions they would openly flaunt the following day.¹³⁴

The signing of the Brioni Accord stipulated the withdrawal of all Yugoslav army units from Slovenia, thus implying that international recognition of southern Slavdom's small Alpine protrusion would soon be granted. But although Croats were party to the negotiations which led to Brioni, the agreements therein left the issue of Croatia entirely open. Thus while this initial intervention of the European Community was not without value as it ended the war in Slovenia, it none the less failed to address the central issue of the Yugoslav crisis -- Croatia. The essential problem of a Yugoslav state lies in the numerical and political dominance of Serbs over Croats; the essential problem of a Croatian state lies in the numerical and political dominance of Croats over Serbs.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Glenny, Misha, *The Fall of Yugoslavia, The Third Balkan War* (New York, Penguin Books, revised edition, 1993), p. 99.

¹³⁵ Glenny, Misha, *Ibid*, p. 100.

Slovenia successfully sought international recognition. One of the reasons that recognition was successfully obtained was that the Serb or Croat ethnicity factor was not an issue. A second reason was that Kužan did not mobilize Slovenians with exaggerated nationalism and continued promoting political reforms and economic change, as he had in preparing Slovenia's December 1990 referendum.

As the war progressed in Croatia, the situation in Bosnia became more and more tense. The issue that set the mix on fire was diplomatic recognition in spring 1992. The European Community had not immediately recognized either Slovenia or Croatia when they declared their independence in 1991. ... In December 1991 the European Community agreed to recognize those former Yugoslav states that met certain requirements, including the protection of human rights. The Badinter-Commission examined the documentation and found that only Slovenia and Macedonia met the requirements for recognition.¹³⁶

It might be too early to conclude, but it seems that on issues at the periphery of the Greater Serbia's agenda agreements could be achieved. Certainly no Serb minority was threatened in Slovenia. The way Milošević dealt with Macedonia, however, was different and more difficult for the Macedonians.

E. FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND GLIGOROV

Not a "sacred shrine of Serbdom" -- but in Serbian eyes still regarded as part of "Old Serbia" -- Macedonia became an area where Great Serbia wants to exercise its influence, even though only a two percent¹³⁷ Serb minority lives there.

Once the Greek president Mitsotakis informed the world that Milošević was going to divide Macedonia at his convenience, diplomacy, backed up with force, i.e.

¹³⁶ Stokes, Gale, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down, The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 250.

¹³⁷ CIA, *World Factbook 1993* (Washington D.C., 1993), p. 235.

the willingness actually to put some peacekeeping troops on the ground to enforce the decision, was able to deter Milošević's government from seeking further action. According to the Macedonian authorities, there are some 43.000 Serbs in Macedonia although the Montenegrin newspaper Pobjeda claims there are really about 300,000....As the rump Yugoslavia (new constitution of April 27, 1992) headed by Milošević increasingly takes the look of the villain of the Balkans, Greece has maintained its close historical ties with Serbia. Milošević and Mitsotakis do not see eye to eye on all matters, however, as witnessed by disclosure in Athens that the Serbian President proposed six months ago [i.e. December 1991] that Macedonia be carved up between Serbia and Greece. Mitsotakis declined and reported the proposition to the European Community.¹³⁸

On August 21, 1992, the Macedonian Foreign Minister Malewski met with U.S. Under Secretary (for International Security Affairs) Wisner:

Wisner emphasized the U.S. desire to follow through rapidly on President Bush's proposal that a continuous international monitoring mission work in Macedonia, under the auspices of the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (CSCE), to help prevent the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina from spreading.¹³⁹

...regarding *recognition* Wisner emphasized that the U.S. strongly supports the stability and territorial integrity of Macedonia. The U.S. view is that prompt resolution of the Macedonian recognition issue will help to bring stability to the Balkans.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Perry, Duncan M., "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma" in: *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* (Vol. 1 No. 25, 19 June 1992), p. 44.

¹³⁹ U.S. Department of State (DoS), *U.S.DoS Dispatch* (Vol. 3 NSUP6-7, 1992, September 1992), pp. 32-33.

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Department of State (DoS), *Ibid*, pp. 32-33.

The Republic of Macedonia's legislature had to amend Macedonia's new constitution in order to clarify it and satisfy their Greek neighbors, who claimed Macedonia as part of 4000 years of Greek history. Article 49

stated that the Republic cares (*sic*) for the status and right of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighboring countries as well as Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development and promotes link with them.¹⁴¹

The advantage of recognition for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is that it can receive assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the EC in spite of Greek sanctions. The current situation reduces tensions and provides stability. FYROM does not show any aggressive imperial attitudes towards its neighbors' territories but should renounce its 1992 irredentist claims and provocative symbols like the "sixteen-pointed sun of Vergina" in its national flag. Once normal relations are established with Greece and its economic problems are solved, FYROM's sovereignty will probably be more secure.

F. CONCLUSIONS ON INHERENT TENSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTS AND WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA

It seems obvious that there is no hidden agenda but an open one at work so far. Serbia feels that with the breakdown of communism it can overcome the restriction of Tito's 1974 constitution. Led by their champion, Milošević, the Serb may now gain whatever leading role they deserve. This was achieved by taking away the privileges of the autonomous regions, and, with those privileges, their only defense against violent Serb aggression. This happened for economic reasons with the Vojvodina and for purely nationalistic reasons with Kosovo, still violently ruled by a communist party. Once the Yugoslav Central Government was taken over by

¹⁴¹ Perry, Duncan M. "Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma" in: *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* (Vol. 1 No. 25, 19 June 1992), p. 44.

Serbian, purges of the communist party apparatus followed, in Serbia as well as the former autonomous provinces.

The Yugoslav People's Army was turned into an instrument for Serb repression. Non-Serbian officers defected, and former communists unwilling to change their loyalties towards Serb Nationalism were dismissed.

Meanwhile in Slovenia and Croatia the Serb build-up to achieve an inner Yugoslav hegemony led both leaders to embark on a course of nationalism: the Slovenes felt that secession was their only option, that they would benefit from economic reforms and be able to join the integration process under way in western Europe.

In Croatia, Tudjman opportunistically promoted Croatism and did not prepare for an encounter with Serbia, or even come close to preparing the other constituent parts of Yugoslavia to resist Serbia. Tudjman tried to cut his deal with Milošević and failed, perhaps because Tudjman's Greater Croatia idea might have threatened Milošević, or because of Milošević's will to take the lead in pursuing his great Serbian goals. In any case, war broke out in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina shortly afterwards.

G. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ

Serbian and Croatian nationalists both have claimed that Bosnia should be theirs, but in 1992 it was the Serb who provoked the Bosnian war. Influenced by Serbian nationalistic enthusiasms of the late 1980's, Bosnian Serbs, under the unbalanced leadership of Radovan Karadžić and with the encouragement of Slobodan Milošević, began a propaganda campaign against Alija Izetbegović, whom they falsely accused of being a Muslim fundamentalist. By raising the issue in this way they brought back primitive memories of the Ottoman period, which Serbian tradition characterizes as one of bloody oppression of Serbs. Serbian activists in Bosnia-Herzegovina started establishing local units of government, creating militia to

"Protect" themselves, and proclaiming their desire to become part of Milošević's Serbia.¹⁴²

President Alija Izetbegović's aim was always to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina together and upon the war's conclusion to restore a united Bosnia-Herzegovina with a decisive central government in Sarajevo. This is the fundamental condition, the "*conditio sine qua non*", to survive as a constitutional arrangement. All attempts by Croatia (with the exception of the period of the Croat-Muslim agreements) and by Serbia deny this opportunity for Bosnia-Herzegovina to be a sovereign state. Compared to Serbia's encounter in Croatia, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina followed a different scheme. The Serbs were going to occupy and "protect" territory which would become part of permanent greater Serbia:

In Croatia the war gradually built up from a local Serb 'uprising' in the summer 1990 to a full scale war in the summer of 1991. Serbia's aggression against Bosnia Herzegownina took the form of a Blitzkrieg. In Croatia "ethnic cleansing" was to produce some 300.000 refugees in the course of one and a half years. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the victims of the policy of "ethnic cleansing" on a larger scale numbered almost 2 millions within six month. A U.S. Senate report estimated that during this period as many as thirty five thousand people were killed as a result of 'ethnic cleansing' alone. In Croatia, Serbia fought the war ostensibly to defend a minority threatened by a 'fascist regime'.¹⁴³

In Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs were not a minority but one of three formally recognized constituent nations. The Bosnian elections of November 1990 produced an assembly in which the Serbs were represented in numbers reflecting their weight in the population as a whole. A government was formed with appropriate Serb representation. Despite this, the war against Bosnia-Herzegovina was from the start waged with one aim only: complete destruction of the

¹⁴² Stokes, Gale, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down, The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 250.

¹⁴³ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina*, 1993, p. 252.

republic. It was here that the 'Great Serbian' project was finally to reveal fully its true criminal nature.¹⁴⁴

1. Initial Serb War Strategy: Ethnic Warfare

From the very beginning of the Bosnian war, the atrocities were primarily against the Muslim minority but were also against the Croats that were settled in Serb-claimed areas. This was part of the Serb strategy to achieve an ethnically "clean" territory at the end of the war.

The Bosnian war began with the shooting in Sarajevo on April 5, 1992. Serb gunmen standing on top of the Holiday Inn fired upon anti-war demonstrators in the center of the city. One might also mark the outbreak of hostilities with the April 2nd raid by paramilitary units from Serbia on Bijeljina, a town near the Serbian border. Those who entered the city claimed that the Muslims in Bijeljina were planning a massacre of Serbs. The Serb forces supposedly acted to prevent such an event. They took over the town and in the course of their operation they murdered at least several dozen Muslims. From that day until now, the war has unfolded according to a precise plan: non-Serb territories are encircled and Serbian majority areas are linked with one another. '*Ethnic cleansing*' has been an integral part of the entire plan. As Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights and former Prime Minister of Poland, put it: '*Ethnic cleansing*' was the objective, and not a consequence, of the war.¹⁴⁵

Instrumentalized to become weapons in "ethnic warfare" became rape and castration : "Castration has occurred with some regularity in the Balkan war and

¹⁴⁴ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 1993, p. 252.

¹⁴⁵ Cerović, Stojan, "Letter From Serbia: 'Greater Serbia' and Its Discontents" in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, *Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan War*, 1993, pp. 259-268

it appears, together with rape, to be part of a pattern of psychological pressure that has played an especially insidious role in ethnic cleansing.¹⁴⁶

The European Community recently put the number of rape-victims at twenty thousand. The Sarajevo State Commission for Investigation of War Crimes estimates that fifty thousand women were raped up to October 1992. Even if numbers are highly controversial, it may be that the truth will not be known until after the war, if at all.

Rape is an instrument of war, a very efficient weapon for demoralization and humiliation....What seems to be unprecedented about the rapes of Muslim women in Bosnia (and to a lesser extend of Croat women too) is that there is a clear political purpose behind the practice. The rapes in Bosnia are not only a standard tactic of war, they are an organized and systematic attempt to cleanse (to move, resettle, exile) the Muslim population from certain territories. Serbs want to conquer in order to establish a Greater Serbia. Thus not only is their cultural and religious integrity destroyed but the reproductive potential of the whole nation is threatened. It may seem very abstract to speak of rape as a method of "ethnic cleansing", but it becomes quite clear when one talks to the victims and witnesses.¹⁴⁷

2. Initial Serb War Aims: Establishment of Serb Autonomous Regions

The preparations for the assault on Bosnia-Herzegovina followed a pattern already set in Croatia. Once again a Serb Democratic Party (SDS) was set up which prior to the elections of November 1990, immediately proceeded to declare itself sole representative of Bosnian Serbs, who were to be viewed as part of a seamless Serb nation. A Serb National Assembly and a Serb National Council were set up in Banja Luka in October 1990, as sovereign legislative and executive bodies, wholly independent from Sarajevo. From October 1990 to

¹⁴⁶ Crane-Engel, Melinda, "Germany vs Genocide" in: *The New York Times Magazine* (New York, October 30, 1994), p. 59.

¹⁴⁷ Draculić, Slavenka, "Women Hide Behind a Wall of Silence" in: Ali, Rabia and Lifschultz, Rabia, *Why Bosnia ? Writings On The Balkan War*, 1993, pp. 118-119.

December 1991, the SDS was busy consolidating its structure including its police and its armed forces. The Serbs started demarcating new internal borders in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the end six so-called Serb Autonomous Regions (SAOs) had been established by the end of this process: *Bosanska Krajina, Northern Bosnia, Northeastern Bosnia, Romanija, Hercegovina and Old Hercegovina*. These were then proclaimed parts of a "Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" later (spring 1991) renamed the "Serb Republic" (Srpska Republic). Many non-Serb areas found themselves included in this self-proclaimed mono-ethnic state. The first aim of Serbian military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina was subsequently to be the establishment of corridors between the different SOAs, cleared of all non-Serb population.¹⁴⁸

3. Serb Attack on Bosnia's Democratic Institutions:

In Bosnia-Herzegovina's National Assembly, three big parties controlled 86 % of the 240 seats. The elections produced a coalition government and state presidency made up of representatives of the three main parties: Serb Democratic Party (SDS) 86 seats, Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica B-H*, HDZ) 44 seats and the Muslim-based Party of Democratic Action (*Stranka Demokratske Akcije*) SDA with 86 seats. The SDS used its influence to prevent all moves the Bosnian government might make to save the republic. Besides this obstruction the SDS splits the National Assembly into two unevensized blocs: The minority, made up by the SDS and its satellite parties, wanted the republic either to join Serbia en bloc with some 'federal' facade or be broken up. No compromise was possible with the majority bloc composed of deputies belonging to the SDA, the HDZ and most of the smaller parties which wished to become Bosnia-Herzegovina a sovereign state within Yugoslavia, or failing this an independent state. For obvious reasons the SDS in February 1991 turned down a proposal by the SDA (supported by the HDZ) to adopt a declaration giving the Bosnian legislature precedence over the "federal" legislature. The federal Yugoslavia by then was already Serb controlled.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina*, 1993, p. 252.

¹⁴⁹ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina*, 1993, p. 252.

In October 1991 the National Assembly adopted a draft memorandum confirming constitutional amendments, which as in other republics the departing Communist administrations introduced designed to enhance the republic's integrity and sovereignty. Bramka Magas noted that, though "falling short of a declaration of independence, the Memorandum affirmed the inviolability of the republic's borders, while expressing support for Yugoslavia made up by sovereign states". The SDS deputies with their leader Radovan Karadžić walked out before the vote was taken. The adoption of the Memorandum provided an occasion to declare Bosnia's neutrality in the ongoing war already raging in Croatia.

4. Death of Bosnian Identity

The creation of the "Serb Republic" (*Srpska Republic*) and the "Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna" was effectively intended to destroy all attempts to establish a "Bosnian identity", which was necessary for Bosnia-Herzegovina to survive the challenges of Serb and Croatian nationalism. The inviolability of borders would become meaningless, if the Serbs and Croats sought linkages to their home territories. The National Assembly's affirmation of sovereignty was immediately followed by the SDS's proclamation of a separate Serb state: the "Serb Republic".

The proclamation of the Serb Republic was followed by local Croat HDZ leaders calling for the establishment of two so-called Croat Communities, one in the north on the Sava River and one in the south called "*Herceg-Bosna*". The Bosnian HDZ leadership (supported by almost all Croatian parties and most of the Bosnian Croats) denounced the moves as a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, Serbs and Croats made it clear that their recognition of the Sarajevo Government could only be achieved, if Sarajevo retained its independence from the former and any future Yugoslavia. Croatia did not attack Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also did not want to disregard its considerable Croat population there. Franjo Tudjman made it clear at an early point that he believed neither in the likely survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor in its historical legitimacy in the event of Yugoslavia's disintegration into national states. In Croatia, the idea of dividing Bosnia-

Herzegovina was deeply unpopular. And on the principle of the inviolability of Yugoslavia's internal borders, Croatia hoped for the return of its Serb-occupied territories.

To accomplish the impossible Croat officials followed the SDS in proposing the "Cantonizing" of Bosnia-Herzegovina on an ethnic basis.

5. "Divide and Rule" Became Cantonization

Croat officials followed the SDS in proposing '*cantonization*' of Bosnia-Herzegovina on an ethnic basis. The SDS had justified the creation of the six SAOs on the grounds that, in a centrally-run republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs would become an oppressed minority. Under Zagreb's influence, parts of the Bosnian HDZ now accepted the same logic.

The European Community too -- to its eternal discredit --, encouraged this '*ethnically based*' program, in whose name it has subsequently sought to qualify the Bosnian government's legitimacy.

The ethnic dispersion within Bosnia-Herzegovina, of course makes the idea of cantonization (like Switzerland) on an ethnic basis dangerous nonsense. A look at the census makes it clear, that for the benefit of creating cantons with absolute national majorities an enormous proportion of Bosnia-Herzegovina's inhabitants would have to be uprooted and resettled. Cantonization involved not only just civil war, but destruction of the very identity of the Bosnian state created by the coexistence of the three nationalities. This is why the idea of cantonization was rejected by all Bosnian Muslims, by a majority of Bosnian Croats, probably by most Serbs in Bosnia's major cities, and by an unknown number of Serbs in areas under SDS control.

Croat officials followed the SDS in proposing '*cantonization*' of Bosnia-Herzegovina on an ethnic basis. The SDS had justified the creation of the six SAOs on the grounds that, in a centrally-run republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs would become an oppressed minority. Under Zagreb's influence, parts of the Bosnian HDZ now accepted the same logic. The European Community too -- to its eternal discredit,

encouraged this '*ethnically based*' program -- in whose name it has subsequently sought to qualify the Bosnian government's legitimacy....The ethnic dispersion within Bosnia-Herzegovina, of course makes the idea of cantonization (like Switzerland) on an ethnic basis dangerous nonsense. A look at the census makes it clear, that for the benefit of creating cantons with absolute national majorities an enormous proportion of Bosnia-Herzegovina's inhabitants would have to be uprooted and resettled. Cantonization involved not only just civil war, but destruction of the very identity of the Bosnian state created by the coexistence of the three nationalities. This is why the idea of cantonization was rejected by all Bosnian Muslims, by a majority of Bosnian Croats, probably by most Serbs in Bosnia's major cities, and by an unknown number of Serbs in areas under SDS control.¹⁵⁰

6. Bosnian Self-Defense Rests in Bosnia's Independence and Recognition

In December 1991 the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was in the air - despite the results of the Badinter commission - and therefore at the end of the Maastricht Treaty conference on December 20th Bosnia-Herzegovina applied to become a independent state.

The European Community arbitration commission invited Bosnia-Herzegovina to hold a referendum on the issue of independence as a condition of recognition, which in the National Assembly was approved Jan. 25, 1992 by the SDA and HDZ deputies, supported by most of the smaller opposition parties. The referendum would be held under international supervision.

The SDS leaders proclaimed the decision towards independence to be null and void and announced that in case of the event that independence would be granted, the "Serb Republic" would become part of the "Federal State of Yugoslavia".¹⁵¹

As outlined above, it became impossible to achieve a constitutional consensus for Bosnia-Herzegovina's future.

¹⁵⁰ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina*, 1993, p. 254.

¹⁵¹ Magas, Branka, *The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina*, 1993, p. 255.

The decision to apply for independence is discussed even though, given the dedication of the SDS to create a "Greater Serbia" and to join "Mother Serbia" with their "Serb republic", there was no real choice anyway. Bosnia-Herzegovina had fulfilled the conditions set by the EC for international recognition, but the West bowed to Serbian pressure by conditioning the recognition of the Sarajevo government upon its acceptance of "cantonization". This principle was first put on ice when the link between "cantonization" and "ethnic cleansing" became quite obvious in Summer 1992, when a war was in progress, for which Bosnia-Herzegovina was not prepared at least.

The same arms embargo which has given the Belgrade Serb forces such an advantage against the Croats has been maintained until now and has directly contributed to the human and material devastation.

In summary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, because of its geopolitical location, unluckily situated and exposed to the opposing powers Croatia and Serbia, had no real chance to be a political sovereign entity. The governments in Serbia and Croatia wanted to divide Bosnia and annex the spoils. Since Serbia and Croatia did not achieve their goals, they closely controlled the movements of the party leaders of their respective nationalities. The leader of the Serbs, Radovan Karadžić, proclaimed his own independent state, as did the leader of the Croats, Mate Boban, who replaced Stjepan Kljuić as leader of the Croat party HDZ. Boban replaced Kljuić because of the latter's opposition to dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, placing the condition of "cantonization" on recognition of the Sarajevo government led to violent war.

Those who were born and bred on Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory started fighting for what they considered their home. However, the Serbs immediately spread the terror of "ethnic cleansing" in order to achieve a homogeneous Serb territory -- as far as their forces are able to hold it -- one that would later unite with Serbia. The Croats joined in the fighting in order to protect their territorial heritage. Every nationality was fighting against the other, including the Croats

against the Moslems; and the Muslim-Croat atrocities by the Spring of 1993 started to run out of control.

H. CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF MILOŠEVIĆ'S YUGOSLAVIA

Tito left Yugoslavia too decentralized to allow a single ethnic group to dominate it. Milošević from the very beginning set out to enable the Serbs to play the role that they believed their large population and historical "mission" entitled them to. He therefore deprived the autonomous regions of their autonomy and incorporated Kosovo and the Vojvodina with Serbia and Montenegro, forming the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Milošević began his career as a communist apparatchik of extremely authoritarian mien, even for Serbia. He rose to the leadership of the Serbian party by betraying the man who gave him his chance in politics, Ivan Stambolić, whose purge Milošević organized. Milošević is an opportunist, not an ideologue, a man driven by power rather than nationalism. He has made a Faustian pact with nationalism as a way to gain and hold power.¹⁵²

But with nationalism unleashed, the Slovenian nationalists broke all political and economic ties with the Yugoslav government and in their drive to independence they simply ignored the 22 million Yugoslavs who were not Slovenes. Before Milošević was able to annex Macedonia to 'Great Serbia,' a continuous international monitoring mission under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) protected Macedonia's integrity. With the U.S. strongly supporting the stability and territorial integrity of Macedonia, a prompt resolution of the Macedonian recognition issue followed.

¹⁵² Zimmermann, Warren, "The Last Ambassador, A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia" in: *Foreign Affairs*, (New York, March/April 1995), p. 5.

As Yugoslavia could no longer include "all Serbs in one country", Milošević's Serbian project would encompass them. This meant annexation or war for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Warren Zimmermann still believes "that Milošević and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić had already decided to annex the majority of Bosnia by military force", Milošević had spoken to him of 70 percent. Zimmermann also reports that "neither Milošević nor Tudjman made any effort to conceal their designs on Bosnia" from him. Bosnia, known as the "place where Serbs, Croats, and Muslims had coexisted peacefully for centuries," became "an affront and a challenge to these two ethnic supremacists."¹⁵³

In March 1995 all the warring parties in the Yugoslav conflict are preparing to fight again. The cease-fire secured by former President Carter after Christmas is still lasting but no political breakthrough is in sight.

Croatia's 74-year-old President Franjo Tudjman decided that he cannot wait much longer to recover the thirty percent of Croatian territory seized by the Serbs in 1991 and hosting the Serb Krajina Republic. Tudjman regards the 12,000 U.N. troops as accomplices to the Serb occupation. In January 1995 he threatened the United Nations cease-fire monitoring mission in Croatia by no longer allowing them to stay. The UNPROFOR's recent mandate would expire on March 31, 1995 and their withdrawal had to be completed on June 30. Tudjman's bargaining successfully earned him the United States attention. For not ousting the peacekeepers the American Vice President assured Tudjman of "full U.S. support for restoring Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia."¹⁵⁴

Milošević's goal in 1995 is to get the trade sanctions lifted. He has formally cut Belgrade's support for the Bosnian Serbs, not to give up the Serbian cause but

¹⁵³ Zimmermann, Warren, *The Last Ambassador, A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia* in: *Foreign Affairs*, (New York, March/April 1995), pp. 15-16.

¹⁵⁴ Crosette, Barbara, "Croatian Leader Agrees to Continuation of U.N. Force," in: *The New York Times*, (Vol CXLIV, No 49,999, March 13, 1995) p. A 4.

to destroy his personal enemy Karadžić. To recognize Croatia and Bosnia, however, seems to be an insurmountable problem for Milošević, as he could not survive politically: it would mean to give up and bury the idea of a Greater Serbia.

Meanwhile the Bosnian Government is determined to take back territory by military means and to avenge the atrocities suffered by the Muslim civilians. Roger Cohen reports:

As for Bosnia, General Rasim Delić, the commander of the Government Army, appears to have drawn his conclusions about the future. 'We have used this period to train our army,' he said this week. 'We are now better prepared than ever to fight.'¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ Cohen, Roger, "Sinking Hope in a Balkan Bog, Amid Western Confusion, Fears of a Wider War Grow" in: *The New York Times* (New York, March 5, 1995), p. 4.

V THE EXTERNAL DYNAMICS OF THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR DEFENSE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY, THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES

This chapter deals with the involvement of global and regional organizations for defense and collective security in the Yugoslav crisis. The struggle over how to end the conflict in Yugoslavia -- which nation or organization should lead to the way out -- is not yet decided. However, the years since 1990 have influenced the development of a European common security and defence policy. *The Economist* notes that

The trouble with talking about a 'European defence policy' is that so many important questions still have no answers. Will NATO find a new role for itself in the post-cold-war era? How will the bitter experience of peacekeeping in ex-Yugoslavia, especially the row it has caused between Europe and America, influence the debate? What will come out of next year's [1996] constitutional conference of the European Union, the EU, which is due to examine...the Maastricht treaty's vague commitment to 'the eventual framing of a common defence policy which may in time lead to a common defence'?¹⁵⁶

How the security organizations adapted to the crisis is investigated here. It is concluded that the regional security organizations, after realizing the inadequacy of their institutional approaches, tacitly or openly re-established the United Nations as the sole practicable international authority to mobilize military forces for hazardous interventions. The United Nations greatly influenced the peace plans, and U.N. peacekeeping operations supported the delivery of humanitarian aid. The United States as the sole remaining superpower participated in the UN work but also followed its own agenda. The U.S. influenced the peace plans and sponsored the

¹⁵⁶ *The Economist* in its Special "The Defence of Europe" concludes on "European defence policy," what the title of the article projects: *It can't be done alone*, (New York, volume 334, number 7903, February 25th 1995), pp. 19-21.

Croat-Muslim agreement. In March 1995 the United States Vice President Al Gore assured the Croat President Tudjman "of full support for restoring Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia."¹⁵⁷

A. INTRODUCING THE ACTORS IN THE BALKAN REGION: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE 'ALPHABET SOUP' OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE.

In 1989 Francis Fukuyama discussed the "End of History."¹⁵⁸ Fukuyama certainly would have joined in the joy of the heads of state and government in Rome on November 7, 1991. There Western European, Canadian and United States leaders confirmed that

...[t]he world has changed dramatically. The Alliance has made an essential contribution. The peoples of North America and the whole of Europe can now join in a community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.¹⁵⁹

A Europe of cooperation and prosperity should counter the new challenges with a new security architecture:

The challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the

¹⁵⁷ Crosette, Barbara, "Croatian Leader Agrees to Continuation of U.N. Force," in: *The New York Times* (March 13, 1995), p. A 4.

¹⁵⁸ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest*, (No. 16, Summer 1989), p. 3.

¹⁵⁹ NATO, *Rome Declaration On Peace And Cooperation*, (Brussels, Press Communique S-1(91)86, November 8th, 1991) Article 3: A New Security Architecture, p. 1.

European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. Regional frameworks of cooperation will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.¹⁶⁰

Less euphoric in his assessment, Henry Kissinger believes the security architecture today has changed dramatically in the past five years. In Kissinger's opinion the convenient and relatively simple zero-sum game of the Cold War era has been replaced by a complex security architecture for a cold peace. He writes that

The complex interplay of 'interlocking regional institutions' and the UN is best characterized by the efforts to restore peace and security in the former Yugoslavia. Here, what Kissinger called an 'alphabet soup' of security and defense organizations were and are working to bring the situation under control.¹⁶¹

For brevity's sake the United Nations and Europe's regional security organizations are addressed, notably those directly involved in the Yugoslav crisis.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ NATO, *Ibid*, p. 1.

¹⁶¹ Berkhof, Gerard C., *Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations for Collective Security*, (Caen, 22-23 September 1994), draft of paper prepared for the Conference of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, p. 6.

¹⁶² The paper will not include organizations which promote security in a wider sense like the Council of Europe, nor will it include global organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Committee of the Red Cross or the Red Crescent (ICRC) and numerous non-governmental organizations concerned with human rights (such as Amnesty International), social security (such as the International Labour Organisation), or environmental security (such as Greenpeace).

The United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has urged an expanded role for regional organizations, and he has clearly stated that the regional organizations in Europe have a special responsibility to relieve the already overburdened UN machinery. However, the initial division of labor among the regional organizations and the United Nations has been hard to maintain.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a collective defense organisation, is regarded by some as a self-defense alliance similar to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Both collective defense organisations aspire to maintain the territorial integrity of their members.¹⁶³ Individual NATO and CIS member states currently contribute to the UN peacekeeping contingent present on the ground in the former Yugoslavia.

General defense alliances include the Western European Union (WEU) and possibly the European Union (EU). Both organizations have military aims that encompass more than collective self-defense, but they are primarily directed against any common foe.

NATO, CIS, WEU and EU are distinct from universalist, Wilsonian-style collective security organizations. The purpose of such collective security organizations is to maintain the *status quo*. Members exist peacefully together and take action, if necessary, to prevent a conflict. In the event that one state violates the *status quo*, penalties can be imposed ranging from diplomatic disapproval and economic sanctions to military action. The only European collective security organisation is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), referred to as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since December 1994.

¹⁶³ "The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of the values they share." NATO, *Rome Declaration On Peace And Cooperation*, (Brussels, Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, November 8th, 1991) Article 20, p. 8.

Since the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis in 1991, several attempts have failed to establish a truce or cease-fire and to move towards a permanent cessation of hostilities. The security organizations involved in promoting a peace acceptable to all parties are introduced and discussed in this chapter in accordance with the broader sequence of the events. The organizations involved in efforts to end the Yugoslav crisis have not failed totally, even though in March 1995 no peace settlement has yet been achieved. Lessons have been learned as the conflict regarding Yugoslav secession developed into a crisis on Yugoslav succession and then into a full-scale war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Numerous diverging interests are involved, allowing Serbs, Croats and Bosnians to carry on fighting and to play one European power against the other. The conflict, however, has been contained within the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as a result of the involvement and actions of the several security organizations. The failures and modest achievements during the Yugoslav crisis will influence the options of the security organizations in the future.

B. OVERVIEW OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

From January 1990 -- when the Yugoslav League of Communists adjourned their party congress to never meet again -- until the end of March 1995 four distinct phases of the Yugoslav conflict may be identified. During the first phase the international community supported Yugoslavia's political integrity. The break-up would, it was feared, set a bad example for other multi-ethnic countries, especially the Soviet Union. The break-up of Yugoslavia had to be avoided in order to keep the federation together, it was argued. The European Community offered economic assistance and trade concessions and refused to recognize any breakaway republics. In the summer of 1990 the Serb "uprising" in Croatia signaled the start of the war of Yugoslav secession, which became a full-scale war in the Summer of 1991.

In June 1991, when the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) attacked Slovenia, the second phase began. It was characterized by Austria's initiation of the emergency mechanism of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The

CSCE's Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna required Yugoslavia to clarify its military intentions. The CSCE's and the European Community's diplomatic intervention achieved the end of the fighting in Slovenia.

Phase three began with the movement of the YPA into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. International efforts became necessary to resolve the conflict. The European Community initially attempted to persuade Serbia to agree to a political settlement and simultaneously to keep Bosnia-Herzegovina together, thus limiting the rise of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia. The number of cease-fire monitors was increased to 300. Political negotiations sponsored by the E.C. peace conference began, forming three working groups (on constitutional arrangements, minority rights and economic relations). The working group considering the republics' constitutions became known as the Badinter commission.

Phase four has been characterized by the conflict in Bosnia, which began when the Bosnian Serbs started to consolidate their control over Serb-dominated areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Milosević explained this to Warren Zimmermann in October 1991 that "...the Serbs were a rural people living on 70 percent of the land, to which they therefore had a right".¹⁶⁴ The Serb reaction on April 7, 1992, to the Bosnian referendum in favor of independence undermined the security situation. The Bosnian Serbs, aided by the Yugoslav Army, escalated the violence and focused on the forcible removal, intimidation, and killing of Bosnian Muslims and Croats to create "ethnically pure" Serb enclaves. This phase continues.

A fifth phase is likely to begin in Spring 1995. In a worst-case scenario the the UNPROFOR mandate will then be terminated and, with the completion of the UNPROFOR withdrawal, war will almost certainly engulf Croatia.

¹⁶⁴ Zimmermann, Warren, *"The Last Ambassador, A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia"*, *Foreign Affairs* (New York, March/April 1995), p. 16.

1. The European Community¹⁶⁵ : The E.C. Before Maastricht

In retrospect it is evident that the twelve European nations then forming the European Community (E.C.) tried to administer rather than control the crisis.¹⁶⁶ At the beginning of the crisis, however, it might have been possible to stop Serbian aggression and further escalation without overwhelming military force. But the Western Europeans did not agree on sending a WEU interposition force to Eastern Croatia as proposed by Germany and France. Nicole Gnesotto writes that,

The Franco-German axis held firm during the first months of the conflict: in mid-August 1991, a Franco-German proposal was made for the deployment of a force between Serbs and Croats in Croatia itself, within a WEU framework. This was immediately opposed by the British who...[have] drawn from Northern Ireland and Cyprus the lesson that great caution has to be exercised in interposition operations....The affair came to an abrupt halt when, on 19 September 1991, the European Council simply asked WEU to draw up plans for a possible peacekeeping operation and turned to the United Nations for the management of the conflict. From October 1991 and the UN's appearance on the scene, the Franco-British axis was, however, to become dominant, and Germany was to go it alone and later be absent altogether.¹⁶⁷

In December 1991 neither the E.C.'s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) nor the particular role of the WEU forces had yet been developed. For this reason Great Britain opposed the employment of armed forces.

¹⁶⁵ The European Community (E.C.) became the European Union (EU) in November 1993. The Council of the European Communities, the High Contracting Parties, agreed at the Maastricht E.C. summit on December 9-11, 1991, to establish by this Treaty "among themselves a European Union." Declared in Article A of the Treaty on the European Union.

¹⁶⁶ E.C. members consist of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.

¹⁶⁷ Gnesotto, Nicole, *Lessons of Yugoslavia*, (Paris, Institute for Security Studies WEU, March 1994) Chaillot Papers 14, p. 21.

In the autumn of 1991 the Presidential Committee of the Assembly of the WEU asked the Council of Ministers to invite the UN Security Council to set up a peace-keeping force capable of enforcing the cease-fire in the area. It hoped the WEU could play that role if such a force were constituted, but the Council restricted itself to declaring an embargo on the delivery of arms and military equipment to Yugoslavia.¹⁶⁸

Instead of an armed force for interposition operations the E.C. sent its European Community Monitor Mission into Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, on the diplomatic front, the European Community in September 1991 created a commission to establish criteria for recognizing breakaway Yugoslav republics. This commission was led by the French Minister of Justice, Robert Badinter. The efforts of the E.C., the CSCE and the Security Council of the United Nations to resolve the crisis were supported by NATO -- support that was emphatically expressed at the Rome summit of the NATO members in November 1991. NATO welcomed the measures agreed upon by the European Community's member states at the meeting of foreign ministers on 8 November. The foreign ministers also agreed to Lord Peter Carrington's efforts. His plans provided a framework for the peoples of Yugoslavia to solve their problems. Gerard Berkhof wrote that,

[a]t the diplomatic level the EC initially took the lead, beginning with the 'Troika' of past, present and future chairmen, and then with special representative Lord Carrington, followed by Lord Owen. The objective was to bring about a cease-fire, first between the different republics of the former Yugoslavia - Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia - and later between the warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at diplomatic conferences in The Hague, Brussels and London. Later, when the UN became involved, the venue was moved to Geneva. The

¹⁶⁸ Berkhof, Gerard C., *Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations for Collective Security*, (Caen, 22-23 September 1994), draft of paper prepared for the Conference of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, p. 6.

endeavors of EC diplomacy were supported from the outset by an EC Monitor Mission in the field.¹⁶⁹

The European Community developed a basic strategy which from the very beginning of its involvement in the crisis in 1990 included three actions: permanent negotiations with the conflicting parties, economic sanctions and an arms embargo, and some hindrance of the military operations of the conflicting parties through peacekeeping forces.

2. The United Nations: UN Resolution 713

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Xavier Perez de Cuellar, was reluctant to involve the UN. After the outbreak of fighting, he initially rejected UN intervention in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, as Slovenia was not a member of the United Nations.

But with the continued failure of EC-led efforts, attention increasingly focused on the UN as an alternative forum. France (a permanent member in the Security Council, and the Council's chair in September [1991]) and Austria (serving a term membership on the Council) continued to lead the effort. France's interest in UN action was stimulated by the continued political disagreements within the EC on how to proceed and by a general unwillingness to use the WEU, while Austria was a neighbor concerned about possible widening of the conflict and responding to its close historical and cultural ties to Croatia and Slovenia.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Berkhof, Gerard C., *Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations for Collective Security*, (Caen, 22-23 September 1994), draft of paper prepared for the Conference of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, p. 6.

¹⁷⁰ Steinberg, James B., "Yugoslavia", in Damrosch, Lori Fisler (Ed.), *Enforcing Restraint, Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, (New York, Councils on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 38.

On 25 September 1991, the Security Council supported the cease-fire agreements of 17 and 22 September 1991 by encouraging diplomatic action and adopting its first resolution on Yugoslavia to implement an arms embargo. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713 states that member nations are,

...[d]eeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia which is causing a heavy loss of human life and material losses,...[c]oncerned that a continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international peace,...[c]ommending the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, through, inter alia, the implementation of a cease-fire including the sending of observers, the convening of a Conference on Yugoslavia, including the mechanisms set forth within it, and the suspension of the delivery of all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia... [d]ecides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.¹⁷¹

On 8 October 1991, Perez de Cuellar appointed former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance as his personal envoy to Yugoslavia. In November 1991 a second United Nations Security Council resolution 721 (later called Resolution, UNSCR), considered the "request by the Government of Yugoslavia for the establishment of a peace-keeping operation."¹⁷² But Resolution 724 of December 1991 - the third on Yugoslavia in 1991 - stated that the

¹⁷¹ United Nations Security Council resolution 713 [later called Resolution and abbreviated UNSCR], adopted by the Security Council at its 3009th meeting on 25 September 1991.

¹⁷² UNSCR 721, adopted by the Security Council at its 3018th meeting on November 25.

conditions for establishing a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia still do not exist... [Nevertheless the Security Council] [e]ncourages the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Yugoslavia in liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF and other humanitarian organizations, to take urgent practical steps to tackle the critical needs of the people of Yugoslavia, including displaced persons and the most vulnerable groups affected by the conflict, to assist in the voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes.¹⁷³

The actions outlined in the three Resolutions of 1991 were all undertaken with respect to threats to the peace as provided by Chapter VII of the Charter.¹⁷⁴ Each supported the negotiated and unconditional cease-fire and the implementation of the arms embargo. Once the cease-fire was agreed upon in Geneva on 23 November 1991, the employment of peace-keeping forces would follow in accordance with the Charter's Chapter VIII.¹⁷⁵ This phase lasted until the end of 1991 and was characterized by the absence of a military threat by an international force. This phase resulted in numerous attempts to arrange cease-fires and provide humanitarian relief to civilians and refugees.

3. The European Community at Maastricht: The E.C. Summit in December 1991

At the Maastricht Summit it became evident that the conflict in Yugoslavia did not threaten the Western European states and therefore no immediate calls for action or assistance would be pursued. Planning the economic future for Europe

¹⁷³ see: UNSCR 724, adopted by the Security Council at its 3023rd meeting on November 25, 1991

¹⁷⁴ "Chapter VII Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." Benett, A. Leroy, *International Organizations, Principles and Issues*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1991), p. 445.

¹⁷⁵ "Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements." Benett, A. Leroy, *Ibid*, p. 445.

eclipsed the development of a consolidated peace effort, despite the Western Europeans' diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.¹⁷⁶

The Treaty on European Union, which was negotiated . . . became the focal point of the post-cold war campaign of EC completion. The Maastricht Treaty has been widely heralded as the most important [but]...is first and foremost an economic document, designed to consolidate and expand upon the progress which had been made during the cold war toward the creation of a fully integrated West European economic system.¹⁷⁷

"During the spring and summer of 1991, as West European governments were preparing for Maastricht," Douglas Stuart observed, "Yugoslavia was treated as an annoyance and an inconvenience rather than an immediate regional security crisis."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Germany encouraged the E.C. members to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as soon as possible. The E.C. member states agreed upon individually recognizing both countries not later than January 15th in 1992. After the decision at the Maastricht Summit was made on December 16th, 1991, Germany's Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, informed Slovenia and Croatia on their recognition by Germany already two days later. Most probably Germany's early announcement on December 18th was done in response to German domestic politics, as Genscher had promised to insist on recognition before Christmas.

Germany's pushing the EC to "early recognition" is held responsible by some for the outbreak of the war in Bosnia in April 1992. Authoritative observers have dismissed this theory, however. "Milošević, Karadžić, and their spokesmen have asserted that the Western recognition of Bosnia had forced the Serbs to move. I doubt this. The two Serbian leaders already had a joint strategy for dividing Bosnia and they were going to carry it out, regardless of what the rest of the world did." Zimmermann, Warren, *"The Last Ambassador, A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs*, (March/April 1995), p. 18.

¹⁷⁷ Stuart, T. Douglas, *Can Europe Survive Maastricht*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S.Army War College, 1994), p. V.

¹⁷⁸ Stuart, T. Douglas, *Can Europe Survive Maastricht*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S.Army War College, 1994), p. 27.

In early December [1991], the leaders of the E.C. at last sat down in Maastricht. Neither together nor singly had they done anything worth mentioning about Serbian aggression. Carrington had brokered a succession of cease-fires, not one of which lasted much longer than the time it took to announce it. In two full days of meetings to conclude their treaty, the E.C. leaders dealt quickly with the recognizing of Croatia and Slovenia. But neither the consequences of recognition nor the real problems posed by Yugoslavia ever came up in their discussions.¹⁷⁹

The act of recognition by the E.C. in January 1992 followed another, more durable, cease-fire in Croatia.¹⁸⁰ Cyrus R. Vance, the personal envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations, had negotiated this cease-fire. The lengthy duration allowed the United Nations peace plan to take effect.¹⁸¹ "The cease-fire was seen by many relieved Europeans and most Germans as proof that recognition had done no harm, and possibly even some good."¹⁸² Since Croatia and Slovenia had become independent, Bosnians were confronted with a choice they would have preferred to avoid. If they would not attempt recognition, Bosnia would become part of the Serbian-dominated "Rump-Yugoslavia," with "ethnic cleansing" and the expulsion of Muslims. Applying for recognition, however, was likely to bring on civil war. In February 1992, Bosnia held a referendum for independence and the E.C. and the United States recognized Bosnia in April 1992.

¹⁷⁹ Newhouse, John, *Dodging The Problem. The Diplomatic Round*, (The New Yorker, New York, 1992) August 24, p. 66.

¹⁸⁰ UNSCR 727, adopted by the Security Council at its 3028th meeting on January 8, 1992, "welcomes the signing...for implementing the unconditional cease-fire."

¹⁸¹ UNSCR 740, adopted by the Security Council at its 3049th meeting on February 7, 1992, "welcomes the efforts to remove the obstacles in the way of the deployment of a peace-keeping operation."

¹⁸² Newhouse, John, "Dodging The Problem. The Diplomatic Round", (The New Yorker, New York, 1992) August 24, p. 66.

In February 1992 the United Nations, supported by the E.C. and the CSCE states, decided to establish a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).¹⁸³ After recognition fighting broke out in Bosnia, which in April 1992 already influenced the timely deployment of advanced elements of the UNPROFOR.¹⁸⁴ The Security Council authorized full deployment of the UNPROFOR on April 7, 1992, under the command of the Indian General Satish Nambiar. Units of the Yugoslav People's Army and elements of the Croatian Army were still operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina when the UNPROFOR called for a mandate for Eastern Slavonia, a region rich in resources such as oil on Croatia's Serbian border, where the heavy artillery of the Yugoslav army shelled the urban Croat population.

Since May 1992 the safety of personnel operating under the aegis of the United Nations or the European Community Monitor Mission has not been guaranteed in Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁵ The European Community was still pursuing efforts to establish a framework on constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina at the Conference on Yugoslavia, when the safe and secure access to Sarajevo was already threatened. The United Nations plan, once implemented, would create United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) where the UNPROFOR should disarm all irregular forces, irrespective of their origin. "On May 19th, [1992,] Margaret Tutwiler, the U.S. State Department spokesperson, had said that she was 'not aware

¹⁸³ UNSCR 743, adopted by the Security Council at its 3055th meeting on February 21, 1992 "considers that conditions permitting the early deployment of...UNPROFOR...are met."

¹⁸⁴ UNSCR 749, adopted by the Security Council at its 3066th meeting on April 7, 1992 "reports...daily violations of the cease-fire and the continuing tension in [some] regions even after the arrival of UNPROFOR's advance elements."

¹⁸⁵ UNSCR 752, adopted by the Security Council at its 3069th meeting on May 15, 1992 deplored the "death of members of the European Community Monitor Mission."

of" any American security interest at stake in Yugoslavia."¹⁸⁶ At the following NATO meeting held in Lisbon on May 24th an American-led delivery of humanitarian aid was approved unanimously, but it has been dependent on the free use of the Sarajevo airport and therefore threatened.¹⁸⁷ It was known before the Maastricht Summit, but afterwards became more evident, with the outbreak of hostilities: "the Balkan crisis has confirmed that the EU cannot provide security guarantees."¹⁸⁸

The E.C. was confident that the established embargo would succeed. More economic sanctions were agreed on by the United Nations before the summer of 1992. But the sanctions did not force the warring parties to agree to a conference; instead violence increased. The French announced that they were prepared to support humanitarian aid with ground forces and President Mitterrand on "Kosovo-day", 28 July 1992, made a one-day trip to the beleaguered city of Sarajevo. In addition to the need for humanitarian aid, it became known that prisons, camps, and detention centers were established in Yugoslavia to promote "ethnic cleansing."¹⁸⁹ Mass killings and the continuance of the practice of "ethnic

¹⁸⁶ Newhouse, John, *Dodging The Problem. The Diplomatic Round*, (The New Yorker, New York, 1992) August 24, p. 68.

¹⁸⁷ UNSCR 758, adopted by the Security Council at its 3083rd meeting on June 8, 1992 noted that "the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes, under the exclusive authority of the United Nations,...would constitute a first step in establishing a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport."

¹⁸⁸ Wohlfeld, Monika, "Implications for Relations between Western and Central Europe," in: Jopp, Mathias (Ed.), *The implications of the Yugoslav crisis for Western Europe's foreign relations*, (Paris, Institute for Security Studies WEU, 1994) Chaillot Papers 17, p. 64.

¹⁸⁹ UNSCR 771, adopted by the Security Council at its 3106th meeting on August 13, 1992 expressed "grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law...including reports of mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians in detention centers, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, hospitals and ambulances..."

cleansing" led to demands that international humanitarian organizations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross, have access to the detention camps.¹⁹⁰ As "ethnic cleansing" became recognized as a phenomenon throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, "the promoting of safe areas for humanitarian purposes," became a major effort.

4. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: The CSCE Helsinki Summit in the Summer of 1992

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe became involved because of its newly established emergency mechanism which would provide for holding a special meeting of the CSCE at the request of one member, if that request was supported by twelve other CSCE members as well. On 28 June 1991 Austria requested a meeting to have Yugoslavia clarify its military intentions. As a result, three E.C. foreign ministers negotiated the Brioni Accords of 8 July 1991 which ended the fighting in Slovenia, and established a cease-fire and a moratorium on the declaration of independence. The E.C.'s Monitor Mission, consisting of 30 to 50 observers, had the task of monitoring compliance with all the previous agreements.

Almost exactly a year later, on 10 July 1992, the members of the CSCE returned to its birthplace, Helsinki, Finland. The 1992 Helsinki document states (regarding security and management of changes and conflicts) that,

[In paragraph 18:] The CSCE has been instrumental in promoting changes; now it must adapt to the task of managing them....

[In paragraph 19:] We have provided for CSCE peacekeeping according to agreed modalities. CSCE peacekeeping activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution. In this respect, we are also prepared to seek on a case-by-case basis, the support of international institutions and organizations such as the EC, NATO and WEU, as well as other

¹⁹⁰ UNSCR 780, adopted by the Security Council at its 3119th meeting on October 6, demanded "as a matter of urgency, an impartial Commission of Experts to examine..."

institutions and mechanisms, including the peacekeeping mechanism of the CIS....

[In paragraph 23:] We remain convinced that security is indivisible. No state in our CSCE community will strengthen its security at the expense of other States. This is our resolute message to States which resort to the threat or use of force to achieve their objectives in flagrant violation of CSCE commitments.¹⁹¹

Paragraph 23, as mentioned above, concerned Serbia's and Croatia's position vis-à-vis the other recognized states of the former Yugoslavia; rump-Yugoslavia consists of Montenegro and Serbia with its former autonomous provinces of Kosovo and the Vojvodina. In accordance with paragraph 19 the E.C. Monitor Mission in August 1992 was endorsed by the CSCE countries.

This prepared the ground for non-EU states - Canada, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Sweden- to join the mission. Beginning in October 1992, seven Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) were deployed in the countries bordering 'Rump Yugoslavia': Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], Romania and Ukraine, under the aegis of, and financed by, the CSCE. Customs officers on the SAM teams, consisting of more than 150 members, advise the authorities of the host countries on the implementation of sanctions and thus support those authorities in enforcing the blockade imposed by the UN Security Council.¹⁹²

The period from the Summer of 1992 to the Summer of 1993 was characterized by numerous efforts to implement and tighten the economic sanctions. At Helsinki the CSCE Ministers decided to send human rights observers to Serbia

¹⁹¹ Helsinki Summit Declaration in: *Helsinki Document 1992, The Challenges Of Change*, (Washington D.C., U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1992), p. 5.

¹⁹² Berkhof, Gerard C., *Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations for Collective Security*, (Caen, 22-23 September 1994), draft of paper prepared for the Conference of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, p. 6.

(Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina), in order to implement monitoring operations in the Adriatic Sea. NATO and WEU naval forces were soon deployed to the region. Gerard Berkhof writes that,

[i]n February 1993, the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE appointed a joint CSCE-EU Sanctions Coordinator to oversee the sanctions imposed on 'Rump Yugoslavia'. Later, in April, 1993, the CSCE 'welcomed' the Western European Union's patrolling operation to implement the sanctions on the Danube. This 'allowed' all riparian states to accept the WEU operation. In the Yugoslav conflict the WEU has consistently acted in close collaboration with the UN.¹⁹³

5. The Western European Union: WEU Monitoring 1992 -1993

The idea of a Western European Union (WEU) was born in 1948. Established in London by the Brussels Treaty, the WEU was modified by the Paris agreement of October 1954.¹⁹⁴ After maintaining a low profile the WEU was reactivated in Rome after 30 years on October 27, 1984. The negotiations concerning the withdrawal of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union made it necessary to develop European consultations on defence. The European role inside NATO and the dialogue with the Warsaw Pact countries on arms control was discussed in the WEU Ministerial Council's "Platform on European Security Interests" at The Hague on October 27, 1987:

'We recall our commitments to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include

¹⁹³ Berkhof, Gerard C., *Relationship between the United Nations and Regional Organizations for Collective Security*, (Caen, 22-23 September 1994), draft of paper prepared for the Conference of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, p. 6.

¹⁹⁴ Germany joined Belgium, France, Italy, The Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1954, Great Britain joined in 1963.

security and defence' (paragraph 2 of the preamble). Member States resolved 'to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.'¹⁹⁵

By 1988 the WEU had deployed minesweepers to the Arabian Gulf. In 1990 the WEU naval forces participated in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. In 1992, with its parliamentary assembly and research institute located in Paris, the WEU had a planning cell of approximately forty participants working on contingency planning, peacekeeping, crisis-management and humanitarian relief. Regarding the Yugoslav crisis, the WEU contributed to the sanctions imposed on Serbia-Montenegro through two complementary actions:

[First: The Embargo in the Adriatic Sea] From 16 July to 22 November, [1992,] WEU vessels, acting in close coordination with NATO, carried out monitoring operations in the Adriatic, followed by embargo enforcement operations since 22 November [1992].

[Second: The embargo on the Danube River] At an extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 5 April 1993, Ministers proposed that WEU member States also provide assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in their efforts to enforce the embargo on the Danube [River]. This was a police and customs operation of a civilian nature aimed at strengthening the embargo to which WEU countries would contribute appropriate resources. This joint initiative by WEU and the three riparian States has been coordinated with the efforts of other organizations, in particular the EC and CSCE.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ *Western European Union, History, Structures, Prospects*, (Brussels, WEU Press & Information Service, 1993), p. 9; the same document indicates that "the same meeting decided to open negotiations with Portugal and Spain regarding their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty. Those countries formally became members on 27 March 1990, increasing its membership to nine. Two other European members of the Atlantic Alliance expressed their wish to join the Organization: Turkey, in the summer of 1988, and Greece in December 1988." *Ibid*, p. 9.

¹⁹⁶ *Western European Union, History, Structures, Prospects*, (Brussels, WEU Press & Information Service, 1993), p. 14.

In June 1993, a single leader became the authority over the combined NATO/WEU embargo enforcement operations. The effect of the WEU effort called "Operation Sharp Fence" is discussed in the next section together with NATO's involvement. By the late Summer of 1992, the WEU's naval forces were trained to operate together with NATO's naval forces. This deployment emphasized monitoring operations at sea -- similar to its counterpart the EC Monitor Mission ashore -- called "Operation Maritime Monitor." With regard to the Yugoslav crisis the WEU efforts alone might not provide an adequate solution, some critics believe. *The Economist* wrote that

... it is unlikely that they [the WEU members] organize a purely European force, for any purpose, even a twentieth of the size of the alliance that won the Gulf war. The bigger the crisis, the more likely that the Europeans would have to turn to America for help.¹⁹⁷

6. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO Displayed Determination, Denied Flight and Enforced the Maritime Embargo

In the Summer of 1992, the UN again requested strengthening the arms embargo and the economic sanctions. NATO¹⁹⁸ deployed one of its Standing Naval Forces, the former Mediterranean naval on-call force (NAVOCFORMED), into the Adriatic. In 1991, this force was established as NATO's Standing Naval Force

¹⁹⁷ *The Economist* in its Special "The Defence of Europe" concludes on "European defence policy" what the title of the article projects: "It can't be done alone", (New York, volume 334, number 7903, February 25th 1995), p. 20.

¹⁹⁸ The Atlantic Alliance was founded in Washington D.C. on April 4th, 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the twelve countries of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Greece and Turkey became members in 1952, Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982.

Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED). It consisted of six naval units of destroyer and frigate size, a Mediterranean sister to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic.¹⁹⁹

In September 1992, within the context of the Yugoslav crisis, NATO used the annual presence of its Standing Naval Force Atlantic in the Mediterranean to exercise its ships in joint operations with naval units of the United States Sixth Fleet, particularly the Saratoga Battle-Group. This large-scale naval operation took place in the Adriatic, Ionian and Aegean Seas and was named "Exercise Display Determination."

It is not possible to prove that the show of force at sea displayed NATO's determination and added to its credibility about taking the lead in the Yugoslav crisis. At least the International Conference on Yugoslavia at Geneva made some progress, and the Joint Declaration was signed on September 30, 1992, and October 20, 1992, between Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro. The Joint Statement made by Tudjman and Milosević on October 19, 1992, and the Joint Communiqué issued on November 1, 1992, at Zagreb by Tudjman and Izetbegović allowed some hope of a peaceful resolution. The Mixed Military Working Group was established in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and an outline constitution was drafted.

Nevertheless the deteriorating situation caused by Serb military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the continuing support for the Serbs by military flights obliged President Izetbegović to address the Security Council on October 4, 1992. Resolution 781 banned all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ In 1967, the NATO Council created the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, when the former "five month single force Matchmaker," was established as "Quick Reaction Force," the visible symbol of multi-national cooperation and commitment.

²⁰⁰ UNSCR 781, adopted by the Security Council at its 3122nd meeting on October 9, 1992, requests the UNPROFOR "to monitor compliance with the ban of military flight, including the placement of observers where necessary at airfields in the territory of the former Yugoslavia."

On 16 November 1992, the Security Council agreed to enforce the embargo on the Danube River and in the Adriatic Sea.²⁰¹ When naval forces in the Adriatic were ordered to enforce Resolution 787, NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and the Naval Forces of the Western European Union (NAVFORWEU) immediately took charge. STANAVFORMED employed its ships and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) in "Operation Maritime Guard", whereas NAVFORMED continued "Operation Sharp Fence." In Summer 1993

...[f]ollowing the adoption of Resolution 820, WEU and NATO have studied means of enhancing the effectiveness of these embargo enforcement operations. At a joint session on 8 June 1993, the North Atlantic Council and the Council of Western European Union approved the concept of combined NATO/WEU operations under the authority of the Councils of both organizations, and a single commander was appointed to head the combined NATO/WEU task force.²⁰²

The combined NATO/WEU Task Force 440 combined the operations "Sharp Fence" and "Maritime Guard" to "Operation Sharp Guard." In July 1993, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic joined the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and the NAVFORWEU in NATO's Southern Region under the single command of Commander Naval Forces Southern Region (COMNAVSOUTH). The American Admiral Jeremy Boorda, NATO's former Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe and superior to COMNAVSOUTH, wrote

²⁰¹ UNSCR 787, adopted by the Security Council at its 3137th meeting on November 16, 1992, in paragraph 12 acting "under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter...calls upon States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements ...to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations."

²⁰² *Western European Union, History, Structures, Prospects*, (Brussels, WEU Press & Information Service, 1993), p. 14.

[f]or the first time in history NATO is in action. In a rapid transition from its original deterrence and defence mission the Alliance has deployed its mighty means in support of the United Nations. The aim is to save lives, restore order and hopefully, bring about peace, in compliance with the will of the international community to develop a more peaceful and better world. The Southern Region has been NATO's agent in a remarkable performance of the Alliance's new role.²⁰³

The naval blockade component included a total of twenty ships with several units permanently blocking access to the ports of Bar and Kotor in Montenegro. Other naval units tracked shipping leaving the Adriatic. Nearly every ship entering the Adriatic has been inspected for contraband and weapons. Permanent air coverage for surveillance of the entire operations area was provided by military patrol aircraft performing from Italian air bases. NATO's Operation "Deny Flight" was installed as the air component to enforce the UN sanctions, in order to ban military flights in the air space over Bosnia-Herzegovina and to provide air cover of UNPROFOR while carrying out its mandate. Approximately 4,000 personnel from ten NATO nations operated from air bases, mostly in Italy, to deny the warring parties the use of air power over Bosnia.²⁰⁴ French, British and American aircraft carrier groups patrolled the Adriatic to protect the UNPROFOR detachments ashore. In May 1994 the American Vice Admiral J.W. Prueher described both the operations as a big success. Prueher concluded that "multi-national forces can work, that effectiveness transcends efficiency, that presence connotes deterrence."²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Boorda, Jeremy M., *"Loyal Partner - NATO's Forces in Support,"* in: *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, (Brussels, No.1, 1994) p. 8.

²⁰⁴ NATO's "Operation Deny Flight" involved 67 American, 31 French, 26 British, 18 Dutch and 18 Turkish aircraft.

²⁰⁵ Prueher, J. W., *"The US Experience"*, 1994; the American Vice Admiral Prueher was the Commander of the Sixth Fleet and the Commander of the American Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe, when he lectured in May 1994 on NATO's Operation Deny Flight and Operation Sharp Guard at the

Robert H. Thomas recently published a study entitled *Use of Naval Forces in Imposing and Enforcing Sanctions, Embargoes and Blockades*. He wrote that,

[t]he blockade against the Balkan states has been ineffective for many reasons. Apart from the problems posed by access through the Danube River, the attractiveness of this market in a world experiencing a major recession and concurrent reduction of armed forces has been too great to pass up. Slovenia and Croatia have been able to acquire military equipment from at least ten countries, often channelled through illicit arms markets in Austria. It has been claimed that the relative peace in Lebanon has been achieved only through the wholesale transfer of arms into the Balkans.

Despite the expanding efforts of the United Nations, NATO and the WEU,...supplies continue to enter overland and up the Danube. Bulgaria is supplying...oil and additional material is provided through Albania and Greece....Given the right equipment, they [the blockade enforcers] have the capability to be effective in their role. The overall success of the mission, however will depend more on the political and diplomatic activities required to develop a comprehensive enforcement policy and on the will to persevere over time to achieve the desired result, than it will depend on the intrinsic capability of the naval forces themselves.²⁰⁶

The naval blockade and the no-fly zone over Bosnia successfully contained the Yugoslav crisis from spreading. Both were still in place, when on completion of the Geneva foreign ministers meeting on 5 July 1994 the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on 11 July 1994 decided to support the Geneva peace plan.

7. NATO's Failed Test of Power At Bihac in November 1994

On 21 November 1994, the American Admiral Leighton W. Smith, the Commander of the NATO forces in Southern Europe, ordered thirty nine aircraft from the United States, Britain, France and The Netherlands to attack the Udbina airfield in Croatia and to destroy all runways, taxiways, anti-aircraft guns and

Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

²⁰⁶ Thomas, Robert H., *Use of Naval Forces in Imposing and Enforcing Sanctions, Embargoes and Blockades*, (Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993), p. 21.

surface-to-air missiles that posed a threat to NATO pilots. This airport was used by Croatian Serbs to support Bosnian Serbs in their attack against Muslims in the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) of Bihac. Croatian Serb aircraft flying out of Udbina attacked civilians in the Bosnian town of Bihac, using cluster bombs and napalm. At the request of the UN military commander in Yugoslavia, Lieutenant General Bertrand de Lapresle of France, the raid did not attack Serbian aircraft at the base. Ambassador Yasushi Akashi, the top UN official in the former Yugoslavia, received authority from the UN Security Council to use NATO air power to strike the Serbs on Croatian territory. Previously such authority was confined to Bosnia. Because the air raid did not take place in Bosnia, it did not involve Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, the Commander of UN forces in Bosnia. From January 1994 to January 1995 Rose was a persistent opponent of the use of NATO air power against the Serbs.

The strike on Udbina air base was NATO's newest type of combat involvement since July 1992, when NATO warships began operations in the Adriatic. In April 1993 NATO began combat patrol operations to enforce compliance with the flight ban, and in June 1993 NATO offered close air support to protect UN personnel in Bosnia. In August 1993 Bosnian Serbs threatening Sarajevo came under attack. In February 1994, the Sarajevo ultimatum forced the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons around Sarajevo within ten days. Four light Serbian attack aircraft were shot down the same month. In April 1994, the first allied attack on ground targets -- against Serb forces around Gorazde -- was conducted. NATO announced its preparations to protect all six UN "safe areas" with air strikes. The Serbs therefore withdrew from Gorazde. In August 1994, heavy weapons deployed in violation of the exclusive zone around Sarajevo were attacked, and in September 1994 a Serbian tank that had been used to attack UN peacekeepers was hit near Sarajevo.

Despite this record of successful strikes, including the November 1994 series of strikes on Serbian missile sites in northwestern Bosnia, the United States and its

European allies remained divided on the fundamental question of how to respond to the threat to European security from the fighting in the Balkans. Craig R. Whitney wrote that

The United States has often inclined towards punishing the Serbs, but has never wanted to send in American soldiers on the ground to do it. Since the beginning of the Clinton administration, it has been pressing the allies to agree to a combination of stepped-up NATO air strikes on the Serbs and lifting the arms embargo for the Bosnian Government forces. The Europeans have inclined instead toward forcing the combatants to compromise. They have provided the bulk of an 18,000-strong UN force that does what it can to protect civilians from the worst ravages of war.²⁰⁷

With the war raging around Bihac, General Sir Michael Rose in January 1995 praised NATO's role as 'indispensable'. He is quoted as saying that,

... lifting the arms embargo would be catastrophic and predicted that the United Nations forces would stay on in Croatia despite the Croatian Government suggestion that it might ask them to leave.²⁰⁸

8. The UN Agenda 1995: UNPROFOR Support UNHCR

On 28 January 1995 the change of command of the UNPROFOR in Bosnia occurred. When General Sir Michael Rose relinquished command to Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, he repeated that his forces had to retain strict neutrality to fulfill their mission, which is primarily an operation to bring relief aid to 2,700,000 people. John Darton writes that

Britain opposes exempting the Bosnian Government from an arms embargo in the Balkans on the ground that it might deepen the

²⁰⁷ Whitney, Craig R., "A Testing of NATO," *The New York Times* (November 24, 1994), p. A 6.

²⁰⁸ Darnton, John, "British Officer Defends Tour In The Balkans, Ex U.N. Commander Is Angry at Criticism," *The New York Times* (January 29, 1995), p. Y 6.

conflict. Britain also opposes widening the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs lest that lead them to retaliate against United Nations forces. Britain has 3,500 troops in Bosnia and the neighboring Croatia.²⁰⁹

The UNPROFOR blue helmets and the humanitarian missions run by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are sharing three main jobs. *The Economist* labeled those "Aid provision, Protecting minorities and Peacekeeping:"

Aid provision: Some 2.7m people in Bosnia, and around 3.8m throughout all former Yugoslavia, get some kind of aid...The UNHCR delivers it, along with various agencies from small private ones to the Red Cross and Red Crescent. UNPROFOR's main job is to assist the UNHCR. In some areas this means giving aid trucks an armed escort which can shoot back if fired upon...The most dependent on the UN operation are Sarajevans, whether Muslim, Croat or Serb. The bulk of their aid is flown into the city's airport which is run by UNPROFOR. *Protecting minorities:* UNHCR protection officers also monitor the fate of minorities caught behind the lines, Serbs in Muslim areas, Muslim in Serb areas and...can also signal when emergency evacuations are necessary. *Peacekeeping:* In central Bosnia the UN polices a cease-fire between Croats and Muslims which has brought peace and opened up roads for commercial traffic; thanks to this hundreds of thousands there no longer depend on humanitarian aid. The UN, however, still has a part to play, through its military observers...In Serb-held areas of Croatia, UNPROFOR troops have helped ensure that... war has not spilled out from the borders of Bosnia.²¹⁰

With the peacekeepers serving as a liaison on both sides of the front line the UN acts as the communications link between the warring parties and may enable them to achieve a permanent peace. At the top of UNHCR and UNPROFOR

²⁰⁹ Darnton, John, "British Officer Defends Tour In The Balkans, Ex U.N. Commander Is Angry at Criticism," *The New York Times* (January 29, 1995), p. Y 6.

²¹⁰ *The Economist*, "The consequences of pulling out," (New York, volume 333, number 7894, December 17th, 1994), p. 53.

Ambassador Yasushi Akashi, the UN Secretary General's special envoy, acts as the crucial link between the warring forces and the outside world.

This review of events has shown how the security organizations adapted to the crisis. It concludes that the other security organizations, after realizing the inadequacy of alternative institutional settings, tacitly re-established the United Nations as the sole practicable international authority to mobilize military forces.

9. The Absence of Effective Institutional Settings for the Post-Cold War Era

The limited interest of the superpowers - and especially the limited interest of the United States - forced European leaders to confront the Yugoslav problem. For several different reasons both the trans-Atlantic and the European regional organizations failed. The institutional settings were too weak to deal with the problem, partly because the adaptation to the post-Cold War era had just begun.

The European Community was active at the beginning of the crisis. On the diplomatic front the E.C. achieved a cease-fire by concluding the Brioni Accords. The E.C. set up the Badinter Commission to establish criteria for recognition and the E.C. kept the community together. This was very successful diplomacy, compared with the events following the Balkan crisis in 1914.

In 1991 the E.C.'s and the CSCE's adaptation to the post-Cold War era was not developed. Therefore the E.C.'s 'common foreign and security policy' (CFSP) and the CSCE's 'standing on-call military component for common action' was still missing. The Yugoslav conflict thus contributed to the discussion of a CFSP and made it obvious that the E.C. needed a common policy to act successfully. The sequence of events, however, limited the Maastricht provisions on a CFSP.

In 1991, the CSCE established a mechanism to allow a single member to call an emergency meeting as a crisis response reaction. Austria called for such a meeting when the YPA attacked Slovenia, and consequently Yugoslavia became the first member of the CSCE whose membership was suspended. The principle of consensus minus one was established, and the 1992 Helsinki Conference proved that

the CSCE constitution could be adapted to the Yugoslav crisis. The position of a High Commissioner for National Minorities was established, and the CSCE agreed on mechanisms and procedures for conflict prevention and crisis management. CSCE peacekeeping would include actions of the EC, as well as military forces and civilians from NATO, WEU and CIS.

The Yugoslav crisis pushed WEU leaders to adjust their organization. At the Petersberg meeting near Bonn in 1992, the WEU developed a permanent planning staff with 100 members. The Petersberg Declaration defined WEU peacekeeping missions for the UN and the CSCE, as well as humanitarian and rescue missions. As a result, naval forces were tasked to enforce the UN Adriatic embargo and to patrol the Danube river.

NATO did not react immediately to the Yugoslav crisis because no signatories of the treaty nor any member's territory was attacked. NATO became involved as the action arm of the CSCE and the UN Security Council. NATO's Adriatic sea embargo, the surveillance of the no-fly zone over Bosnia, and all of its forces participating in the UNPROFOR acted under the aegis of the United Nations.

All these organizations indicate that institutional problems were solved as the crisis developed. As all these organizations rely on individual member states, fundamental disagreements between the members were imported into the organizations. As James B. Steinberg wrote:

Ironically, what many considered the regional organizations' comparative advantage -- proximity to and interest in resolving the conflict -- also proved a serious limitation. Because many states in the region had historical alliances with the parties to the Yugoslav conflict, their impartiality was questioned.²¹¹

²¹¹ Steinberg, James B., "Yugoslavia", in Damrosch, Lori Fisler (Ed.), *Enforcing Restraint, Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, (New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 61.

The sympathies of France and to a lesser extent Britain have been with the Serbs. Germany and Austria have closer political, historical and religious ties to Croatia and Slovenia. Steinberg explains that these concerns about partiality were blamed for the limited success of the E.C.-sponsored peace conference. Russia, the dominating member of the CIS and member of the UN Security Council, has traditionally been sympathetic to the Serbian cause.

Besides the problems of impartiality, there exists an imbalance between France, Britain and Spain and the other European countries in terms of resources and risks. Germany, no longer hampered by its constitutional constraints, has to decide how it will join those three in sharing the burden of military intervention. Such an imbalance implies political consequences which will influence the development of the security organizations in the post-Cold War era.

C. THE UNITED NATIONS INFLUENCE

1. The United Nations' Sole Authority to Resort to Military Force

The Yugoslav crisis re-established the United Nations as the sole practicable international authority to mobilize military forces for hazardous interventions abroad. Nicole Gnesotto wrote that,

the decision to resort to military force -- for reasons other than individual or collective self-defence -- can elude the strictly European frameworks and be transferred to the UN. ...Indeed, all the democratic governments have wanted to act in Yugoslavia in response of a UN mandate: firstly, because the UN continues to represent the hope, or the illusion, of new, post-communist international cooperation; secondly, because the UN makes it possible to short-circuit or hide any domestic political reticence in each of our [democratic] countries; and, finally, because this allegiance to the authority of the UN is supposedly stamped with the virtues of example, in particular with Russia in mind, which nobody wishes to see unilaterally using its armed forces to defend the 25 million or so

Russians outside Russia. For the first time in its history, the UN has thus managed a grave crisis in continental Europe.²¹²

The UN reference for the legitimation of the use of military force is convenient and helpful but not necessarily the ultimate wisdom. Even it is not always relevant today, in view of Moscow's explicit veto of any anti-Serb action by the UN. This should not necessarily mean that blocking UN action, would prohibit the United States, NATO or the WEU from carrying out retributive action. For Germany it would be unacceptable to mount military action without the blessing of the UN. Recalling the clarification on this point made by the British government during the Gulf war, Nicole Gnesotto wrote, "for other Europeans with different military cultures, the UN's primacy does not imply the UN's exclusiveness in legitimating the use of military force."²¹³

2. United Nations Peacekeepers and Peace Plans

Since late 1991, various bilateral, national, multinational and supranational authorities have increasingly tried to influence the conflict's outcome. Most of the external influence is reportedly impartial and designed to bring about a quick and lasting peace. The multitude of those external attempts cannot be analysed here. However, the efforts brought forward by the international community through the United Nations as well as the European Community have been designed to overcome the internal tensions. The agreed upon solutions to exercise influence by these organizations have been through the use of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and peace plans. Both are used to assess progress and are discussed in this section. The peace plans' common denominator is the "cantonization" of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

²¹² Gnesotto, Nicole, *Lessons of Yugoslavia*, (Paris, Institute for Security Studies WEU, March 1994) Chaillot Papers 14, p. 18.

²¹³ Nicole Gnesotto explained that "the clarification on this point [was] made by the British government during the Gulf war..." Gnesotto, Nicole, *Lessons of Yugoslavia*, (Paris, Institute for Security Studies WEU, March 1994) Chaillot Papers 14, p. 21.

Several initiatives in diplomacy have been undertaken, but they have not solved the conflict. Cyrus R. Vance negotiated the Serb-Croat cease-fire in Spring 1992. Gale Stokes writes that,

[t]he European Community reacted with shock at the outbreak of civil war almost in its midst but found it very difficult to find an effective response. The Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe proved to be useless in the face of this level of conflict, as did the Western European Union. The European Community attempted to bring the warring sides together in a series of meetings in The Hague, but when truce after truce was immediately broken, it had to admit defeat, although desultory negotiations continued. Finally a United Nations negotiating team, headed by the former United States secretary of state Cyrus Vance, was able to achieve a break in the fighting, and in the spring of 1992 blue-helmeted United Nations troops, operating under a mandate of the Security Council, took up positions in Croatia. By the time of arrival of the United Nations force, Serbs had been able to seize about one third of Croatia's territory, which, under the truce arrangement they continued to occupy.²¹⁴

In contrast with "normal" peacekeeping operations (PKO), the warring parties in the Yugoslav war do not agree on disarmament nor do they want to stop their warlike activities. From the beginning of PKO there has been no peace to keep. The Serbian goal has been quite obvious in their pursuit of a Greater Serbia: to occupy and hold Serb territory and to "ethnically cleanse" areas in order to link them to Serb territory, despite on-going talks, conferences or any agreement on a cease-fire or truce.

[t]he proposal of the mediator Lord Carrington was to make Bosnia a state "with three constituent units based on national principles" though the split would also have taken geography and wealth into

²¹⁴ Stokes, Gale, *The Wall came tumbling down, The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993,) p. 250.

account. Under it, the Muslims would have got about 44 % of Bosnia, the same as the Serbs.²¹⁵

3. The Vance-Owen-Peace-Plan in Winter 1992

The participants at the Geneva Conference table presented a promising amount of Yugoslav leadership. Misha Glenny writes that,

[f]rom its inception, The Geneva Conference on Yugoslavia took its work extremely seriously. With a core team of highly skilled international civil servants who overshadowed the bundle of dead wood also floating around the conference floor, the co-chairman, Cyrus Vance, appointed by the United Nations, and Lord Owen, the European Community representative, set about their work with gusto. Within three months, they had produced a draft constitution and the outline of the Vance-Owen peace plan (VOPP) for Bosnia-Hercegovina. It was an incredibly complex diplomatic task which involved negotiating with three delegations headed by Izetbegović, Karadžić and Boban; presidents Milošević (Serbia), Tudjman (Croatia), Čosić (Yugoslavia) and Bulatović (Montenegro); the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Milan Panić; the three Bosnian army commanders Sefir Halilović, Ratko Mladić and Milivoje Petković; and the chiefs of the Yugoslav Army (*Vojska Jugoslavije*) and the Croatian Army (*Hrvatska Vojska*), generals Života Panić and Janko Bobetko....The whole operation had to be coordinated on the ground with the United Nations Protection Forces UNPROFOR commander General Satish Nambiar and the head of the UN Civil Affairs for Yugoslavia, Cedric Thornberry. In addition, the work required extremely close co-operation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was led by Sadako Ogata.²¹⁶

Once all of the high-profile delegations mentioned above were brought to sit down at the negotiation table -- the peace plan on the table was intended to carve

²¹⁵ *The Economist*, "A Quarter of a Blood-Soaked Loaf" (July 31, 1993,), p. 45.

²¹⁶ Glenny, Misha, *The Fall of Yugoslavia, The Third Balkan War* (New York, Penguin Books, 1993), p. 224.

Bosnia into ten provinces with a weak central government. Stjepko Golubić noted that,

[r]egardless of any differences or refinements, critics of the peace plan, and all other such proposals for Bosnia-Herzegovina - designed on the principle of carving-up territory on the basis of ethnicity - are inherently unworkable attempts to divide the indivisible.²¹⁷

Misha Glenny further stated that,

[t]he peace plan was an exceptionally good document ... and was never intended as a definitive solution to the Bosnian crisis. Its function was to provide an interim political solution which would facilitate the scaling down of military operations in the republic. It certainly provided a very clear framework and direction for any future constitutional order but it was not considered immutable by the authors.²¹⁸

However, this document was abused by the politicians in press and media throughout the world and particularly inside Yugoslavia, where it was wilfully misinterpreted to legitimize Serb military action to achieve the 'proper ethnic mapping' or to intimidate and terrorize the opposed nationality. Glenny writes that,

[t]he VOPP involved both the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs making substantial concessions. The Bosnian Croats and by extension the government in Zagreb, were perfectly satisfied with the plan. President Izetbegović's first response to the VOPP was to reject it as it involved the collapse of his aim of restoring a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina with a decisive central government in Sarajevo. ... However, although it gave the Serbs wide-ranging powers in the areas designated to them, it contained punitive measures against them as well. Firstly, it insisted that they hand back 60% in total (25% of

²¹⁷ Golubić, Stjepko, "How Not to Divide the Indivisible," in: *Why Bosnia* (Stoney Creek Connecticut, Pamphleteer Press, 1993), p. 209.

²¹⁸ Glenny, Misha, *The Fall of Yugoslavia, The Third Balkan War* (New York, Penguin Books, 1993), p. 224.

Bosnian territory as a whole) of the territory which they had conquered militarily in what they perceived to be a civil war. This included such crucial towns as Zvornik, Bratunac, Visegrad, Foca, Bosanski Novi and Rogatica. They would be denied a northern corridor, while the southern route to eastern Herzegovina was also broken. In addition, the VOPP specifically denied them their central war aim - the formation of an independent state outside Bosnia-Herzegovina with the right to forge constitutional links with third parties [i.e. Serbia and the Krajina]. So the VOPP was hard for both Moslems and Serbs to swallow, although the problem for the Bosnian government was ameliorated somewhat inasmuch as their options were strictly limited because of their military weakness.²¹⁹

The Bosnian Muslim lobby at the Geneva conference, particularly Bosnia's Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić, advocated the dropping of the VOPP and instead requested a lift of the arms embargo against Yugoslavia. European countries with troops on the ground acting as UNPROFOR Blue-Helmets, including Russian troops, were opposed to the idea of supplying weapons to the Muslim government and provoking the Serbs with air strikes to attack peacekeepers.

The Croats were alarmed by the proposed idea that a strengthened Bosnian Muslim might turn against Croat-held territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States proposal for a 'lift-and-strike' policy instead of the VOPP was not accepted by the Europeans. President Clinton's Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, after several months of procrastination, unveiled the Clinton-Plan, which was identical to the VOPP with one negligible exception of territory in favor of the Bosnian government. When the Clinton-Christopher-Initiative was abandoned in late April 1993 (no lift and no strike), the Bosnians pressed for the immediate implementation of the VOPP for two reasons: the Bosnian Serbs had occupied 70 percent of Bosnian territory and the Croat diplomatic failures to implement the VOPP on their Croatian Army (*Hrvatska Vojska*) HVO-controlled territory was crushing the Bosnian government's influence. The VOPP had allotted eight districts with a

²¹⁹ Glenny, Misha, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, p. 224.

Moslem majority to the Croats. There Mate Boban's government of "the Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna" in March and April 1993 tried to 'solve the minority problems' in a militarily way. This culminated in the massacre of Muslim civilians in the village of Ahmići, a site of considerable religious significance for Bosnia's Moslems. Because the Serbs were not rewarded for their conquest of territory, they did not sign the VOPP.

4. The Owen-Stoltenberg-Peace-Plan of June 1993

In Geneva negotiators and mediators met to establish peace, for the E.C. Lord Owen and for the UN Thorvald Stoltenberg. Present at the negotiations were Slobodan Milošević (Serbia), Franjo Tudjman (Croatia) and as head of Bosnia's delegation Alija Izetbegović (a total 10 member Bosnian Collective presidency of all three ethnic groups, including Mohammed Filipović and Fikret Abdić).

An agreement to split Bosnia-Herzegovina in three, even with the signature of the three warring Bosnian leaders on it, is no guarantee of peace, as the international mediators ... well know. But given the reluctance of the outside world to do more to protect them, it may be Bosnia's best chance to avoid even worse punishment at the hands of the Serb and Croat forces.²²⁰

The situation after 15 months of war was that Serb forces still held Gorazde under siege. In June 1993 Charles Lane reported that,

[I]ast week in Geneva, European Community mediator Lord Owen and U.N. envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg gave up all but the pretense of holding a sovereign Bosnia together and convened talks on a new 'peace' plan to turn it into three ethnic ministates. The latest scheme would ratify the carve-up of an internationally recognized republic along the bloody lines of ethnic cleansing - exactly what the international community had pledged to resist.²²¹

²²⁰ *The Economist*, "A Quarter of a Blood-Soaked Loaf," (New York, July 31, 1993), p. 45.

²²¹ Lane, Charles, "A Partition Plan for Bosnia," (*Newsweek*, 1993), p. 32.

The plan would assign Bosnian Serbs half of the territory, Bosnian Croats 30 percent. Both ethnic groups would apparently be free to link up with Serbia and Croatia respectively. The proposed state for Muslims would consist of two separate landlocked pockets on some 20 percent of the remaining land. The Bosnian government did not accept this proposal as it was evident that the Muslim pockets would not be economically viable, with no access to the Mediterranean through the Adriatic Sea (Ploce would be a Croat port). The reaction was spectacular and desperate. Bosnian President Izetbegović, who would have had to sign off on the plan, labeled the proposal "genocide" and stormed out of the Geneva talks.

Vice President Ejup Ganić said there would be terrorist attacks by Bosnians in Europe if the West abandoned Bosnia. As result of the non-signing, the Serb and Croat conquest of Bosnian territory to the disadvantage of the Muslims continued. Some groups felt legitimized by the Owen-Stoltenberg mapping to "ethnically cleanse" their assigned territory.

5. The "Land-for-Peace" Contact-Group Proposal in Spring 1994

Led by the chief American official Charles Thomas, the five-nation group called the "*Contact Group*" started a new diplomatic effort to bring peace by supporting a modified partition plan in the Balkans. France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States strongly believed that there was no better and more honest partition possible. The plan was offered to the parties and (despite Serb rejection) not modified. The plan was presented as a take-it-or-leave-it alternative. In December 1994, the plan had still not been accepted by the Serbs because it does not acknowledge the 70 percent territorial gains of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Serbs. The position of the Bosnian Serbs, lead by Radovan Karadžić, is best expressed by the Serb Commander-in-Chief, who still controls and coordinates all Serb military actions west of the Drina River; General Ratko Mladić said that,

'the dominant shape of armed conflict for me is attack....I have an offensive character and that's acceptable to the High Command of the army of the Republic of the Serbians.'...Asked to cede to the Muslims land his 80.000 troops conquered? 'I wouldn't do it if I had one million lives and had to lose them all. Only an army that is defeated retreats.'²²²

D. UNITED STATES INFLUENCE: CROAT-MUSLIM AGREEMENTS

The tragic tale of U.S. involvement in Yugoslavia began in late 1989 and early 1990 when the CIA warned the Bush administration of the impending violent breakup of Yugoslavia. It has been shown in this thesis that the violence and turmoil in the region was not a spontaneous and unforeseen event. It can be stated that the initial U.S. policy was not caused by a lack of intelligence.²²³ The initial Bush administration policy with regard to the disintegration of Yugoslavia was one of non-involvement. The U.S. president's knowledge about the military superiority of the Serb forces indicated passive support for the Serbian cause. Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Belgrade on June 21, 1991. The last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, noted Baker's arrival and wrote:

During his one-day visit Baker had nine consecutive meetings: with the Albanian leaders from Kosovo, with all six republican leaders, and twice with Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković and Foreign Minister Budimir Lončar. Listening to Baker deal with these complex and irascible personalities, I felt that I had rarely, if ever, heard a secretary of state make a more skillful or reasonable presentation. Baker's failure was not due to his message but to the fact that the different parts of Yugoslavia were on a collision course....Baker did, however, leave a strong political message. He said to Prime Minister

²²² Binder, David, "*Pariah as Patriot: Ratko Mladić*" (New York, *The New York Times Magazine*, 1994), p. 28.

²²³ Glynn, Patrick, "*See no evil: Clinton-Bush and the truth about Bosnia.*" in: *The New Republic*, (Vol 209, No 17, October 25, 1993), p. 23.

Marković, a conduit to the army, 'If you force the United States to choose between unity and democracy, we will always choose democracy.' Baker's message was the right one, but it came too late.²²⁴

Former Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in retrospect described the inaction during this time as a mistake, believing "that a tough-minded initiative, led by the United States and centering on NATO, might have averted what is now, in his mind, an unfixable tragedy."²²⁵ After almost a complete year of abstinence of U.S. diplomacy regarding Yugoslavia, from June 1991 to June 1992,

In Washington the Bush administration tried to obscure its own passivity and uncertainty by talking a tougher game than it was prepared to play. According to *The Times*, Baker told Republican senators at the end of July [1992] -- shortly before he left State to head the President's reelection campaign -- that European foot dragging had held back American policy.²²⁶

The first implementation of President Bush's 'defuse-and-contain' policy was the United States recognition of Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 7 April 1992. It appears that the recognition by the United States -- four months after the E.C. had recognized Slovenia and Croatia -- was intended to dissuade the Serbs from actively continuing an aggressive action against another internationally recognized state. The Bush administration's policy shift stressed six distinct objectives:

²²⁴ Zimmermann, Warren, "The Last Ambassador, A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia" in: *Foreign Affairs*, (March/April 1995), pp. 11-12.

²²⁵ Kelly, Michael, "Surrender and Blame," in: *The New Yorker*, (New York, December 19, 1994), pp. 44-51.

²²⁶ Newhouse, John, "Dodging The Problem. The Diplomatic Round," in: *The New Yorker*, (New York, August 24, 1992), p. 70.

1) First and foremost there was to be an end to the ethnic cleansing activities of the Serb forces. 2) The US government having recognized Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, would establish full diplomatic relationships with those governments. 3) The Serbians would continue to be the primary target for sanctions, aimed at forcing them to ease aggressive activities. 4) The spread of the Balkan conflict into Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzhak and Macedonia was to be prevented by all diplomatic means. 5) The spread of conflict to neighboring states was to be actively prevented. 6) NATO was to become an active player in the implementation of the above objectives.²²⁷

In the Summer of 1992 the United States attempted to overcome the diplomatic and military stalemate of the three belligerent parties in order to achieve an agreement. During the stalemates, the strongest party usually lost less in negotiations. Serbia always used time to its advantage and did so by creating terror and continuing to ethnically cleanse the territories it controlled.

1. The Way to the 1992 Croat-Muslim Agreement

The United States, having agreed that Serbia has to be the primary target for sanctions aimed at forcing Belgrade to cease aggressive activities, supported the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in resisting the Serb aggression. A coalition of Croats and Muslims could fight Milošević's Croatian and Bosnian Serbs.

In 1992 Croatia needed to leave the corner of the aggressive Milošević-type state on the Balkans. This could only be achieved by turning away from the Bosnia-Partition policy. It needed a responsible Croatia repudiating all territorial ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia should be strongly encouraging the democratic rights for all national groups and trying to find a common language with the Bosnian Muslims. At the same time it could try to find a common cause with the non-irredentist Serbs inside Croatia and attract them to a nationally pluralistic vision of Croatia's future. A coalition could fight Milošević's Bosnian surrogates. In the long run this would weaken

²²⁷ Bush, George, "Containing the crisis in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia.", in: *US Department of State Dispatch*, (Transcript, Vol 3 No 32, August 10, 1992), p. 617.

Milošević, and he would be less able to challenge the world community any longer.²²⁸

To close observers of the diplomatic scene and to Patrick Moore

[i]t appeared that a kind of international division of labor had emerged or been hammered together, with the United States taking the lead in bringing the Muslims and Croats around to an agreement and with Russia moderating Bosnian Serb behavior.²²⁹

When Patrick Moore analyzed the Croatian-Muslim Agreements, he wrote in 1994 that,

[t]here had been a formal alliance between Bosnia and Croatia dating back to 12 July 1992, but it had broken down by spring of the following year; in any event, the ten or more documents on restoring the alliance signed by the two sides since 1992 proved to be as ephemeral as most of the other agreements that have emerged in the course of the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession. The Croats at first seemed to have the upper hand in the ensuing conflict but by early 1994 the Muslims had not only gone on the offensive but stood a good chance of driving out the ancient Croatian communities of central Bosnia. The Serbs, however, continued to hold 70% of the republic's territory, and ultimately they remained the chief problem for Muslims and Croats alike.²³⁰

2. The 1994 Croat Muslim Agreement

More than in 1992, the State Department in 1994 was informed by its allies in the Islamic world, in particular Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that pressure was building up within the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) to help the

²²⁸ Banac, Ivo, "Croatism, Franjo Tudjman's brutal opportunism," in: *The New Republic*, (1993), p. 22.

²²⁹ Moore, Patrick, *The Croatian-Muslim Agreements*, (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol 3, No.13, April 1, 1994), p. 22.

²³⁰ Moore, Patrick, *The Croatian-Muslim Agreements*, 1994, p. 22.

Muslims in Bosnia. No European or Western power wants to establish a 'strong Muslim fundamentalist state in Central Europe' but the seventeen Muslim states in the United Nations cannot be ignored.

On 1 March 1994 Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, Croatian Prime Minister Mate Granić and Kresimir Zubak of the Presidency of the self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna signed a series of agreements....One document was a preliminary accord between the Croats and the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina to set up a *federation of ethnically-based cantons*. A second group of documents provided the broad outlines of a confederation consisting of the new Bosnian state and the Republic of Croatia, as well as of the rules governing transportation and trade between the two countries, including guaranteeing the Muslim access to the Adriatic.²³¹

Croatia's objective seemed to be very clear: unable to fight the Serbs alone in the Croatian territory of the Krajina and in increasingly worse shape in its bid to hold Croat-occupied territory in Bosnia, a Croat-Muslim confederation would at least save Croat territorial gains and allow Croatia to play a bigger influence with the help of a Muslim partner. If in the long run a post-Cold War 'New Yalta' might be established, Croatia and Bosnia might hope to find themselves in the area under the influence of the United States rather than in a Serbian 'Russian Sector.'

3. The "Bihac" Offensive of November 1994

What will probably become known as just another step of international failure to influence the events in Bosnia towards a peaceful outcome is called the November 1994 Bihac offensive. The Bosnian army, confident of its support from Croat forces and knowing about Milošević's unwillingness to support Karadžić, hoped the time was right to successfully reconquer lost territory. In December 1994, the Muslim-Croat military alliance looked like it would fail instead of forcing the Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiation table.

²³¹ Moore, Patrick, *The Croatian-Muslim Agreements*, 1994, p. 22.

Since June 1994, when Vojislav Seselj, the Chairman of the Serbian Radical Party (the ultra-nationalist wing in the Serb government coalition), made public Milošević's attempts to defeat Radovan Karadžić, the world was made to believe and thought that Milošević's support for the Bosnian Serbs was coming to an end and that this would allow peace to be achieved soon. In a report

Seselj claims that Milošević had constructed a plan supported by the West for a four month truce in Bosnia, so that he could organize elections during that time and, with the help of the State Security Service, secure Karadžić's defeat at them.²³²

Furthermore, *The Economist* wrote that,

[i]n the wake of battlefield reverses, military tribunals have been set up to try Bosnian Serbs accused of failing to defend their posts. Radovan Karadžić ... says menacingly that anyone who spreads the belief that land recently lost had been given up in some secret deal would be shot. But sullen conspiracy theorists within his own camp say that Mr. Karadžić is creeping towards acceptance of the western plan to give the Serbs half of Bosnia rather than the 70% they hold. They speculate that it is politic for him to start deliberately losing surplus territory in battle -- albeit at the cost of several hundred dead Serbs -- rather than give it away in negotiations....In any case, Mr. Karadžić has ordered full mobilization and demanded martial law in some parts of his self-proclaimed republic, against the wishes of his own politicians....In Belgrade, Serbian officials are sanguine ... about the recent reverses suffered by their brother Serbs in Bosnia. It became fashionable to talk breezily about a "transitional solution" -- meaning the period between the hoped-for fall of Mr Karadžić and the installation of new leaders obedient to Mr Milošević. "Karadžić is history," rasps a senior man in Serbia's ruling Socialist Party.... 'There can be only one boss of the house.' If they cannot get rid of Mr

²³² FBIS, "Seselj: Milošević Planed Karadžić's Defeat," (Foreign Broadcast Information System, June 14, 1994), p. 53.

Karadžić now, the people around Mr Milošević hope he will soon be forced to sign the peace plan -- before he is finally ousted.²³³

In October 1994 the Bosnian Serbs still refused to sign the peace plan proposal and Karadžić was still in office, when the Bosnian Government army in the Bihac enclave at the north western tip of Bosnia decided to start an offensive and to shift the military balance in favor to the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. After a short period of advances for Bosnia's Muslim-led army, the Bosnian Serbs fought back. Roger Cohen wrote that the Bosnian Serb offensive,

supported by rebel Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia and some renegade Muslim forces, came in response to an abrupt advance last month [October 1994] by the Muslim-led Bosnian Army to the east of Bihac. More than 10.000 Serbian civilians lost their homes to the V Corps of the Bosnian Army and fled west and south into Serbian-held parts of Croatia.... At least 8.000 Muslim refugees of a total population of 180.000 Muslim people in the Bihac pocket have fled the Serbian advance.²³⁴

The Bosnian Serb offensive showed first the involvement of the Croatian Serbs, as the attack on Bihac has fully coordinated between Croatian and Bosnian Serbs. Roger Cohen reported that on a recent visit to Knin, the capital of the Krajina region, Croatian Serb officers could be seen calling Banja Luka in Bosnian Serb territory to receive their instructions. Only through a coordinated campaign has Bihac been entirely surrounded, and the Bosnian Army attacked on several fronts at once. The Commander of the Bosnian Serb Forces, General Ratko Mladić, warned that he could no longer guarantee the safety of UN personnel on Bosnian

²³³ *The Economist*, "Fear and loathing beyond the Pale," (New York, Vol 334 Number 7889, November 12, 1994), p. 64.

²³⁴ Cohen, Roger, "Serbs Press Drive on Bosnian Town Using Helicopter", in: *The New York Times*, (November 23, 1994), pp. A 1 / A 6.

territory. During the events that followed, NATO (as the striking arm of the United Nations) could no longer protect the 23,000 peacekeepers on the ground. Approximately 500 were held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, and negotiations about a cease-fire failed as Karadžić refused even to talk to the Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 2 December 1994. The United Nations aims have been simple: to stabilize UN safe areas, to prevent Croatia from entering the war, and to stop further Serbian advances. The Serb advance is going beyond reclaiming lost territory: Bosnian and Croatian Serbs surrounded Bihac and took up positions on the outskirts of the town, leaving the Muslims in Bihac with 1,250 Bangladeshi peacekeepers, in an untenable position.

During the Winter of 1995 the ring Serbian rebels built around Bihac was kept tight. A continuing regular supply for the peacekeepers and the delivery of humanitarian aid never could be established. Alan Cowell reported in March 1995 that,

[a]part from attacks on convoys in other Muslim enclaves in Bosnia, officials from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and World Food Program have been worried by harassment of convoys passing through Serb-held areas of Croatia to reach the Bihac pocket in northwestern Bosnia. Those convoys also pass through Bosnian territory controlled by a renegade Muslim group, which frequently refuses to allow them to pass. This group, loyal to a local leader named Fikret Abdić, insists on what U.N. officials call 'disproportionate' supplies of relief food for areas under its control. Mr. Abdić's rebels,...are allied with the Krajina Serbs in one of the Balkans' more baffling alliances.²³⁵

The Serb rebels in the Krajina, which (like the Bosnian Serbs) act under the military command of the Serb General Ratko Mladić and are allied to Abdić's

²³⁵ Cowell, Alan, "The U.N. Cuts Off Aid to the Croatian Serbs." in: *The New York Times* (March 9, 1995), p. A 6.

Muslim renegades, were told on March 9th, 1995, that all food aid convoys to them would be suspended until there are guarantees of access to routes into Bihac.

4. Croat-Muslim Agreement Endangered by Foreign Islamic Militants

Besides the external threat through the Serbian forces in Croatia and Bosnia, the Croat-Muslim agreement is challenged from within. Some Islamic fundamentalists have formed a special battalion within the Bosnian Army. Roger Cohen reported that,

[t]he Islamic militants are believed by British United Nations troops in the area [of the Croat suburb Podbrezje of the town Zenica] to number about 500 and to come mainly from Iran, Egypt, Sudan and the Persian Gulf. The problems arising from their presence are increasingly severe, threatening an already flimsy Muslim-Croat federation and causing strains within the Muslim-led Bosnian Government.²³⁶

The Bosnian Army, as a 'secular and multinational' army, intends to effectively defend the Bosnian cause. The Islamic militants are forming a part of the Bosnian army, and their unit is called the Mujahedeen Brigade. Roger Cohen reported the statement of Mr. Spahija Kozlic, the spokesperson of the Zenica-based III Corps of the Bosnian Army: "These people came here to help us. They are doing their job in a normal way. They are an integrated part of our corps."

President Alija Izetbegović has turned increasingly to the Islamic world for financial and military support as he has seen that a Western military intervention to save Bosnia was not forthcoming. Government ministers, including Prime Minister Haris Siljadić, have been regular visitors to Iran during the last year [1994].²³⁷

²³⁶ Cohen, Roger, "Foreign Islamic Militants Strain Bosnian Alliance" in: *The New York Times* (February 18, 1995), p. 3.

²³⁷ Cohen, Roger, *Ibid*, p. 3.

There is no information available that the aid the Bosnian Government has received from Islamic governments has to specially support the foreign volunteer military forces, but it is plausible that, in return for the money coming from the fundamentalist countries, the Bosnian army has to tolerate the Mujahedeen. These mujahedeen are self-styled holy warriors from the Islamic world, who have come to defend Islam and to defend the Bosnian Muslims. United Nations troops from Turkey constantly patrol the suburb of Zenica, trying to ensure that no violence erupts. The Turkish peacekeepers' "main problem with the fundamentalists is, that they [the mujahedeens] do not like us as Turkey is a secular state", said the spokesman for the Turkish Battalion.²³⁸

Much will depend on President Alija Izetbegović's balancing act between his own commitment to a multiethnic and religiously tolerant Bosnia and the demands placed on him by countries such as Iran in exchange for financial and military support.

5. The U.S. Mission Helping to Reduce the UNPROFOR in Spring 1995

During the Winter of 1994/1995 the UNPROFOR in Croatia had some 12,000 soldiers policing the 1,000-mile cease-fire line in Croatia between Croatian Government forces and Serbian rebels. Croatia's President Tudjman had insisted since January 12, 1995, that the United Nations forces leave and the United Nations troops begin their withdrawal on March 31. This deadline was perilously close to the April 30 expiration of the cease-fire negotiated by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Allan Cowell reported from Zagreb that,

[i]n the latest of a series of inconclusive Western moves to avert a renewed Balkan flareup, the American envoy, Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke, met with President Franjo Tudjman at the Presidential Palace in the hills above Zagreb....President Tudjman is believed to want Western troops to secure his international borders

²³⁸ Cohen, Roger, "Foreign Islamic Militants Strain Bosnian Alliance" in: *The New York Times* (February 18, 1995), p. 3.

after United Nations forces leave, enabling him to satisfy both his own ambitions and strong domestic political pressure for the re-assertion of formal control over all of Croatian territory. NATO officials in Brussels have spurned the idea.²³⁹

The deepest worry among U.N. officials was that the localized conflict between Croatian Army units and the Croatian Serb militia in the Krajina region could easily draw in other forces from what Alan Cowell called "the patchwork of antagonisms known as the Balkans."

On March 6, 1995, Croatia forged a new alliance with Bosnia. Croatia and Bosnia established, reported Alan Cowell, what "on paper is a common front between former adversaries to counter Serbian rebels in both their countries." Cowell further wrote that

The new agreement was 'in fact a preparation and an agreement on how to act if the situation starts developing' toward broader and fiercer hostilities after the March 31 dead-line said Kresimir Zubak, the Croat who leads the Muslim-Croat federation set up in Bosnia with the backing of the United States one year ago.²⁴⁰

The Croatia-Bosnia military pact was intended to counter a similar pact between the Croatian and Bosnian rebel Serbs agreed on in late February 1995. Whereas the latter Serb pact always was in place, its existence was denied by the Serbian leaders Martić, Karadić and Milosević. The Muslim-Croat pact has yet to be proved more than a symbolic gesture.

On 8 March 1995 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) unveiled in its report,

²³⁹ Cowell, Alan, "U.S. Envoy Visits, but Croatia Seems Firm on Removing U.N." in: *The New York Times*, (March 7, 1995), p. A 6.

²⁴⁰ Cowell, Alan, "New Croat-Bosnian Link Worries U.N." in: *The New York Times*, (March 8, 1995), p. A 6.

[i]n what is believed to be the most comprehensive United States assessment of atrocities in Bosnia...that 90 percent of the acts of 'ethnic cleansing' were carried out by Serbs and that leading Serbian politicians almost certainly played a role in the crimes.²⁴¹

The report makes nonsense of the view, which Roger Cohen noted, consistently put forward by western European governments and intermittently by the Clinton administration, that the Bosnian conflict is a civil war in which guilt should be divided between Serbs, Croats and Muslims rather than a case of Serbian aggression.

Tudjman's insistence on making the UNPROFOR leave Croatia, the announcement of the existence of the Serbian rebel military pact for common defense of the Serb-occupied territories in Croatia and in Bosnia, the Croat-Bosnian alliance and the CIA report revealing the Serb responsibilities for the atrocities, all together prepared the ground for the United States to confront Milosević with an unexpected *fait accompli* in Croatia. Recently, the British, French and Russians seemed prepared to ease sanctions on the Serbian leader to encourage his cooperation in recognizing the borders of Bosnia and Croatia. In March 1995 the United States seized the diplomatic initiative from the Europeans, who have dominated policy on the region for many months. Barbara Crosette wrote that

The agreement forestalls a NATO and United States mission in helping more than 35,000 peacekeepers withdraw from the former Yugoslavia, a move the United Nations saw as inevitable if its operation in Croatia was cancelled by Mr. Tudjman.²⁴²

²⁴¹ Cohen, Roger, "C.I.A. Report on Bosnia Blames Serbs for 90% of the War Crimes" in: *The New York Times*, (March 9, 1995), p. A 1/A 6.

²⁴² Crosette, Barbara, "Croatian Leader Agrees to Continuation of U.N. Force," in: *The New York Times* (March 13, 1995) p. A 4.

President Tudjman acknowledged that his demand that the UNPROFOR begin leaving Croatia by 1 April 1995 was a ploy. The accord reached between U.S. Vice President Al Gore and the Croatian president requires two new Security Council resolutions, creating thereby two separate United Nations Forces for Croatia and Bosnia. The Croatian U.N. force will be smaller, consisting of 5,000 troops deployed along the international border with Bosnia and no longer protecting the 1,000-mile cease-fire line running through Croatian territory. This would stop Croatian Serbs from crossing the border into Bosnia and supporting the Bosnian Serbs in fighting the Muslim-led Bosnian government. The American Vice President assured Tudjman of "full U.S. support for restoring Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia."²⁴³

²⁴³ Crosette, Barbara, "Croatian Leader Agrees to Continuation of U.N. Force," in: *The New York Times*, (March 13, 1995) p. A 4.

VI SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

A. THE LEGACY OF VIOLENCE

The core of today's crisis in the Balkans is Serbia, even though the center of actual fighting has shifted and is limited to skirmishes over Bosnia-Herzegovina's Muslim areas of Bihac and Sarajevo. Serbia's history is embedded in that of the Balkans and has taken a specific form since the arrival of nationalism during the Napoleonic wars.

From 1804 until 1806 the Serb leader, Kara Georg Petrović, called Karadordes (Black George), led an uprising in Belgrade against the Ottoman janissaries. This led to a short period of Serbian autonomy. The autonomy attested to the Serbs in the peace of Bucharest in 1812, however, only lasted until 1815. At the Congress at Vienna Serbia was again given to the Ottoman empire. A new uprising in 1815 led by Milos Obrenović achieved autonomy and the Serbs were granted the title of a "Principauté of succession" under Ottoman sovereignty. Sovereign Serbia installed a parliament and proclaimed a constitution. Kara Georg Petrović returned from his exile in Austria in 1817 but was murdered by his Obrenović opponents. Milos Obrenović in 1819 was recognized by the Turks as hereditary prince of Serbia. The murder of Kara Georg marked the beginning of the blood feud between the Obrenović and the Karageorgević families which lasted until 1903 when Serbia's King Alexander I Obrenović and his wife were assassinated by high-ranking Serbian officers.

In 1844 I. Garasanin developed the "Greater Serbian Program." This program promoted the idea of a single unified nation for all Southern Slavs, which in 1844, included part of Habsburg Austria. This nationalist program traces Serb history back to the time when the faithful Serbs defended Christianity at Kosovo in 1389 and were completely defeated by the Turks. The event is still annually celebrated on June 28, as Saint-Veits-Day. The Serbs have long felt entitled to

pursue a nationalist program, and their recourse to force in doing so has created a legacy of violence.

Today the Serbs in Croatia, the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbs in Serbia-Montenegro have an army. They have used this army effectively and they will continue to do so. If their army is defeated, the spirit of defiance will remain unbroken. The consequences are well-known throughout recorded history: assassinations, sabotage, and other terrorist activities.

B. YUGOSLAVIA'S UNRESOLVED NATIONAL QUESTION: 1941 AND 1991

After the First World War the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for the first time in history united all of the Serb population of the Balkans in a single state. In Yugoslavia President Woodrow Wilson's vision of bringing democracy and self-determination to Europe materialized. Slovenes and Croats welcomed this arrangement in which the Serbs were the dominant group as it liberated them from Austria, Germany, Italy and Hungary. It was assumed that Yugoslavia would develop to become a modern European state. During the inter-war period the conflict potential grew between Croatia and Serbia. The violent nationalist Ustasha movement struggled for Croatia's independence, and some autonomy from Serb centralism was gained for Croatia in 1939. Historical analysis shows that the Yugoslav state failed before 1941, in part because it did not resolve the national question.

In 1941 Germany occupied Yugoslavia and allowed the extremists of Croatian nationalism to create an independent Croatia. In this process the Ustasha massacred hundred of thousands of Serbs. The Serb nationalist group of royalist Chetniks, who retaliated, carried out the massacres on the Croat side, poisoning the national question for generations. Survivors and their descendants on each side remember this period of violence, during which Tito and his partisan movement took sides whenever convenient in order to install their power. The Communist partisans finally participated in the Red Army's triumph, liberated Yugoslavia from

occupation, and established communist rule. But Tito's Yugoslavia for the second time failed to solve the national question. The national question became a taboo instead for the sake of Tito's program declaring the 'Brotherhood and Unity' of all Yugoslavs. Tito's heritage, the constitution of 1974, established a federation which Nikola Koljević in 1990 described as one in which "each individual people in Yugoslavia, irrespective of how much it has gained or lost, feels that it has been cheated by others."²⁴⁴

Both times, before 1941 and after 1945, the state of Yugoslavia was created on the basis of a political idea, with little cultural or historical content, and as John Zametica wrote, "imposed from above [and] conceived bureaucratically rather than democratically."²⁴⁵ Both times Yugoslavia disintegrated over the national question. But no single person or single cause is responsible for the outcome in Yugoslavia. The great complexity of the Yugoslav case needs careful explanation. This thesis has suggested that the three factors of ethnic nationalism, economic dislocation, and changes in the international security environment are responsible for the Yugoslav crisis. Ethnic nationalism has been manifest in the competition for territory and political dominance among the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims and others. This ethnic nationalism has centuries-old roots, but came to the fore in the 1980s, owing to the death of Tito in 1980 and the economic setbacks of the 1980s, which led to a search for scapegoats and intensified inter-ethnic mistrust and rivalry.

²⁴⁴ Nikola Koljević cited in: Zametica, John, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, in: *Adelphi Paper no. 270* (London, Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 75.

²⁴⁵ Zametica, John, *Ibid*, p. 75.

C. SERB-CROAT ANTAGONISM THROUGHOUT HISTORY

Different aspects of the problems have been analyzed in the chapters on Yugoslav history, Tito's heritage, and the internal and external aspects of the Yugoslav crisis. Ethnic mistrust and rivalry have had a long history since migrating Slav tribes arrived in the Balkan region in the 4th century A.D. and settled on the fault line between the Western and Eastern Roman Empires. The Serb-Croat antagonism has persisted ever since.

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in large part from Serbia's struggle to dominate what is left of the former Yugoslavia. Slovenia's secession from Yugoslavia was possible because Slovenia was the only Serb-free Yugoslav republic. The Serbs in Bosnia did not want Bosnia to become a sovereign state, because this would divide them from Serbia proper; nor did the Serbs living on Croatian territory in the Krajina intend to live separated from Serbia. Therefore in Croatia Milan Martić proclaimed the 'Serb Republic of the Krajina' and Radovan Karadžić claimed the 'Serb Republic' in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In reaction to the Serb proceedings, Mate Boban announced 'the Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna' for the Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both Serbs and Croats intended to live apart from the Bosnian Muslim population. Bosnia's President Izetbegović has consistently advocated the preservation of a multinational Bosnia as a means to ensure Bosnia's survival. Recognition by the international community has not been able to save Bosnia, and its prospects appear bleak. The problem of Yugoslav succession has to be solved in a regional context.

The core of the Yugoslav crisis is Serbia's drive to dominate the Balkan region. Croatia and Serbia must both be considered in any attempt to change the *status quo*. For a peaceful future both countries have first to determine how they will politically, economically and militarily deal with each other. The international community has to monitor how they implement democratic values, protect minorities inside their territory, and establish relations with their neighbors.

Serbian nationalism and the Croatian reaction have to be kept in mind, beginning with a portrait of the Serb leader Milošević and Serb nationalism:

Milošević's Serbia was at the heart of the complex of issues that destroyed Yugoslavia. Serbs are a naturally talented and ebullient people with an instinctive liking for Americans that is based partly on a shared garrulity and partly on a military alliance spanning both world wars. Their tragic defect is an obsession with their own history; their hearts are in the past, not the future. In the Balkans, intellectuals tend to be the standard-bearers of nationalism; in Serbia, this is carried to fetishistic lengths.

A lugubrious, paranoid, and Serbo-centric view of the past enables the Serbs to blame everyone but themselves for whatever goes wrong. They had a real grievance against Tito, in some measure justified, for creating a postwar Yugoslavia that denied them a role that they believed their large population...and historical mission entitled them. When Tito died, leaving a Yugoslavia too decentralized for any ethnic group to dominate, it became inevitable that a Serbian nationalist would rise up to redress the perceived wrongs dealt his people. It was a tragedy for Serbia, its neighbors, and Europe as a whole that the nationalist turned out to be Slobodan Milošević.²⁴⁶

Croat nationalism is best understood as a reaction based to the Serb efforts to dominate Croatia, and best expressed by the actions of the Croat leader Tudjman.

Unlike Milošević, who is driven by power, Tudjman is obsessed by nationalism. His devotion to Croatia is of the most narrow-minded sort, and he has never shown much understanding of or interest in democratic values. He presided over serious violations of the rights of Serbs, who made up 12 percent of the population of Croatia. They were dismissed from work, required to take loyalty oaths, and subjected to attacks on their homes and property....Tudjman's saving grace, which distinguishes him from Milošević, is that he really wants to be a Western statesman....For better or worse, Croatian nationalism is defined by Tudjman -- intolerant, anti-Serb, and authoritarian. These attributes -- together with an aura of wartime fascism, which Tudjman has done nothing to dispel -- help explain

²⁴⁶ Zimmermann, Warren, "The Last Ambassador, A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia", in: *Foreign Affairs*, (New York, March/April 1995), pp. 3-4.

why many Serbs in Croatia reject Croatian rule and why the core hostility in the former Yugoslavia is still between Serbs and Croats.²⁴⁷

In Spring 1995 30 percent of Croatia is still occupied by the Krajina Serbs and 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory is controlled by Bosnian Serbs. New realities have been created, but Milošević's Serbs are still barred from uniting in a Greater Serbia. Despite economic sanctions Belgrade has not agreed to recognize the sovereignty of Croatia nor a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. Neither Milošević and Serb nationalism nor Tudjman and Croat nationalism have achieved their goals. Croatia will not agree to a permanent loss of the Krajina and of Croatian territory in Eastern Slavonia. The Serb leader Martić and his ally, the leader of the renegade Muslims, Fikret Abdić, are controlling enclaves in Croatia. In their resistance to Croatian sovereignty they ignore both Serbia and the international community. Unless the majority of the Croatian Serbs choose to leave, Croatia will prepare to regain by force, what it can not retrieve by negotiations.

Since summer 1994 Serbia has officially no longer supported the Bosnian Serbs. It seemed that Milošević disagreed with the political concepts of Karadžić. Whether ignoring both Serbia and the international community was Karadžić's policy or only a maneuver remains to be seen. In December 1994 the Serb leader Karadžić, residing in Pale, refused to meet with the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Sarajevo.

Milošević still has to deal with problems for Serbia in Kosovo, where only a few Muslims are willing to live within Serbia forever. He cannot surrender the Serb national symbol to Albanian nationalists, nor can he yield to the Muslims in the Sandzak, another area of tension and potential violence. Finally, the ethnic minority of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina may cause problems as well. John Zametica writes

²⁴⁷ Zimmermann, Warren, *Ibid*, pp. 7-8.

...if Serbia acceded to all the demands from its minorities, it would soon find itself roughly within the borders confirmed by the 1878 Congress of Berlin: over a century of wars and sacrifices would have brought it back to square one. Such an outcome will naturally be resisted by the Serbs.²⁴⁸

The problem can only be solved in a regional context.

As a first step of analysis it should be recognized that both Yugoslavias -- that of 1919 - 1941 and that of 1945 - 1991 -- failed to resolve the national question. Woodrow Wilson's construction of a self-determined "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" never became a modern European state. Tito's post-war communist invention of a Yugoslav state of 'Brotherhood and Unity' was to fall apart in the 1980s.

The obsession of the Serbians with their own history, which means to blame everyone but themselves for whatever goes wrong, allowed the communist bureaucracy to embark on a Serb national course and to seek domination of the former Yugoslavia by force. The pursuit of a Greater Serbia revived the Serb-Croat antagonism, and both nations proclaimed enclaves for members of their nationality. None of these enclave states wanted to settle for minority status in a foreign nation, and at first they were strongly loyal to their mother nation. Croatia and Serbia both established enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The vital problem for Izetbegović's state, once it was carved up despite international recognition, became that the Muslims have nothing to offer either the Croats or the Serbs.

D. THE PHANTOM STATE OF THE BALKANS: BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia-Herzegovina, internationally recognized and a member of both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations, is nevertheless a phantom state.

²⁴⁸ Zametica, John, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, p. 80.

In the past Bosnia-Herzegovina was the outpost of the Ottoman empire. It then marked the only area to which Austria's hegemony (blocked elsewhere in Europe) could expand. During the past two centuries Bosnia has always had protection from outside its borders to prevent it from being crushed by Serb and Croat attempts to establish their nation-states by force. A Serb nationalist in Sarajevo assassinated the heir to the Austrian throne in 1914. Both Serbs and Croats consider all or part of Bosnia as essential to their national identity. This sentiment is strongest among those Serbs and Croats actually living in Bosnia's 'Serb Republic' or in the 'Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna.'

Bosnia's future viability as a multinational entity depends critically on an agreement of the three national components. The Serbs occupying seventy percent of the territory intend to link this area with Serbia. The Croats originally had the parallel intentions for their occupied territory, but due to the one-year-old (and recently renewed) Croat-Muslim agreement their territorial claims are not being pursued at present. The difficult problem for the Bosnian Muslims is to settle for an internal constitutional arrangement based on a territorial division of power. This is for Bosnia's President Izetbegović and the Muslims a most unattractive (if not impossible) proposition, as it would leave them with very little territory and very little influence. A Greater Croatia would include the Serb Krajina and large areas of Bosnia. This could overcome problems that are presented by Croatia's awkward topography and would block Serbian territorial aspirations. As long as Serbian aggression is halted, the present Croat-Muslim agreement serves Muslims and Croats better than any feasible alternative.

E. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S PROBLEM WITH IMPARTIALITY

The limited interest of the superpowers -- and especially the limited interest of the United States -- in the fate of the former Yugoslavia forced European leaders to confront the Yugoslav problem. For several different reasons both the trans-

Atlantic and the European regional organizations failed to resolve the crisis and bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. The institutional settings were too weak to deal with the problem, and reflected the lack of political will of the member governments. The adaptation to the post-Cold War era had just begun. The European Community in 1991 acted immediately: it established the Badinter Commission, and at its Maastricht summit decided to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. In April 1992 the E.C. decided to recognize Bosnia in order to allow international law to become applicable and to intervene in favor of the victim of aggression. In the first six months of the crisis, in 1991, American, British and French diplomacy was fairly pro-Serb, whereas Germany was more susceptible to Slovene and Croat claims. When the United Nations appeared on scene in 1992, mediation and dialogue with all parties became the official rule. In the tradition of United Nations interventions, peacekeepers have to act in a strictly impartial fashion, a rule that is difficult to apply in conflicts of 'ethnic warfare.' Impartiality created problems, as Nicole Gnesotto observed.

Some will therefore suspect that this neutrality is merely a facade that conceals a widely shared pro-Serb sentiment....the decision by the United Nations to create UNPROFOR, shows for example the ambiguity in the positions adopted by Cyrus Vance in adopting the proposals of Milosević rather than those of Tudjman and Izetbegović on the zones in which blue helmets could or could not be deployed. Others...will defend the choice of neutrality as being the only possible and desirable option for the West, whose intentions have always been honorable and good, even if Western countries recognize that, paradoxically, the consequence of their impartiality was often to favor the strong rather than the weak. Indeed, there is no doubt that the deployment of UNPROFOR I troops in Croatia froze Serbian territorial conquests and prevented the return of Croatian refugees...It is also true that the embargo on arms to the former Yugoslavia had the effect of increasing the Serbian forces' military and industrial superiority.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁹ Gnesotto, Nicole, *Lessons of Yugoslavia* (Paris, Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, *Chaillot Paper* 17, March 1994), p. 43.

To these obvious limitations of impartiality must be added those which are based on historical experience. Historically induced political restraints restricted Germany in getting involved with any risk of armed conflict.²⁵⁰ The nations acting together in global or regional security organizations -- the U.N., CSCE/OSCE, E.C./EU, WEU and NATO -- therefore could only partially counterbalance with burden-sharing the challenges raised by the Yugoslav crisis.

All these organizations indicate that some institutional problems were solved as the crisis developed. Because all these organizations rely on individual member states, fundamental disagreements between the members were imported into the organizations. As James B. Steinberg wrote:

Ironically, what many considered the regional organizations' comparative advantage -- proximity to and interest in resolving the conflict -- also proved a serious limitation. Because many states in the region had historical alliances with the parties to the Yugoslav conflict, their impartiality was questioned.²⁵¹

The sympathies of France and to a lesser extent Britain are with the Serbs. Germany and Austria have closer political, historical, and religious ties to Croatia and Slovenia. Steinberg explained that these concerns about partiality were blamed for the limited success of the E.C.-sponsored peace conference. Russia, the dominant member of the CIS and a member of the UN Security Council, has traditionally been sympathetic to the Serbian cause.

Besides the problems of impartiality, there exists an imbalance between France, Britain, Spain and the other European countries in terms of resources and

²⁵⁰ Germany contributed to the UN embargo enforcement forces permanently two frigate-destroyer size ships deployed in the Adriatic, helped with NATO AWACS aircrafts and in other ways.

²⁵¹ Steinberg, James B., "Yugoslavia", in Damrosch, Lori Fisler (Ed.), *Enforcing Restraint, Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, (New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 61.

risks. Germany, no longer hampered by its constitutional constraints has to decide how it will join France, Britain, Spain in sharing the burden of military intervention. Such an imbalance implies political consequences which will influence the development of security organizations in the post-Cold War era.

F. UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY SHIFT FROM THE SERB CAUSE TO THE CROAT-MUSLIM CAUSE

The U.S. involvement began with the CIA's warning the Bush administration in late 1989 that a violent breakup of Yugoslavia was probable. In the beginning of the crisis the U.S. supported the idea of Yugoslavia's unity in order not to set an example for a possible disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Bush administration followed a policy of non-involvement until June 1991 when Secretary of State James Baker informed all six republican leaders in Belgrade that the U.S., if forced to choose between unity and democracy, will always choose democracy. The Yugoslav republics, already on a collision course, decided for secession. Serbia and Croatia proceeded along with their ideas about how to partition "rump-Yugoslavia." Due to domestic pressure and the Europeans inability to end the conflict, the Bush administration in August 1992 shifted its policy towards 'defuse and contain'. The administration also sponsored the Croat-Muslim Agreement in Summer 1992, an accord which broke down when fighting began again in spring 1993.

In March 1994 the agreement was renewed with U.S. backing. The coalition with the Muslims offered support to Croatia, whose forces were unable to fight the Serbs in the Krajina. The agreement also would save Croat territorial gains. Hoping for Croat support, however, the Bosnian army in fall 1994 began the "Bihac" offensive. The fighting was intende to force the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table, but after some initial success in November 1994, the joint efforts of Bosnian and Croatian Serbs directed by General Mladić turned the offensive into a failure. Since then the Serbian rebels have kept a tight siege around this Muslim enclave in northwestern Bosnia, and no continuing regular supply for civilians and the

peacekeepers has been established. In December 1994 former U.S. President Jimmy Carter negotiated a cease-fire, and retired U.S. army generals were sent to Croatia to act as advisers for the Croatian and Bosnian armed forces.

Concerned that the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers along the 1,000- mile-long cease-fire line running through Croatian territory might create a permanent political reality -- like the UN-monitored demarcation line in Cyprus -- Croatia's President Tudjman in early January 1995 announced that he would terminate the mandate of the UNPROFOR in Croatia. Preparing for the end of the cease-fire at the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR, the Croatian and Bosnian Serb rebels in late February 1995 announced a military pact which made public their intentions to defend the Serb-occupied territory wherever an attack by the Muslim-led Bosnian army might occur. On 6 March 1995 Croatia forged a new alliance with Bosnia to counter Serbian rebels in both their countries.

In March the CIA report was "leaked" in some details, and the most comprehensive United States assessment of atrocities in Bosnia held the Serbs responsible for ninety percent of "ethnic cleansing."²⁵² This prepared a decisive shift of the Clinton administration towards the Croat-Muslim cause. On March 13, 1995, U.S. Vice President Al Gore assured Tudjman of "full U.S. support for restoring Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia."²⁵³ However, it remains to be seen whether this shift indicated that the United States is inclined to take an active role as the sole remaining super-power and take steps to end the conflict.

²⁵² Cohen, Roger, "C.I.A. Report on Bosnia Blames Serbs for 90% of the War Crimes" in: *The New York Times* (March 9, 1995), p. A 1.

²⁵³ Crosette, Barbara, "Croatian Leader Agrees to Continuation of U.N. Force," in: *The New York Times* (March 13, 1995) p. A 4.

G. TOWARDS RE-ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The Yugoslav crisis re-established the United Nations as the sole practicable international authority to mobilize military force for hazardous interventions abroad. U.N. legitimation of the use of military force is convenient as well as helpful to overcome domestic political reticence. Experience has also shown that the absence of the lead by the U.S. leadership has undermined prospects for achieving the aims laid down in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

It is not appropriate to blame the United States alone for continuing political hesitation and indecision in the Yugoslav case. Once the Vance-Owen plan deadline for acceptance was ignored by Milošević in May 1993, the Clinton administration intended to force the Serbs back to the negotiation table by implementing a policy labeled "lift and strike." The Clinton plan was based on coalition involvement, and the U.S. administration sought the support of the U.N., E.C. and the CSCE.

Instead, the Europeans followed the French proposal of providing "safe havens," while the U.S. policy turned to supporting U.N. operations as such enforcing the no-fly zone, and delivering relief supplies. Thus in supporting the *status quo* the Serb aggression was rewarded. The most successful U.S. action was the deployment of a reinforced infantry company to monitor the Serbian border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Serb inaction since the arrival of the U.S. forces in Macedonia may be explained by a Serb reluctance to directly confront the U.S. on the ground.

Even the U.S. participation in almost all air strikes executed by NATO has not deterred the Serbian forces as intentionally no major damage has been inflicted. The Serbs have responded by isolating UNPROFOR units, cutting off supply lines, and retaking some earlier handed-in heavy weaponry. The U.N. reaction has been to back down. This reaction has reinforced the Serb belief that the U.N. member states would get involved only as long as the effort was painless.

On July 1, 1994, Senator Robert Dole introduced a defense authorization bill demanding U.S. arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims. In reference to this

attempt to lift the embargo, President Clinton stated "that the arms embargo has unfairly and unintentionally penalized the victim in this conflict."²⁵⁴ The U.S. Congress in August 1994 demanded that the President seek a lifting the embargo by the U.N. On November 15, 1994, the United States unilaterally ceased supporting the arms embargo enforced by the joint NATO/WEU naval blockade. To gain time for a peaceful negotiated settlement, the Bosnian government asked for a period of delay, which will expire in May 1995.

It appears that the United States in spring 1995 is back on the scene, with the Clinton administration returning to the proposed 1992 position of "lift-and-strike" in a changed environment.

On 16 March 1995 President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, Kresimir Zubak, the Bosnian Croat who is President of the Croat-Muslim federation, and Ejup Ganić, its Muslim vice president, to mark the first anniversary of the agreement and to "give new life to a languishing political federation that his Administration says is vital to helping Muslims and Croats stand up to their joint enemy, the Serbs."²⁵⁵ So far the agreement has accomplished virtually nothing beyond getting the Croats and Muslims to stop fighting each other. But there is financial support available:

The United States pledged \$ 30 million in economic aid to the federation while the European Union promised about \$120 million. Including pledges from Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey and other Muslim nations, a new group called Friends of the Federation

²⁵⁴ Doherty, Carrol J., "Senate puts Clinton on zigzag course towards ending Bosnia arms embargo.", *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (Washington, Vol 52, No 32, August 13, 1994), p. 2362.

²⁵⁵ Greenhouse, Steven, "Clinton Meets With Bosnian and Croatian Chiefs" in: *The New York Times* (March 17, 1995), p. A 5.

has pledged more than \$300 million so far to help the Muslim-Croat alliance.²⁵⁶

Political structures are also supposed to develop. Steven Greenhouse wrote:

...leaders of Bosnia's Muslims and Croats vowed to set up joint Muslim-Croat governments at the canton and town level. They also promised to unblock efforts to create an integrated police force in the southwestern city of Mostar and to allow displaced Muslims and Croats to return to their homes in that divided town, which was supposed to be a showcase for integration in Bosnia.

With regard to the military survival of the federation, it is said that

[t]he United States has also promised to provide Bosnia's Muslims and Croats with some military advisers to help them coordinate their armies, a move that American officials say is designed to deter future Serbian aggression.

President Tudjman in March 1995 acknowledged that his demand that the UNPROFOR begin leaving Croatia by April 1995 was a ploy. The accord reached between U.S. Vice President Al Gore and the Croatian president will require two new Security Council resolutions, creating thereby two separate United Nations Forces for Croatia and Bosnia. The Croatian U.N. force will be deployed along the international border to Bosnia and will no longer protect the 1,000-mile cease-fire line running through Croatian territory. This would stop Croatian Serbs from crossing the border into Bosnia and supporting the Bosnian Serbs in fighting the Muslim-led Bosnian government. The American vice president assured Tudjman of "full U.S. support for restoring Croatian sovereignty to all parts of Croatia."²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ Greenhouse, Steven, "Clinton Meets With Bosnian and Croatian Chiefs" in: *The New York Times* (March 17, 1995), p. A 5.

²⁵⁷ Crosette, Barbara, "Croatian Leader Agrees to Continuation of U.N. Force," in: *The New York Times*, (March 13, 1995) p. A 4.

This development has encouraged hope for peaceful change towards a final settlement. As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the Yugoslav crisis re-established the United Nations as the sole practicable international authority to mobilize military force for hazardous interventions abroad. The recognized legal and moral legitimacy of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII could support the United States, which prefers to exert its leadership through the Security Council (rather than through the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, where it is only one among equals).

The United States seizing the diplomatic initiative may encourage the United Nations to move more decisively towards re-establishing international order and preventing the aggressors from being rewarded. The U.S. initiative has presented Milošević with an unexpected *fait accompli* in Croatia. It is for the international community to join the initiative, to work out a solution for the minority status of twelve percent of the population, the "Serbian Croats" presently occupying 30 percent of Croatia's territory. The protection of Serbs against Croat retaliation and the re-settling of Serb-expelled Croats in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia could set a valuable example for the future and thus help to preserve Croatia's recognized international borders. To a larger extent this would be a challenge close to "nation-building", leading to disaster in Somalia but successfully accomplished by the U.N. in Namibia and Cambodia. The United States could test, if wished to do so, the "New Pentagon Strategy [which] Adds Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Missions to Combat Tasks."²⁵⁸ Bradley Graham reported:

The 'National Military Strategy,' made public yesterday [March 8, 1995], says the principal roles of American troops are no longer limited to fighting wars and deterring aggression but include

²⁵⁸ Graham, Bradley, "Responsibilities of U.S. Military Expanded. New Pentagon Strategy Adds Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Missions to Combat Tasks" in *Washington Post* (Washington, March 9, 1995), p. 36.

sustaining peace. The new version marks the first time the document has emphasized peacekeeping.²⁵⁹

Could the mandate for the future UNPROFOR monitoring the Croatian border be complemented by the U.S. policy of "lift-and-strike" ? A military analysis would back the opponents of lift-and-strike, because the mountainous terrain in the Balkans severely limits the effectiveness of air power. Against well dug-in forces it is difficult to acquire targets, and the damage to the forces would probably be negligible. Using air power to perform a critical and decisive role for the outcome of the campaign might be impossible, but there are missions which could be accomplished that might turn the tide of the struggle in favor of the Bosnian forces. Serb movements of concentrated forces could be halted. Supply lines could be cut by destroying bridges and rail lines into the region from Serbia, striking choke points on mountainous roads, and by preventing all aerial movement. These strike actions could be coupled with rearming the Croat military and the Muslim-led Bosnian army. This might not only stop Bosnian-Serb advances but could facilitate the liberation of lost territory.

The United Nations implementation of such a policy, with the United States taking the lead, would involve minimal risks for U.S. forces and might stop the Serbian attempt to dominate the region militarily. The United Nations could live up to its commitment to prevent and never again permit atrocities like those carried out during the Second World War.

Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, March 23rd, 1995, Gerald Axel Möller

²⁵⁹ Graham, Bradley, *"Responsibilities of U.S. Military Expanded. New Pentagon Strategy Adds Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Missions to Combat Tasks"* in *Washington Post* (Washington, March 9, 1995), p. 36.

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Flottenkommando Postfach 1163
D 24956 Gluecksburg, Germany | 1 |
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Flottillenadmiral Lutz Feldt
Opdenhoff Strasse 24
D 26384 Wilhelmshaven, Germany | 1 |
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Rear Admiral Rudolf Lange
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
4645 Reservoir Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007-1998 | 1 |
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11150 Sunrise Valley Drive
Reston, VA. 22091-4394 | 1 |

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1474 Gilbert Street
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Maritime Command Headquarters
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Kelm Strasse
D 24944 Flensburg, Germany

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Elbe Strasse 101
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20. **German Naval Attache** **1**
Kapitaen zur See Lutz-Uwe Gloeckner
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
4645 Reservoir Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007-1998

21. **Zentraler Forschungs- und Studienbereich I** **1**
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51465 Bergisch Gladbach Germany

22. **Bundeswehr Universitaet Muenchen** **1**
Fachbereich Paedagogik
Werner Heisenberg Weg
85577 Neubiberg Germany

23. **German Assistant Naval Attache** **2**
Fregattenkapitaen Karl-Wilhelm Bollow
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
4645 Reservoir Road, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007-1998